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Abstract

This paper analyzes the policy impacts generated by three interconnected
regulations that were authorized in the 2014-2015 period pertinent to Indonesian marine
fisheries governance. In addition, it also develops policy alternatives and investigates
the stakeholders’ attitudes towards these policies.
Employing the mixed-method research approach with the case study research
design, this paper explains the impacts caused by the increased fishing fee tariff on the
national fisheries revenues, the composition of the Nationally Registered Fishing
Vessels (NRFV), and the Fishing Operational Costs (FOC). The latter, the contribution
of the increased fishing fee tariff to the FOC, was derived from an analysis conducted
on 1,108 samples of medium-scale commercial fishing vessels (60-200 GT) based in
the Nizam Zachman Oceanic Fishing Port, the largest industrial-scale fishing base in
Indonesia.
In regard to the revocation of regency/municipality authority and their maritime
jurisdiction, several policy impacts are summarized, encompassing relicensing issues
for the small-scale commercial fishing boats (5-30 GT), job reassignment, and
irrelevancy of related existing law. This paper also conducts an assessment of the
establishment of a Fisheries Management Commission in Indonesia Fisheries
Management Areas (FMC-IFMA), a newly established regional fisheries institution.
The assessment focuses on the legal basis, tasks and functions, and membership
apportionment.

Investigation of the stakeholders’ attitudes also employs a mixed-method
research approach. Collected responses from a survey on 446 respondents of Indonesian
marine fisheries stakeholders are merged with the summary of 19 in-depth interviews.
In addition, the findings garnered from field observation are also included. As a result,
the magnitude and distribution of attitudes from nine types of stakeholders are
portrayed, including supporting arguments.
In conclusion, this paper argues that the authorized policies generate various
impacts and several potential problems. Several findings also emerge from the
investigation of the stakeholders’ attitudes regarding these policies. Finally, this paper
proposes several recommendations. These encompass reinforcement of the legal basis
for FMC-IFMA establishment, including more engagement of non-governmental
stakeholders in the commission, and an amendment of the formula for the Revenue
Sharing Fund (RSF) from the fisheries sector by implementing a proportional
distribution based on exploitation levels and registered fishing fleet size in each IFMA.

Keyword: commercial marine fisheries management, fishing licensing policy, regional
fisheries governance, fisheries co-management
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Indonesian

marine

fisheries

governance

is

undergoing

significant

transformations generated by the authorization of several national policies and
regulations in recent years (2014-2015). Three of those policies/regulations, based on
Indonesia’s law hierarchy, are Law Number 23 of 2014, Government Regulation
Number 75 of 2015, and Presidential Regulation Number 2 of 2015.
Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning Local Government expands the authority
of provincial governments in managing fisheries, from 4-12 nautical miles (nm) to 0-12
nm, while at the same time this law revokes the authority of the regency and municipal
governments within 0-4 nm (GOI 2014). Meanwhile, Government Regulation Number
75 of 2015 significantly increases the fishing fees imposed on Nationally Registered
Fishing Vessels (NRFV) operating in the 12-200 nm zone (GOI 2015). Lastly,
Presidential Regulation no 2 of 2015 mandates the further implementation of fisheries
co-management by encouraging stakeholder engagement in the decision-making
process.
Undoubtedly the authorization of these three regulations generates both direct
and indirect problems. First, Law 23 of 2014 shifts Indonesia’s policy of decentralized
fisheries management in the opposite direction. Referring to Sen and Nielsen (1996),
fisheries decentralization is defined as an action to move some responsibilities to the
lower level of government. Hypothetically, this alteration will evoke dissatisfaction
from the affected regions-- the municipalities and the regencies. In addition, this law
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also has the potential to make some provisions of other related statutes irrelevant, for
instance, Law Number 33 of 2004 concerning Fiscal Balance.
Second, theoretically, the increased fishing fees directly affect fishing vessels’
operational costs, particularly the Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV).
Indirectly it will also have an impact on the livelihood of the crews working on those
vessels. A policy simulation on the Industrial scale of Hawaiian Longline fishery
demonstrates that doubling the rate of auction fee, as another form of fishing fee, will
significantly (18-21%) decrease the owner and crew incomes. (Chakravorty and
Nemoto, 2000)
Not surprisingly, this regulation has evoked strong resistance from fishermen
and fishing company associations (Mongabay 2016; Tribun News 2016). Furthermore,
this regulation contradicts, arguably, the efforts to increase production from the
domestic fleet after the expulsion of (ex) foreign fishing vessels.
Third, the establishment of a Fisheries Management Commission (FMC) in each
Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (IFMA) as the final outcome of the policy
mandated by the Presidential Regulation will, hypothetically, alter the governance of
commercial marine fisheries in Indonesia. This paper argues that the formation of FMCIFMA can be considered as an attempt to implement federalism in Indonesian marine
fisheries management. Sharing, not dividing, the authority and responsibility between
the central and provincial governments is a relatively new experience for Indonesia.
Prior to further discussion, it is crucial to have some understanding regarding
the term ‘Federalism’ discussed in this paper. Here, federalism is not defined as the
commonly used and known definition; as a mode or type of a state/nation’s political
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system (Law 2013). As discussed in this paper, federalism refers to the sharing of
jurisdictional and management responsibilities between the national and the subnational governments in managing natural resources located in a specific or designated
geographical area (Juda 1993). In the context of Indonesia, the sharing of authority and
responsibility occurs between the central government (the national level) and the
provincial governments (the sub-national level).
As a Unitarian state that does not implement federalism in her political system,
another definition of federalism that is suitable with the Indonesian context is the one
defined by Bauer et al. (2018) as natural resources federalism. It refers to a process of
conferring or granting some responsibilities to the sub-national institution or
administration, to some degree, in governing natural resources. At a glance, this
definition is quite similar with the definition of decentralization proposed by Sen and
Nielsen (1996); an action to move the responsibilities to the lower level of government.
However, it is also necessary to notice that the marine fisheries resources that would be
jointly managed by the central and the provincial governments are initially located in
the national jurisdiction; 12 to 200 nautical miles (nm). This condition has several
similarities with those underlying the establishment of the Regional Fishery
Management Council (RFMC) system in the US (Rogalski 1980). Therefore, the term
federalism is more appropriate than the term decentralization in the following
discussion. Furthermore, it is the main argument of this paper that Indonesia is on the
path to implement federalism in marine fisheries management.
Referring to the potential problems mentioned earlier, several research questions
emerge. First, how do the new policies/regulations affect marine fisheries management
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in Indonesia? Second, what are the other potential impacts from the implementation of
the new policies/regulations? Third, what are the available policy alternatives to cope
with the potential problems? Fourth, will the FMC-IFMA meet the objectives mandated
in the middle-term national development plan (Presidential Regulation) and Ministerial
Strategic Plan? Fifth, to what extent will the commission perform fisheries comanagement? Lastly, what are the stakeholders’ perceptions (attitudes) toward both the
policy impacts and the proposed policy alternatives?
Regarding the research questions, this paper has four objectives. First, it
analyzes the policy impacts generated by the implementation of the new regulations.
Second, it develops policy alternatives related to these policy impacts. Third, it
investigates stakeholder perceptions toward these policy impacts. Lastly, my research
also proposes some policy recommendations generated from the results of policy
analysis and investigation of stakeholders’ perceptions.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
II.1. Fisheries Management and Fisheries Governance
As publicly owned resources, the management policies for fisheries resources
have been developing dynamically covering a broad range of ecology, economics,
socio-cultural, and political aspects. Yet, some failures still occur in spite of the
significant improvements that have been made in fisheries policy and management. The
reasons contributing to these failures are attributed to the failures in enforcing the
management measures and institutional deficiencies (Macinko and Bromley 2002, Okey
2003, Bromley 2009, Dell’Apa et al. 2012).
The evolution of marine fisheries management has led to the adoption of limited
entry regimes, encouragement of fisheries co-management, and some efforts focused on
implementing the Ecosystem Approach to Fishery Management (EAFM) (Ginter and
Rettig 1978, Pinkerton 1989, Schreiber 2001, Jentoft 2005, Zabel et al. 2003).
Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2009) summarized fisheries governance as a more
complex and broader concept than fisheries management mostly dealing with the
technical issues. While fisheries management employs a set of tools for solving concrete
tasks with clearly defined goals and measurable outcomes, fisheries governance
addresses interconnected and complex biological, economic and social issues having,
sometimes, contradictory goals. In addition, governance is not exclusively exercised by
the government, but it is a collective effort involving broader stakeholders that carry out
not only vertical but also horizontal coordination.
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II.2. Fishing Fees as a Type of Limited Entry Regime in Marine Fisheries
Management
A fishing fee or marine resource rent charge can be simply defined as a charge
imposed on resource users for the privilege given to them in utilizing the public resource
(Gylfason and Weitzman 2003, Bromley 2009). Charging the fee for fishing is an
assertion and confirmation of public ownership as it would return the share of the
harvested fish value to the public as the owner of the resources (Macinko and Bromley
2002). In addition, Matthiasson (2001) argued that the fishing fee represents equity and
justice as it works as another form of social contract between the industry as the resource
users and the government as the representative of a publicly-owned resource.
Weitzman (2002) argued that a price-based instrument like a fishing fee is more
efficient than a quantity-based instrument such as an Individual Transferable Quota
(ITQ), especially for multi-species marine fisheries (Gylfason and Weitzman 2003).
Two primary topics commonly discussed in the implementation of fishing fees
are the payment or charging mechanism and the mechanism for distributing the
collected fund or state revenues. Regarding the charging mechanism, the Resource
Depletion Charge (RDC) or Landing Fee is argued as the better market-based instrument
for handling fisheries management issues related to equity or fairness (Gylfason and
Weitzman 2003). Under this mechanism, the amount of charge imposed on the industry
is set based on the percentages of raw wet fish catch value that is to be paid after the
catch is landed.
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II.3. Fishing Fee as a portion of the Operational Costs of Commercial Fishery
Operational costs of commercial fishing are commonly classified into two types;
the fixed costs (vessels and gear maintenance, mooring, and depreciation) which are
commonly borne by the owner, and the variable costs; expenses incurred during the
fishing trips (fuel, bait, ice etc.). The variable costs commonly are shared between the
owner and the crews (Chakravorty and Nemoto, 2000). In addition, Fyson (1985)
categorized the operating costs into 11 items; ranging from crew costs (salary/wages)
and fuel consumption to the income tax. In this categorization scheme, the landing fee
and license fee with unloading costs and watchman’s wages are classified as the harbor
costs. Regarding the operational costs, Matthıá sson (2001) argued that a vessel owner
will continue to run his business as long as the variable costs and the loan costs
(including the interest rate of the invested capital) can be covered by revenues from the
landed catch.
Most fisheries economics literature addressing the economic performance of
specific fishing operations focus on the contribution of fuel consumption to fishing
operations. Drawing from that literature, particularly in the developed countries, it can
be concluded that crews' salary/wages and fuel consumption are the primary
contributors to commercial fishing expenses. Crews’ salary/wage contributes up to 40%
of the annual operating/fishing costs (Fyson 1985, Daures et al. 2013), followed by fuel
costs representing approximately 20% of the annual total fishing costs (Daures et al.
2013).
Increased world fuel price significantly escalates the contribution of fuel costs
toward the total fishing costs. The contribution of fuel costs to the total fishing costs of
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the European Union (EU) fishing fleets rose from 17% in 2002 to 29% in 2008 (Cheilari
et al. 2013). Meanwhile, Abernethy et al. (2010) demonstrated that the increased fuel
price escalates the portion of fuel costs toward the gross expenditures per trip of the UK
trawl fishery from 20-35% in 2007 into 45-60% in 2008. In addition, compared to their
income, the ratio of fuel costs ranged between 19% and 34% of the average income of
the UK offshore fishing fleet (Curtis and Anderson 2012).
Taxes as a percentage of the total revenue from a fishing trip (the total price of
the landed catch) or the Landing Fees are part of the Variable Costs that are shared by
the owner and crews. Therefore, supporting the classical fishery bioeconomic model
(Gordon 1953, Gordon 1954, Schaefer 1957), an increased landing fee will affect both
the owner's and the crews’ income. A policy simulation on the industrial scale Hawaiian
Longline fishery demonstrated that doubling the rate of auction fee will significantly
reduce the owner and crew incomes between 18% and 21% (Chakravorty and Nemoto,
2000).
In contrast, the contribution of any other type of fishing fee to the operational
costs and size relative to vessels' revenues in developing countries is relatively small.
The fishing taxes consisting of vessel registration fee and annual tax of Vietnam's
offshore longline fishery operating in the South China Sea were only about 0.8% of the
average annual vessel gross revenue (Flaaten and Anh 2008).

II.4. Distributing the National Revenues from the Natural Resource Rent
Several studies addressing the distribution of national revenues derived from
natural resources rent favored a proportional distribution based on the derivation basis
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(Alisjahbana 2005, Agustina et al. 2012). This means that the producer regions shall
receive a larger amount of funds from the collected national revenues than the other
regions located further from the location of the resources. The derivation basis is
developed based on the assumption that producer regions suffer from the negative
externalities generated by the natural resource’s extraction. Unfortunately, most of these
studies in Indonesia discuss revenue distribution from other types of natural resources
such as mining and forestry (Alisjahbana 2005, Agustina et al. 2012). These studies
rarely analyze the formula for intergovernmental distribution of resource rent from the
fishery sector.
From the beginning of decentralization in Indonesia back in 1999, the Revenue
Sharing Fund (RSF) derived from the royalty of the natural resources extraction has
always been a sensitive issue, particularly from the oil and mining sector. The disparities
of the RSF tend to ignite disappointment from the subnational governments
(Brodjonegoro and Asanuma 2000, Alm et al. 2001, Alisjahbana 2005, Agustina et al.
2012).
Gylfason (2001) argued that the national revenues collected from natural
resource extraction should be invested back into the education sector, particularly for
the producer regions. In addition, Brodjonegoro and Asanuma (2000) argued that
decentralization in Indonesia should have been implemented and limited at the
provincial level, not on the municipal/regency level. The argument was made based on
the institutional capacity and the availability of human resources.
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II.5. Fisheries Co-Management
Full-government intervention in managing the fisheries as a publicly-owned
resource, either through direct or indirect regulations fails to cope with the complexity
of fisheries problems. Eventually, the failure is attributed to the legitimacy of the
enacted regulations. Two of four factors affecting the legitimacy of the regulatory
scheme are the level of the user involvement in the decision-making process and in the
implementation or the enforcement of the regulations (Jentoft 1989). These factors lead
to the emergence of what is commonly known as fisheries co-management involving
the resource users' participation in the decision-making process.
Fisheries co-management can be understood as a sharing of power and
responsibility between the government and the users (fishermen or fishing industry) in
managing the (fisheries) resources (Sen and Nielsen 1996, Schreiber 2001, and Carlsson
and Berkes 2005). However, the definition encompasses a much wider or broader
spectrum of the collaborative decision-making process (Pinkerton 1989, Sen and
Nielsen 1996).
Types of collaborative management classified as fisheries co-management range
from a local agreement in a fishing village or community (Pinkerton 1989) to the sharing
of authority and responsibility involving intergovernmental agencies at the national
level such as the US Regional Fishery Management Council system (Sen and Nielsen
1996, Burroughs 2011). Furthermore, Carlsson and Berkes (2005) expanded the
definition of fisheries co-management beyond a limited yet formalized power-sharing
arrangement, envisioning a continuous logical approach to governance and to solve
resource management problems through partnership.
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As an effort to simplify assessment of arrangement types, Sen and Nielsen
(1996) classify fisheries co-management into five types (typology); the Instructive
(Type A), the Consultative (Type B), the Cooperative (Type C), the Advisory (Type D)
and the Informative (Type E). This classification is made based upon the role taken by
the government and the users. An arrangement dominated by the government role
represents the instructive type of co-management, while the informative type represents
the most opposite mechanism (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Spectrum of co-management arrangements)
Source: Sen and Nielsen (1996), adapted from Mc Cay 1993 and Berkes 1994

In summarizing the wide spectrum of possible collaborative management
arrangements, Sen and Nielsen (1996) also differentiate the arrangement based on the
role of the government and the user groups in the decision-making process, types of
management tasks, and the stage of the management process. Referring to the type of
management task, the decentralization (moving the responsibilities to the lower level of
government) can be considered as another type of co-management. Furthermore,
Carlsson and Berkes (2005) also describe co-management as a means of linking
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different types of organizations. In this case, various types of organizations coming from
the different levels are working together in a designated area or addressing a specific
resource.

II.6. Federalism as marine fisheries co-management
Muawanah et al. (2017) argued that five main pillars of fishery management
shall be enforced in order to promote a successful fisheries reform in Indonesia. One of
these pillars is the reinforcement of regional governance in each Indonesia Fisheries
Management Area (IFMA). Responding to the encouragement of stakeholders’
participation in managing Indonesian marine fisheries resources in the 12-200 nm zone
as mandated by Presidential Regulation and MMAF’s National Strategic Plan (MMAFRI 2015), the Directorate General of Capture Fisheries (DGCF) as an agency under the
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) that is responsible for marine
fisheries governance in Indonesia, established the Indonesia Fisheries Management
Commissions (FMCs) in each IFMA. Referring to the Directorate General’s Decree,
each FMC consisting of stakeholders’ representatives from the constituent provinces
and other institutions will be assigned to implement and evaluate marine fisheries
management in their respective or assigned FMA (DGCF 2017).
In the context of natural resource governance, federalism is defined as a concept
of sharing jurisdictional and management responsibilities between the national and the
subnational governments in managing natural resources located in a specific or a
designated geographical area (Juda 1993). In addition, Bauer et al. (2018) defined
natural resources federalism as a process of conferring or granting some responsibilities
to the sub national institution or administration, to some degree, in governing the natural
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resources. Drawing from these two definitions, my research argues that the
establishment of FMC-IFMA signifies the implementation of marine fisheries
federalism (Juda 1993, Oakey 2003), and to some extent represents fisheries comanagement (Sen and Nielsen 1996).
Pinkerton (1989) summarized favorable conditions for developing comanagement regimes. Some of the conditions that are relevant to this study encompass
the opportunity for the negotiation process, the existence of a long-term legally
formalized arrangement, the availability of external support from other stakeholders
(university, non-government scientists, and credible organization), the fishermen’s
direct involvement, and the availability of experienced bureaucrats. Other related
conditions encompass the size of managed areas, the size of the relevant population of
fishermen, and the size of the relevant government bureaucracy
Hanna (1996) proposed three main outcomes for evaluating co-management
arrangements; sustainability, efficiency, and equity. The last one consists of four
elements; representation, process clarity, homogenous expectation, and distributive
effect.
Stakeholders’ representation has always been the focus in assessing a fisheries
co-management regime (Pinkerton 1989, Ostrom 1990, Hanna 1996, Schreiber 2001).
Regarding the membership apportionment of the Regional Fishery Management
Councils (RFMC) in the US, for example, several studies (Okey 2003, Eagle et al. 2003,
Dell’Apa et al. 2012) proposed to reshape the existing institutional structure of the
councils, particularly by diversifying the composition of the voting members. The
arguments underlying the request for more balance and broader stakeholder
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representation are attributed to the concerns over domination by specific stakeholders
in the decision-making process (Dell’Apa et al. 2012) and to the failure in bringing
diverse viewpoints into council discussions and decision-making (Eagle et al. 2003).

II.7. Stakeholders’ Attitudes
Marine fisheries stakeholders can be defined as those who have interests in and
are impacted by the enactment of policies pertinent to fisheries management and the
marine environment. While the term is thus quite broad, encompassing various ‘actors’
from society, the fishermen and their representative organizations are considered as the
principal fisheries stakeholders. The other stakeholders encompass fishing
communities, fishing-related industries such as fish processors and fish traders,
management agencies, Non-Profit Organizations or Civil Society organizations such as
environmental NGOs, and other citizens (Mackinson et al. 2011).
Attitude can simply be defined as the extent of disfavor or favor toward an object
or an issue. It has a broad range and contains a belief component (Fishbein and Ajzen
in Perry et al. 2017). Measuring stakeholders’ attitudes is the most common type of
study in investigating human dimensions of natural resource management (Manfredo,
Teel, and Bright 2004 in Manfredo 2008). Studies about attitudes provides the most
understandable way of explaining a group of stakeholders’ thoughts on a specific issue.
Another reason underlying the popularity of attitude studies is their ability to provide
useful information in predicting and influencing human behavior (Manfredo 2008).
Restricted item, or closed-ended item, is the most common survey method used
in quantitative research, and mostly employs rating scale known as a Likert-scale
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varying between 5 and 7 points for measuring the level of agreement of the respondents
(Privitera 2017). Pérez-Sánchez and Muir (2003) and Pont et al. (2016) are few
examples of study employing close-ended questionnaires for assessing fishermen’s
attitudes on issues related to their livelihood. In addition, Pont et al. (2016)
demonstrated a significant positive correlation between fishermen attitude and their
perception toward a specific issue. On the contrary, Knapp (1997) demonstrated the
assessment of fishermen’s attitudes using open-ended, or short comments collected
from the respondents. In other words, attitude can also be studied using a qualitative
approach.
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by Sabatier (1988) is
built based on the assumption that the various stakeholders discussing substantive issues
pertinent to a specific geographical area (Policy Subsystem) will create an advocacy
coalition based on shared policy beliefs at the level of coordination (Weible 2005).
Furthermore, this coalition will promote their beliefs into public policies (Sabatier
1988). According to the ACF theory, stakeholders having similar beliefs will be easier
to coordinate and to share information than those having different beliefs. Since belief
is inherited in attitude, therefore investigation of the stakeholders’ attitudes is expected
to predict the coalition and the level of future coordination among Indonesia’s marine
fisheries stakeholders engaged in FMC.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

III.1. Research Design
The study consists of three stages of research activities. First, it analyzes the
direct policy impacts resulting from the authorization of three new policies/regulations.
Second, it investigates the stakeholders’ attitudes regarding the direct policy impacts
and the proposed policy alternatives. Finally, it proposes some policy recommendations
for the newly enacted policies/regulations. In presenting the results, the study follows
the standard (i.e., non-manuscript) format for dissertations at the University of Rhode
Island.
The study applies the mixed-method research approach using the case study
research design/strategy (Robson 2000, Creswell 2014). The analysis of the policy
impacts and the proposed policy alternatives is conducted based upon the detailed
information derived from the literatures review, field observation, surveys, and
interviews.
The second stage of the research activities, the investigation of the stakeholders’
attitudes, also employs a mixed-method research approach using a survey research
strategy and the Convergence Parallel research design that merges the results of the
quantitative and qualitative analyses (Creswell 2014). Qualitative analysis derived from
the combination of the literature review, field observation, and interviews (the
qualitative approach) supports the quantitative results from the questionnaires (the
quantitative approach) analysis. Lastly, the results from each stage will be used to
develop policy recommendations.
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III.2. Location and Time of the Study
The study was carried out in Jakarta, Indonesia over six months, from June to
November 2018. It was concentrated in two specific locations; the Headquarters of the
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) in Central Jakarta, and the Nizam
Zachman Oceanic-class Fishing Port (NZOFP) in North Jakarta (Appendix I). Data
collection conducted in HQ-MMAF was concentrated in two different places; the Mina
Bahari Building II and the One-Stop Service Center (OSSC) located at the first floor of
Mina Bahari Building IV.
Mina Bahari Building II is the headquarters of Directorate General of Capture
Fisheries (DGCF), an agency (echelon I) under MMAF responsible for marine fisheries
governance in Indonesia. Meanwhile the OSSC is the venue specifically designed by
MMAF to provide various services to the industry covering a broad range from
aquaculture services to the certification of exported aquaculture/fisheries products.
NZOFP, famously known as Muara Baru Fishing Port, is the largest fishing port
in Indonesia covering 110 Ha area, including 40 Ha of Port Basin. NZOFP is the fishing
base of 1,484 vessels, where 76% of those are larger than 30 GT or Nationally
Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV). Total landed catch in 2016 was 92,472 ton or
around 253 tons per day. This volume has declined 23% compared to the total landed
catch in 2014 of 119,603 tons (PPSNZJ 2017).
Fishing vessels based in NZOFP in 2016 were dominated by Bouke Ami (StickHeld Dip Net) vessels making up 37% of total vessels. These were followed by purse
seine, tuna longline, oceanic drift gillnet, and squid jigging respectively (PPSNZJ 2017).
Their fishing grounds cover six different Indonesia Fisheries Management Areas
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(IFMAs); IFMA 572 (Indonesia Exclusive Economic Zone/IEEZ of Indian OceanWestern part of Sumatra), IFMA 573 (IEEZ of Indian Ocean-Southern part of Java),
IFMA 711 (IEEZ of South China Sea), IFMA 712 (Java Sea), IFMA 714 (Banda Sea),
and IFMA 718 (Arafura Sea). Therefore, arguably, the study has already covered nearly
half of the total IFMAs.
In addition to the two primary locations, the study also took place in several
locations nearby Jakarta such as Bogor, particularly for attending the national
conventions and seminars related to the subject matter of this research.

III.3. Data Collection
III.3.1. Types of Data
Data collected for this study are classified into two types; the Primary Data and
the Secondary Data. The first refers to data collected directly by the researcher from the
subjects of study. This comprises data collected from field observation, respondent
questionnaires, short-interviews, in-depth interviews, and other information garnered
from informal discussions. Secondary Data, in contrast, is defined as any data retrieved
from the official sources, either publicly published or unpublished ones. Following the
guidelines from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval form, the use of
unpublished data for the purpose of this study has been approved by the in-charge
officials.
For the purposes of this study, Secondary Data is differentiated into two types;
final secondary data and raw secondary data. The first refers to secondary data that can
be used directly to support the policy analysis. Meanwhile, the raw secondary data
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requires further data processing and analysis prior being used to support the study. The
following diagram summarizes the data classification used in this study.

Figure 2. Types of Data Collection

III.3.2. Primary Data
Field Observation
Data collected during the field observation encompasses any findings and
information from the field (locations of study) that can be used to analyze the policy
impacts and to investigate the stakeholders’ attitudes. For example, the field observation
in NZOFP that was focused on the impact of increased fishing fee and the possibility
for implementing the landing fee mechanism.
As the largest and the most modernized industrial-scale fishing port in
Indonesia, NZOFP has always been the benchmark for its counterparts. Therefore, it is
common that any new policy or regulation will be tested here before being enforced in
other fishing ports. Similarly, any negative impacts experienced by NZOFP’s fishing
fleet hypothetically also occur in other fishing ports’ fleets.
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Field observation was also employed to analyze the future of the Fisheries
Management Commission in Indonesia Fisheries Management Areas (FMC-IFMA).
Findings and information gathered during the conventions and other meetings related to
the establishment of FMC-IFMA support the analysis of this newly established regional
fisheries governance institution.

Survey
In investigating stakeholders’ attitudes towards the policy impacts and the
proposed policy alternatives, a small-scale survey applying a Non-Probability Sampling
Approach (Robson 2000) was conducted. The survey employed a close-ended
questionnaire in Bahasa Indonesian (Appendix 2) to the targeted respondents (Section
III.5).
Each questionnaire consisted of 10 close-ended questions divided into three
sections. Each section discusses different policy impacts and policy alternatives
analyzed by this study. The number of questions in each section was unequal and varied
between three and four questions. For instance, Section (I) questioning the respondent’s
attitude regarding the increased fishing fee consists of three questions. Meanwhile,
Section (III) assessing the respondent’s attitude regarding the establishment of the
FMC-IFMA comprises four questions.
Each question has five possible answers as referred to in the Likert-Scale
Response Anchor set by Vagias (2006). The value of each answered question ranges
from the extremely negative (score = 1) to the extremely positive attitude (score = 5).
In addition to the attitude questions, the questionnaire also collects respondents’
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demographic information. These include the name of the represented institution (nine
options), age, gender, ethnicity, and educational level. Except for the first one, the name
of represented institution that defines the type of stakeholder, the other demographic
questions are optional to afford the respondents confidentiality.

Short-Interview
The study only distributed one-single type of questionnaire. Therefore, the
academicians with the highest educational level and the fishing vessel skippers, who
generally had the lowest educational level, had to answer the same set of questions. To
assist the skippers in completing the questionnaires and to increase the accuracy of the
collected responses, a short-interview was included during the face to face survey of the
skippers in NZOFP.
The comments collected from the skippers also function in reinforcing their
previous answers. Like many other Indonesians, particularly when facing government
officials, the skippers tend to give the non-straightforward answers, or to respond very
cautiously. It often happens that the first answers given are not their real opinion.
Therefore, similar to Knapp (1997), collecting the skippers’ comments in addition to
the questionnaire responses is very helpful in investigating their attitudes.

In-depth Interview
In-depth interviews were conducted with key informants selected for their
expertise in the discussed issues. These key informants covered a broad range of
stakeholders, from bureaucrats representing the central government (MMAF) to the
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head of commercial fishing associations representing the industry. The study conducted
19 in-depth interviews (Appendix 4). Unfortunately, the study failed to interview a few
of the initially targeted key informants.
In addition to the investigation of the stakeholders’ attitudes, in-depth interviews
were also conducted to garner any other information related to the analysis of the policy
impacts. For instance, interviews with the boat caretaker and some fishing vessel owners
were conducted to obtain information related to fishing operational costs.

Informal Discussion
Informal discussions took place in between the formal meetings and on other
occasions where the researcher garnered other information related to the study. This
included discussions during coffee breaks, smoking sessions, or the moment while
waiting for Friday’s prayer. Although ethical consideration related to privacy and
confidentiality have been explained previously, many of the potential respondents,
particularly those representing governments, were reluctant to respond to the questions.
In contrast, valuable information was garnered during the relaxing informal discussions
where the respondents have more liberty in conveying their opinions.

III.3.3. Secondary Data
Final Secondary Data
Final Secondary Data requires no or little refinement prior to be used in the
policy analysis. This includes legal documents containing laws and other types of
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government regulations, the statistic of annual marine fisheries production, the number
of Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV), and other related data.

Raw Secondary Data
Raw Secondary Data requires additional data processing in order to be employed
in the policy analysis. The study uses two types of raw data; the Quarterly Fishing
Report (QFR) and the Landing Report (LR). QFR is an obligatory report that must be
submitted by the Fishing Permit (FP) holders to the Directorate General of Capture
Fisheries (DGCF). This report is one of the requirements to extend the Fishing Permit
(FP). In addition to the basic information regarding the fishing vessel and her designated
fishing grounds, the report also comprises the total catch, catch composition, catch
value, fishing days, and the amount of fuel expenditure. This study uses the 2017
reviewed QFR retrieved from DGCF’s database.
Landing Report (LR) contains catch data from every vessel landing/unloading
in NZOFP. The data are collected daily by the enumerators working in NZOFP.
Information collected in LR is nearly similar to those submitted in QFR. Additional
information provided by the LR includes the main engine dimension, fishing days, and
number of crew. This study used the 2018 LR. Both QFR and LR were used to
reconstruct the average fishing operational costs as the baseline in analyzing the impact
of the increased fishing fee.
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III.4. Sampling Design and Strategy
The study combines Quota Sampling Methods and the Convenience Sampling
Method (Robson 2000). The quota sampling method classifies the respondents into
several categories or groups. Subsequently, a specific sampling quota is set for each
group of respondents (Robson 2000). The amount of quota in nine categories of
stakeholders is determined based on the combination of several factors; population size,
their representativeness in the FMC-IFMA, and researcher personal judgment and
experience.
Convenience sampling methods were applied to sample the fishing vessel
owners or the fishing companies’ representatives, and the fishing vessel crew/skippers.
This sampling method randomly selects the nearest and the most convenient
respondents (Robson 2000). In addition to two sampling designs and as an effort to
increase the respondent participation, this study applied three sampling mechanisms;
Conventional Survey, Online Survey (e-questionnaires), and Guided face-to-face survey

Conventional Survey
This survey distributed the paper questionnaires to the targeted respondents who
are expected to complete it voluntarily. The conventional survey took place in three
different locations; in the HQ of DGCF, in the One-Stop Service Centre (OSSC) of
MMAF, and in the national meetings or conventions attended by representatives from
the fishing port, provincial fisheries agency, and regency/municipality fisheries agency.
The last sampling mechanism is similar to the one conducted by Gray and Campbell
(2008).
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The targeted respondents of the conventional survey in the HQ of DGCF were
the experienced staffs or officials having job descriptions pertinent with the investigated
policy issues. Meanwhile, in the OSSC, the questionnaires were distributed to the
nearest and the most convenient fishing vessels owners or company’s representatives
extending their Fishing Permit (FP). The conventional survey was the major contributor
for this study with 261 answered questionnaires, or 59% of the total collected
questionnaires.

Online Survey
The Online Survey distributed the link of previously prepared paperless
questionnaire by email and to WhatsApp Groups (WAGs). E-mailed questionnaires
were sent to the previously contacted respondents who were willing to participate in the
survey. Meanwhile, the link of the online questionnaire was distributed to several
WAGs specially created for discussing fisheries management’s issues or consisting of
Indonesia marine fisheries stakeholders as the groups’ members. Two examples of
WAGs receiving the link of the online survey were the WAG of Indonesia EAFM and
WAG of alumni of Faculty of Fisheries and Marine Science – Bogor Agricultural
University.
In addition, the link of the online survey was also published in the researcher’s
social media account, Facebook. The online questionnaire distributed to WAGs was
created using the Survey Gizmo application. In total, there were 70 completed equestionnaires or 16% of the total respondents.
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Guided face-to-face survey
This type of survey initially was applied to assist the fishing vessel skippers in
completing the conventional or paper questionnaires. The skippers’ educational level
gave rise to a concern for accuracy that provided the underlying reason for employing
this procedure. The face-to-face survey was assisted by ten enumerators previously
briefed and trained by the researcher. The briefing encompassed the purpose of study,
the strategy to deliver the questions in a short and simple yet understandable way, and
the way to measure respondents’ attitudes based on their short comments, intonation,
and gestures.
The enumerators are contracted employees hired by NZOFP. Their primary job
is to collect the catch data from every fishing vessel landing in NZOFP. Therefore, the
Guided Face-to-Face Survey was conducted during the landing inspection with the
skippers who were willing to voluntarily participate. In addition to the previously
prepared questionnaires, the enumerators also garnered information concerning fishing
vessel dimension (size of the vessels in GT, type of fishing gear), the location of fishing
grounds, and other related data required for further analysis.
A guided face-to-face survey was also employed in sampling the fishing vessel
owners. This strategy was applied to optimize the limited study time. The survey of the
owners was conducted in the form of short-interviews while reviewing their submitted
Quarterly Fishing Report (QFR). Similar to the one applied to the skippers; additional
questions related to the fishing operation were also conveyed to the owners. This
sampling mechanism collected 115 answered questionnaires, or 26% of the total
collected respondents.
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III.5. The Respondents
The study focused on the industrial-scale marine fisheries in Indonesia that are
geographically located from the baseline of the territorial waters to the outer limit of the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a 12 – 200 nautical mile (nm) zone. The area covers
the designated fishing grounds for commercial fishing vessels that are larger than 30
Gross Tonnage (GT) and are holding the Fishing License (FL) and Fishing Permit (FP)
issued by the MMAF-RI. The latest data show that there are 4,229 Fishing Licenses
(FL) and 3,722 Fishing Permits (FP) issued by MMAF-RI by May 6, 2017 (MMAF
2017).
Following the definition of marine fisheries stakeholders (Mackinson et al.
2011), this study limits and classifies the Indonesian marine fisheries stakeholders into
nine categories/groups. These are: 1) central government officials; 2) heads of central
government-managed fishing ports; 3) provincial fisheries agencies’ officials; 4)
regency/municipality’s fisheries agencies officials; 5) fishing vessel owners and fishing
companies’ representatives; 6) fishing vessel crews or skippers; 7) fishermen
associations; 8) environmental NGOs; and 9) academicians.
The Central Government officials are defined as the civil servants or government
employees working in the HQ of DGCF and having job descriptions related to marine
fisheries management. Total respondents from this type of stakeholders were 84
persons, or 19% of the total respondents.
Essentially, the heads of MMAF-managed fishing port are also central
government officials, yet they are posted outside the HQ. Along with the fishing ports’
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staffs (including the harbor master), they are the DGCF’s employees dealing with daily
activities in the field. In other words, the HQ officials represent or are considered as the
regulation drafters, while their counterparts posted in the fishing ports are the regulation
executors or enforcers. In several occasions, regulations or policy prepared by HQ
personnel are difficult to enforce in the field. This clear differentiation between HQ and
field staff is the reason for separating them into two categories.
In principle, both the officials from the provincial and the regency/municipality
fisheries agencies can be classified as the local governments’ representatives. Their
authority only differs based on the jurisdiction of their respective regions. Although
basically these four types of stakeholder are the representatives of the government’s side
and contribute 52% of the total respondents, this study still differentiates them. The
underlying reason is the hypothetical assumption that each of them will advocate their
own interests, particularly when dealing with authority and responsibility issues.
Most fishing vessel owners in Indonesia assign their employees or hire an
independent middle-man to take care of their fishing licensing process. These
representatives or the middle-man are considered as the vessel owners’ right-hand man
or the spokesman when dealing with the government. Thus, for this study, they are
considered the same type of stakeholders. By nature, the right-hand man or the
spokesman has the same opinion as the owner they represent.
Most of the skippers consider themselves as ordinary workers hired by the vessel
owners. Therefore, they tend to follow any instructions from the owners and have little
or no liberty in voicing their opinions. Nevertheless, this paper still classifies them as a
different group from their employers due to the possibility of dissenting opinion.
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The next group is the commercial fishing associations, the institution organizing
and commonly representing the vessel owners in any discussion forum held by the
government or other institutions like the NGOs. These three types of stakeholders can
be classified as the representatives of the industry. Referring to Weible (2005), these
groups are most likely to form an advocacy group where they closely interact with each
other in opposing the government’s side, particularly on adverse regulations.
Hypothetically, this study argues that these two groups, the government and the
industry, will have opposite attitudes toward the increased fishing fee.
Two other types of stakeholders hypothetically considered as neutral groups are
the

environmental

Non-Government

Organizations

(NGOs)

and

the

academicians/researchers. Stakeholders representing the NGOs consist of any NGO
working on or advocating issues related to marine fisheries management in Indonesia.
This includes both the national and the international NGOs.
This study classifies the researchers working in the MMAF Research Center into
the same group with the academicians who are mostly comprised of faculty members
from various universities having marine fisheries programs of study in Indonesia.
Having slightly different perspectives on marine fisheries management than their
counterparts working in the headquarters and fishing ports is the underlying reason to
separate them, although essentially these researchers are also central government
employees. The following table summarizes the number of respondents representing
each type of stakeholders and the percentage (%) of the total pool of respondents they
represent.
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Table 1. Total Respondents

No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Types of Stakeholders
DGCF-MMAF (Central Govt.)
Fishing Port
Provincial Government
Municipality/Regency Government
Skipper/Crews
Industry (Owners) or Company Representatives
Commercial Fishing Association
NGO

9 Academician/Researcher
Total

∑
Respondents

%

86
87
42
17
79
75
12
20

19.28
19.51
9.42
3.81
17.71
16.82
2.69
4.48

28
446

6.28
100.00

III.6. Data Processing and Data Analysis

Data processing was conducted on two types of data requiring further actions
before being used to support the policy analysis. These are the Quarterly Fishing Report
(QFR) and the Landing Report (LR) for estimating the impact of the increased fishing
fee on the fishing operational costs, and the collected responses from the distributed
questionnaires for investigating the stakeholders’ attitudes.
The first data processing consists of four stages; Data Classification, Data
Verification, Data Reconstruction, and Data Analysis. The investigation of the
stakeholders’ attitudes also consists of four stages; Data Compilation, Descriptive
Statistics Analysis, Result Compilation, and Statistical Test. The following diagram
summarizes the stages in data processing.
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Figure 3. Stages in Data Processing

III.6.1. Estimating the Impact of Increased Fishing Fee on the Fishing Operational
Costs
III.6.1.1. Data Classification
This stage sorted out the retrieved raw secondary data, both the QFR and the
LR, based on the type of fishing gear. The resulting data were grouped into six primary
fishing gears based in the NZOFP. Those are the Big Pelagic Purse Seine, Small Pelagic
Purse Seine, Tuna Long Line, Oceanic Drift Gillnet, Bouke Ami (Stick-Held Dip nets),
and Squid Jigging. The type of targeted species and the mesh-size of the net differentiate
Big Pelagic Purse Seine from the other type, the small pelagic purse seine.
Subsequently, the data was sorted based on the size of the vessel in Gross Tonnage (GT)
to facilitate the next stages.
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III.6.1.2. Data Verification
Essentially, this was the data elimination stage. Incomplete reports having little,
or no information required for the next stage of data processing were deleted. The
required information encompasses the total catch value, the length of fishing days, the
number of fishing trips, number of crew, and the size of the main engine. In addition,
this stage also eliminated inaccurate reports. An example of an inaccurate report is the
incompatibility between the type of fishing gear and their landed catch, for instance, a
squid jigging vessel that landed tuna. Regardless of verification stage conducted on the
submitted reports, some errors related to the inaccuracy of the reports still occur.
This stage also verified the report reliability. The simplest way to do it was by
comparing the total reported landed catch with the length of fishing trip and the size of
the vessels. Data verification was the most time-consuming stage of data processing as
the verification was conducted manually and painstakingly on thousands of data entries.
This stage significantly refined the retrieved data. The following table summarizes the
final number of verified fishing vessel reports.
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Table 2. Verified Fishing Vessels’ report

No.

Types of Fishing
Gear

Big Pelagic Purse
1 Seine
Small Pelagic
2 Purse Seine

2017 QFR
S

M

2018 LR

Total

%

S

M

Total

%

0

82

82

19.81

0

78

78

20.86

16

63

79

19.08

4

26

30

8.02

3 Tuna Longline
Oceanic Drift
4 Gillnet

29

22

51

12.32

19

29

48

12.83

18

40

58

14.01

5

12

17

4.55

5 Bouke Ami

42

24

66

15.94

66

74

140

37.43

4

74

78

18.84

2

59

61

16.31

6 Squid Jigging
Total

414 100.00

374 100.00

*S = Small-scale Fishing Vessel (<60GT)
**M = Medium-scale Fishing Vessel (60-200 GT

III.6.1.3. Data Reconstruction
The first step in data reconstruction was to set the components of fishing
operational costs. Referring to literature review (Fyson 1985, Chakravorty and Nemoto,
2000) and due to the limited data availability, this study classified the fishing operational
costs into six categories; fuel consumption, provision, crew basic wage, crew incentives,
charged fishing fee, and miscellaneous costs. Subsequently, expenditure in each
category was calculated based on the formula retrieved from the literature review.
Several assumptions obtained from field observation and interviews were incorporated
into the formulas.

Fuel Costs
This component comprised the fuel consumption for the main engine and the
auxiliary engine. In addition, lubricant consumption was also incorporated. Estimation
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of the main and the auxiliary engine fuel consumption was calculated based on the
following formula:
C = 0.75 × P(max) × (S/d) × † × 0.001 (Prado and Dremiere 1990)
Where;
C
Cf
P(max)
S
D
t

= Engine’s fuel consumption during a given period of time (Liter)
= Average Coefficient (during traversing = 0.7-0.8, during fishing operation = 0.5-0.8)
= Maximum Power of Engine (Horsepower or HP)
= Special consumption of fuel (grams/HP/hour; 170-200 for diesel)
= Density of fuel (0.84 for diesel)
= Time of engine operation (hours)

Referring to the formula, it is obvious that the information availability regarding
the main engine size (Pmax) and fishing days (t) is crucial. Meanwhile the coefficient
values (Cf and S) used in the formula were determined based on the information
garnered from the interviews with the skippers, chief of the engine room, owners, and
boat caretakers. In addition, the lubricant consumption was set as 1% of total fuel
consumption. Subsequently these results were multiplied by the average price of fuel
(diesel) and lubricants in the relevant year to calculate their nominal value.

Provisions
Provision expenditures covered food and other necessities for the crews during
the fishing operation (Fyson 1985). The average daily expenditure for this component
was set based on the interviews with the boat caretaker supplying these items to the
fishing vessels. For instance, in 2017, the average nominal value of daily provisions for
the crew was Rp. 25,000/day/person. Therefore, total provision costs per trip (PC) was
calculated using the following formula:
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PC = FD x  crew x ADPC
Where;
PC
FD
Crew
ADPC

= Provision Cost
=  Fishing Days
=  of crew in the concerned trip
= Average Daily Provision Cost

Wage
Basic wage for the crews varied depending on the type of fishing gear and their
rank (working experience) on the vessels. Tuna Longline crews have the highest average
basic daily wage at Rp. 65,000/day followed by Oceanic Drift Gillnet crew. In contrast,
a purse seiner commonly applies a profit-sharing system between the owner, skipper
and crew. Therefore, unlike other fishing gears, the purse seiner’s crew receive no basic
wage. The purse seine crews’ income is determined by the net value of the landed catch.
The estimation of the Wage Cost (WC) per trip was calculated based on the following
formula:
WC= Fishing Days FD x  crew x ACDW.
Where;
WC
FD
Crew
ACDW

= Wage Cost
=  Fishing Days
=  of crew in the concerned trip
= Average Crew Daily Wage

Incentives
Aside from the daily wages, the crews also received an incentive as additional
income. The incentive was determined based on the total catch and their achievement
during the fishing operation. For instance, each Squid Jigging crew receives additional
Rp. 6,000/kg for squid caught. For purse seine crews, their additional income came from
individual angling conducted while the vessel was drifting nearby a Fish Aggregating
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Device (FAD). This individual catch will be bought by the owners as soon as the vessel
returns to port. Most of this catch was not officially recorded and was separated from
the total landing of a vessel, therefore it is excluded in the analysis of this study. The
estimation on Crew Incentive Cost per trip (CIC) was calculated based on in the
following formula:
CIC = TLC x IR.
Where;
CIC
= Crews’ Incentive Cost per trip
TLD
= Total Landed Catch (kg)
IR
= Incentive Rate (Rp/kg)

Charged Fishing Fee (CFF)
For the purpose of this study, Charged Fishing Fee (CFF) is defined as a portion
of annual fishing fee included into the fishing operational costs. This component was
calculated based on the assumption that the real nominal value of a fishing fee charged
to a vessel depends on the number of her fishing days in a year ( fishing days/365
days). In other word, the CFF is a function of the vessel’s dimension, fishing days, and
fishing fee rate.
For example, if a purse seiner spends 150 days for one fishing trip, then the CFF
is the result of multiplication of the vessel’s dimension (GT), the number fishing days
in a year (150/365), and the Simplified Annual Fishing Fee Rate (Rp. 1,802,200/GT for
Big Pelagic Purse Seine). Therefore, the estimation on the Fishing Fee Costs was
calculated based on the following formula:
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CFF = GT x ( FD/365) x SAFFR
Where;
CFF
GT
FD
SAFFR

= Charged Fishing Fee (Rp.)
= Fishing Vessel’s dimension (Gross Tonnage or GT)
=  Fishing Days (D
= Simplified Annual Fishing Fee Rate (Rp/GT)

Miscellaneous Costs
Miscellaneous Cost was the final component added into the estimation of the
fishing operational costs. It covered any other unpredictable costs and was set as 5% of
the accumulation of the previous five components. Therefore, the estimated Total
Fishing Operational Costs (TFOC) was calculated based on the following formula.
TFOC = (FC + PC +WC + CIC + CFF) x 105%
Where:
TFOC
FC
PC
WC
CIC
CFF

= Total Fishing Operational Costs
= Fuel Costs
= Provision Costs
= Wage Costs
= Crews’ Incentive Cost
= Charged Fishing Fee

III.6.1.4. Data Analysis
The data analysis of the impact of the increased fishing fee over the fishing
operational costs comprised another three stages. First, it calculated the portion, or the
percentage of Charged Fishing Fee (CFF) from the Total Fishing Operational Costs
(TFOC) for each vessel. The calculation was made based on the simple formula; The
CFF Portion (%) = (CFF/TFOC) x 100%
Second, it conducted the Descriptive Statistics Analysis of the CFF Portion (%)
for each type of fishing gear. Referring to the description of the Descriptive Statistics
Analysis (Walpole 1982, Privitera 2017), this stage calculated single values-summary
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statistics. This encompasses the Mean, Median, Mode, Maximum and Minimum Value,
Variance, Frequency, and the Standard Deviation.
Hypothetically, an increased fishing fee tariff will escalate the portion of CFF in
TFOC. Therefore, the last stage of data analysis calculated the magnitude of the
increased CFF portion by comparing the contribution (percentage) of TFOC before and
after the authorization of Government Regulation No.75 of 2015. Automatically, this
stage also determined the most affected fishing gear due to the authorization of this
policy.
III.6.2. Investigating the stakeholders’ attitudes
III.6.2.1. Data Compilation
In this stage, the completed questionnaires, both the conventional (paper) and
the electronic or the online questionnaires were compiled manually. This stage also
sorted the questionnaires into nine groups of stakeholders. Subsequently, each response
was quantified, with values ranging from the extremely negative (score = 1) to the
extremely positive attitude (score = 5).
This stage also summarized the qualitative data; the short comments from the
skippers and the summaries from the in-depth interviews. As previously mentioned, in
investigating the stakeholders’ attitudes, this study employed the Convergence Parallel
research design (Creswell 2014). Consequently, this qualitative data will be merged
with the quantitative results to form the outcome of the stakeholders' attitudes
investigation.
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III.6.2.2. Descriptive Statistics Analysis
Since the collected data was ordinal data, the Descriptive Statistics Analysis
focused on the median and mode as the measures of central tendency (Jamieson 2004).
Initially, the expected result was 90 values of median and mode (10 questions x 9
stakeholders). However, this study collected 83 values since several of the respondents
were not willing to participate in answering Section II (Revocation of
Municipality/Regency’ authority) and Section III (Establishment of FMC-IFMA).
Most of these incomplete questionnaires were collected from respondents
representing the industry interests (Fishing Vessel Owner and skipper). The primary
reason for unwillingness to participate was the lack of interest in commenting on what
they consider as the government’s internal problem. In addition, many of them were not
completely familiar with the questioned issues.
This stage also created the relative frequency histogram or the percentage
histogram (Walpole 1982) mapping the distribution of the recorded answers (in
percentages), a method similar to that applied by Perez-Sanchez (2003). The purpose of
this action was to facilitate comprehension of the answered question, especially in
measuring the magnitude and the direction of the stakeholders’ attitudes.

III.6.2.3. Results Compilation
In this stage, the results from the Descriptive Statistics Analysis were compiled
and summarized to facilitate the next stage, the statistical test. The compilation included
median and mode values for each question from nine different stakeholder groups, the
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frequency distribution histograms (in percentages) of answered questions, and the
summarized interviews.

III.6.2.4. Statistical Test
The Non-Parametric Statistical test employed to analyze questionnaire
responses was the Kruskal-Wallis test. The Null hypothesis was that the nine groups of
respondents are identical populations having equal medians. Therefore, the KruskalWallis test aims to examine the null hypothesis, whether at least one group of
stakeholders has different population median.
If the Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the null hypothesis, the pairwise test will be
carried out. Essentially the test was conducted on each group of stakeholders, by
comparing head to head the median of their responses on each investigated aspect. The
purpose of this test is to determine which medians differ (LeBlanc 2004). However, this
study focuses on the two groups of stakeholders most affected by the authorized policy.
The Pairwise test aims to see whether these two affected stakeholder groups have a
significant difference in the median of their responses. The analysis was conducted
using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24.
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CHAPTER IV
INDONESIA MARINE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

IV.1. Brief Overview on Indonesia Marine Fisheries
As the 2nd largest world marine capture fisheries producer (FAO 2016), the
fisheries sector has significant biological and socio-economic impacts on Indonesia’s
national economic growth. The total national landing of capture fisheries in 2014 was
over 6 million tons. The number increased by 7% from the previous year and by 27%
from the 2003-2014 period (FAO 2016). Combined with the aquaculture sector, the
fisheries sector contributed 2.3% to the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in
2014. In terms of socio-economics, the fisheries sector contributes by providing jobs or
livelihoods to over 2.7 million fishermen. Most of them work in small-scale fisheries
(Pusdatin-MMAF 2016).
Table 3. World’s Major Capture Fisheries Producers

Source: FAO, 2016
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Indonesia’s marine (capture) fisheries production grew over the years (20112015). Yet, data indicates a declining growth in 2015, from 5.27% annual growth in
2014 to 2.77% in 2015. The available on-line data on Indonesia’s marine fisheries
statistics only classifies the catch landings into six categories; tunas (Thunnus sp),
skipjack (Katsuwonus sp), eastern little tunas (Euthynnus sp), other fish (the small
pelagic fish and demersal fish), shrimp, and other marine species. The group of species
categorized as other fish contributes more than 67% of Indonesia’s marine fisheries
annual production (table 4 and figure 5).
Table 4. Indonesia Marine Fisheries Production (2001-2015)

Source: MMAF-RI, 2017 http://sidatik.kkp.go.id/dynamic_report
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Figure 4. Indonesia Marine Fisheries Production (2011-2015)
Source: MMAF-RI, 2017 http://sidatik.kkp.go.id/dynamic_report
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Figure 5. The Composition of Indonesia Marine Fisheries Production (2011-2015)
Source: MMAF-RI, 2017 http://sidatik.kkp.go.id/dynamic_report

IV.2. Decentralized Marine Fisheries Management
The authority for commercial fisheries management in Indonesia (to define
policy and management of exploration, conservation, and utilization of marine fisheries
resources) is divided between the central (MMAF-RI) and the local governments
(provinces and regencies/municipalities). The MMAF’s authority is limited to waters
beyond 12 nautical miles (12-200 nm) i.e., the Indonesia Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ). The authority over the fisheries within 12 nm was initially divided between the
provincial (4–12 nm) and the regency/municipal governments (0–4 nm), but the
regency/municipal’s authority was revoked by an amendment of Law Number 23 of
2014 expanding the province’s authority, from 0 nm (the baseline) to 12 nm (Satria and
Matsuda 2004; GOI 2004; GOI 2014).
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Sen and Nielsen (1996) differentiated fisheries co-management, based upon the
division of management tasks, into 2 types; decentralization and delegation.
Decentralization can simply be defined as shifting responsibilities to the lower level of
government. In the case of Indonesia’s decentralized marine fisheries management,
prior to 2014, enforcement of fishing licensing for the smaller industrial-scale
commercial fisheries was delegated to the provincial (10-30 GT) and the
regency/municipal (5-10 GT) administrations. Delegation of fisheries management, on
the other hand, can be defined as the transfer of responsibilities from the government to
the user groups.
Decentralizing marine fisheries management was one of the impacts of
implementing the decentralization system in Indonesia, which marks the beginning of
the Reform-era, after the resignation of Indonesia’s military regime led by General
Suharto that ruled Indonesia for 32 years (1966-1998). The decentralization system
revised most of the distribution of authority among the administration levels in
Indonesia (Satria and Matsuda 2004, Siddik 2007).

IV.3. Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (IFMA)
Indonesia’s Fisheries management is divided into 11 areas called Indonesia
Fisheries Management Areas (IFMAs). IFMAs are designated management areas for
capture fisheries, aquaculture, conservation, research and other fisheries development
that encompass the inland waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial seas, the
contiguous zone, and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Republic of Indonesia
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(MMAF 2014a). The inclusion of Indonesia’s EEZ into IFMAs is an assertion of the
country’s sovereign rights, as a coastal/archipelagic state, over its EEZ.
Although essentially designated for general and broader fisheries management,
IFMAs are mostly known and used in managing commercial fishing in Indonesia. The
commercial fishing grounds, for instance, are designated based upon IFMAs.
The division of IFMAs is based on geographical and natural characteristics of
each area and following the international code set by the FAO (MMAF 2014a). In
general, IFMAs can be categorized into two groups of World Fisheries Management
Areas; the 57 areas of the Eastern Indian Ocean and the 71 areas of the Western-Central
Pacific.
The characteristics of each IFMA affect the type of catch landed and the fishing
gear operating in the concerned area. IFMA 718, for instance, encompasses the Arafura
Sea, the Aru Sea, and the Timor Sea, and is part of the Sahul Continental Shelf, which
shapes the eastern part of the Indonesia archipelago. Geographically, it is located
between 6000’ – 10050’ South Latitude (SL) and 127027 – 141010’ East Longitude (EL).
Northward it is bordered by the southern coast of Papua, westward and southwestward
are bordered by the Banda and Timor Seas, and southward and southeastward by the
Gulf of Carpentaria and the Torres Strait (Australia). It covers 650,000 km2, mostly a
shallow sea floor consisting of a vast sand and mud bank with depths ranging from 50
to 80 meters (Tomascik et al. 1997; MMAF 2014a; MMAF 2014b).
The combination of shallow depth and a heavy load of nutrient-rich sediments
flowing from the coastal mangrove forests and rivers along the south coast of Papua
results in the Arafura Sea of IFMA 718 being one of Indonesia’s most productive fishing

45

grounds for small pelagic fish (Indian Mackerel, Mackerel, and Scads), demersal fish
(Barramundi/Giant Sea Perch, Croakers, Red Snapper, Jack Trevallies and Giant
Catfish), and Penaeid shrimps (Tiger Prawn, Banana Prawn/White Shrimp and Red
Shrimp). Prior to the prohibition imposed on January 2, 2015, IFMA 718 had been the
preferred fishing ground for mid-water trawlers and shrimp trawlers. Nowadays, small
pelagic purse seiners, squid jigging, and oceanic drift gillnets dominate IFMA 718.
Annually, IFMA 718 contributes up to 10% of the national fisheries production.
Meanwhile, the neighboring IFMA 714 which encompasses the Gulf of Tolo
and the Banda Sea, is categorized as deep-sea waters with an average depth of 5,400 m.
The Banda Sea is one of the deepest seas in the Indonesia archipelago, and is a wellknown fishing ground for big pelagic species such as tuna and skipjack.
From the brief description above, it can be concluded that the IFMA has some
similarities with the US Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ, now EEZ). Yet, there is no
semi-independent institution such as the US Regional Fishery Management Council
(RFMC), which was established for semi-autonomous management of the fisheries in
each designated management area. The commercial fishery in each IFMA, as mentioned
earlier, is managed separately by the central (MMAF-RI) and the provincial
governments based on the vessels’ size and the geographical jurisdiction.
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Figure 6. Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (IFMA)
Source: MMAF 2014a

Being an archipelagic state, most of Indonesia’s provinces have jurisdiction over
two or three IFMAs (table 5). For instance, the Central Java province has jurisdiction
over IFMA 712 and IFMA 573. Another example is the South East Sulawesi province
becoming the constituent province for three IFMAs; 713, 714 and 715. As there are no
landlocked provinces in Indonesia, every province becomes the member of, at least, one
IFMA. These facts contribute to the membership composition of Fisheries Management
Commission in each IFMA.
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Table 5. The Jurisdiction of Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (IFMA)

Source: MMAF 2014a

IV.4. Indonesia Marine Fisheries Management
License limitation and fishing fees are the two primary management tools
enforced in Indonesia’s industrial-scale marine fisheries. Other management measures
include Total Allowable Catch (TAC), fishing gear restrictions, and fishing area
closures. The number of Fishing Licenses (FL) and Fishing Permits (FP) allocated to
commercial fishing is calculated based upon the TACs of primary fisheries in each
IFMA. TAC is derived from the estimated Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), which
is stipulated by the MMAF-RI through a ministerial decree. In consideration of the
precautionary principle, each TAC has been set at 80% of the MSY (Mous et al. 2005;
GOI 2006; MMAF 2006; MMAF 2011).
Due to its high diversity of marine fish species - more than 120 recorded
commercial fish species (DGCF 2014) - the MSY for each IFMA is grouped into seven
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fisheries; the big pelagic fishery (Tuna, Swordfish, Marlin, Skipjack), the small pelagic
fishery (Indian Mackerel, Mackerel, Trevallies, and Scads), the demersal/ground fish
fishery (Barramundi/Giant Sea Perch, Croakers, Red Snapper, Jack Trevallies and Giant
Catfish), the Shrimp fishery (Tiger Prawn, Banana Prawn/White Shrimp and Red
Shrimp), the Reef fish fishery (Groupers), the Lobster fishery, and the Squid fishery.
The estimated total MSY in 2011 was 6.5 million metric tons (MMAF 2011).
The latest total MSY enacted by the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries’ decree
No.50/KEPMEN-KP/2017 was 12.5 million metric tons (MMAF 2017). The 2017
MSY increased by 2.6 million MT or 26.3% compared to the 2016 MSY with 9.9
million MT (MMAF 2016). The new MSY also adds two groups to the fishery: the crab
fishery and the swimming crab fishery.
Table 6. The dynamic of Indonesia’s MSY

The allocated TAC for each fishery in each IFMA is the benchmark, or point of
reference, for limiting the number of vessels allowed to fish in the concerned area. At
maximum, each vessel is allowed to fish in the fishing grounds of two adjacent IFMAs.
The location of the fishing ground is stated in the Fishing Permit (FP). A purse seiner
based in the North Coast of Java, for example, is mostly permitted to have fishing
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grounds in the adjacent IFMAs of the Java Sea (FMA 712) and the Natuna Sea or the
Indonesia EEZ South China Sea (FMA 711), or the Java Sea (FMA 712) and the
Makassar Straits (IFMA 713). This vessel may also be permitted to fish in further
fishing grounds such as in the Arafura Sea (IFMA 718), or in the Indian Ocean (IFMA
572). However, the fishing gear must not be operated when traversing to the designated
fishing grounds.
The Fishing License (FL/Surat Izin Usaha Penangkapan or SIUP) and the
Fishing Permit (FP/Surat Izin Penangkapan Ikan or SIPI) for the industrial scale fishing
vessels, larger than 30 Gross Tonnage (GT) and fishing beyond 12 nm, are issued by
the MMAF (Satria and Matsuda 2004, GOI 2004; GOI 2014). In 2014, there were 3,483
nationally registered fishing vessels (table 7 and figure 7).
The Fishing License (FL) proclaims fishing allocation (number/type/size of
vessels) of a fishing entity, either a firm or an individual, in designated IFMAs. The
Fishing Permit (FP) conferred on a fishing vessel/boat describes the vessel’s technical
characteristics (vessel and fishing gear dimensions) and it’s designated fishing grounds.
In summary, an individual or a fishing company can only have one Fishing License
(FL), while the number of Fishing Permits (FP) granted to them depends on the number
of fishing vessels that they are operating.
The compliance with technical requirements (fishing gear restriction, minimum
mesh size of the operated net, and fishing gear dimension), the TAC’s availability in the
desired fishing ground (IFMA), and payment of the fishing fees are the primary
considerations in granting the license and the permit. In addition, the industry is also
obliged to submit quarterly production/fishing reports to MMAF. The TAC availability
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and amount of fishing fee imposed on the industry are the limiting factors for accessing
the resources.
Table 7. The Number of Nationally Registered Fishing Vessel (NRFV) in each IFMA
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Figure 7. Number of Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (2011-2014
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2014

IV.5. Indonesia’s Fishing Fees
Indonesia’s fishing fees are classified into two types: The Access Fee
(AF/Pungutan Pengusahaan Perikanan or PP) and the Harvest/Fishing Fee
(HF/Pungutan Hasil Perikanan or PHP). The Access Fee is charged to a fishing entity,
either individuals or firms, and is one of the requirements for obtaining the Fishing
License (FL). The Access Fee is calculated based on input factors used to participate in
fisheries. These comprise the number and the size of the vessels (in Gross Tonnage),
and the type of fishing gear. A mobile or active fishing gear such as a Trawler and a
Purse Seiner pay a higher tariff than the passive and less destructive gears like tuna
longline, bottom-longline, or squid jigging.
Unless there is a change or addition in the input factors, such as an addition of
new fishing vessels or a fishing gear modification of the previously registered fishing
vessels, the Access Fee is a one-time payment imposed on a commercial fishing entity
that must be paid in advance. A fishing company adding a vessel to its fleet, for example,
must pay an additional Access Fee. This obligation also occurs when the concerned
fishing entity modifies, at least, one of its registered vessels.
The Harvest/Fishing Fee (HF/PHP) is charged annually before the Fishing
Permit (FP) is conferred on a fishing vessel for a one-year period. Based on this
mechanism, a fishing company or individual operating 10 purse seiners, for example,
has to pay a one-time payment for the Access Fee (AF) to obtain the Fishing License
(FL), and an annual payment of the Harvest/Fishing Fee (HF/PHP) for each operated
purse seine to obtain the Fishing Permit (FP).
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In summary, the Harvest/Fishing Fee (HF/PHP) represents a charge for the
resource rent, a charge imposed on the industry in exchange for the privilege given to
them to utilize or exploit a public natural resource. Meanwhile, the Access Fee (AF)
works merely as an administrative or registration fee for entering or participating in a
certain fishery. It is similar to the Entrance Fee applied by the US National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS).
The fishing fee (HF/PHP) charged to the industry is determined by the
combination of input and output factors. In Indonesia, these factors consist of 4
components; the Coefficient Factor (Y), the size of the vessel in Gross Tonnage (GT)
unit, the Fishing Vessel’s Productivity (FVP) or the Catchability based on fishing gear
types, and the Basic Fish Price (ex-vessel price/dockside price/landing price). Only the
last component, the Basic Fish Price (BFP) represents the output factor.
Both the Access Fee (AF) and the Harvest/Fishing Fee (HF/PHP) are charged to
the industry as resource users prior to the Fishing License (FL) and the Fishing Permit
(FL) being granted. It means that the privilege to fish is given after the industry fulfills
its obligation to pay the resource rent to the State, through the MMAF-RI as the trustee
of publicly-owned resources (GOI 2015).
The Harvest/Fishing Fee (HF/PHP) is calculated based on the following
formula: Fishing Fee (PHP) = Y (%) x GT x FVP x BFP (GOI 2015). Essentially, the
Coefficient Factor (Y) represents the percentage (the rate) of resource rent that must be
paid by the industry. Table 8 illustrates a fishing fee calculation.
Basically, the Fishing Fee is the sum of the multiplication of the components
mentioned above. The vessel’s size in Gross Tonnage (GT) is multiplied by the Vessel’s
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Productivity (Ton/GT/year) and the Basic Fish Price (BFP). Vessel Productivity is
stipulated by a ministerial decree estimating the annual catch of the concerned vessel. It
comprises the amount and composition of targeted species. Each type of fishing gear
has different productivity level. After the prohibition of trawlers starting from January
9, 2015, purse seines have the highest productivity with 1.5 ton/GT/year. This means
that a 100 GT purse seine is predicted to catch 150 ton of fish annually.
Meanwhile, the Basic Fish Price (BFP) is the lowest average of the ex-vessel
price or dockside price. BFP is stipulated annually by the Ministry of Commerce. Lastly,
this multiplication (Vessel Productivity x BFP) is multiplied by the Coefficient Factor
(CF) of the concerned vessel. The CF depends on the size of the vessel. CF for largescale vessels (>200 GT) is 25% while for small-scale vessels (<60GT) it is 5%.
Meantime, the CF for medium-scale vessels (60-200 GT), which dominate the
Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV), is 10%. Therefore, it can be assumed
that the Coefficient Factor (CF), as the percentage of charged resource rent, is the pivotal
component in calculating the Fishing Fee. Further explanation regarding this statement
will be discussed in Chapter V.2.
Table 8. The simulation of Fishing Fee Calculation
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CHAPTER V
POLICY ANALYSIS ON THE INCREASED FISHING FEE
Hypothetically, increased fishing fees, or any other forms of taxes/levies
imposed on the fishing industry, generate both direct and indirect impacts on
commercial fishing activities. Gylfasson (1992) argued that the fishing fee has a similar
role as a pollution tax in discouraging commercial fishing efforts. Therefore, it is aimed
at promoting conservation of fish stocks. On the other hand, as the amount charged by
a tax/fee/levy correlates positively with the input factors used in resource extraction
(such as vessel size and gear dimension), the fishing fee tends to increase the efficiency
of a fishing operation. The additional burden caused by the fishing fee promotes the use
of smaller vessels using more sophisticated yet compact technology.
In addition, Chakravorty and Nemoto (2000) demonstrated that doubling the rate
of auction fees (another form of fishing fee) in the Industrial Longline fishery of Hawaii
reduced commercial fishing profitability. They argued that this kind of policy affected
boat owner’s incomes the most. As profitability declines, so does fishing effort.
Therefore, similar to Gylfasson’s argument (1992), the fishing fee can potentially
preserve fish stocks while contributing to additional revenues for the State. Essentially,
these two studies support the classic fishery bioeconomic model theory (Gordon 1954,
Schaefer 1957)
Drawing from those previous studies, this paper divides the analysis of policy
impacts generated by increasing fishing fee rates into three sections. First, it analyzes
policy impacts on the national revenues collected from the fishery sector. Second, it
evaluates policy impacts on the number and composition of the Nationally Registered
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Fishing Vessels (NRFV). Lastly, it estimates the impacts of increasing fishing fees on
the fishing operational costs.
Subsequently, the analysis is followed by an investigation of stakeholders’
attitudes towards increasing fishing fee tariffs. The investigation focuses on the level of
agreement (agreeability), the level of acceptability, and the level of support or
resistance.

V.1. Impact on the National Revenues from the Fishery Sector
The fishing fee is classified as a natural resource fee, as are the leasing and
royalty fees collected from the Mining and the Forestry sector. In Indonesia’s tax
system, natural resource fees are categorized as Non-Tax State Income (NTSI) from
natural resource (Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak (PNBP) dari Sumberdaya Alam).
The classification is based on the characteristics of the natural resource fee itself. These
types of levies are imposed on the industry, both corporate and individual entities, as a
compensation for the privilege given to them to extract or utilize public natural
resources controlled by the state.
According to Article 33 (3) of the Constitution Law 1945 (UUD 1945), the
highest administrative law in Indonesia, all the natural resources located within the
national jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia are owned and controlled by the State
and shall be utilized for the greatest prosperity of the people. Therefore, any entity
aiming to utilize the resources shall need to obtain approval from the State (the central
government) and must pay a resource fee as a compensation fee for the privilege given
to them. This is the primary reason for categorizing the resource fee as a Non-Tax State
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Income, and to differentiate it from common taxes such as the annual income tax
imposed on each citizen.
Since 2002, the national revenue collected from the fishing fees has fluctuated
(table 9 and figure 8). The gradual increase was caused by two factors: the addition of
the Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV) to the registration of newly built
fishing vessels; and the adjustment of components used to calculate the fishing fee
amount.
Table 9. National Revenues from the Fisheries Sector (2002-2018)

Year

National Fleet (IDR)

Foreign Fleet (IDR)

Total Revenues
(IDR)

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

150,021,491,558.51
60,766,040,148.37
58,573,212,101.70
74,365,362,857.55
81,787,280,296.00
102,698,968,325.00

44,163,372,355.36
153,371,860,433.63
223,794,750,329.93
197,037,546,170.93
116,361,267,799.79
12,384,976,879.60

194,184,863,913.87
214,137,900,582.00
282,367,962,431.63
271,402,909,028.48
198,148,548,095.79
115,083,945,204.60

2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

77,404,162,800.00
91,743,434,620.00
91,816,661,810.00
183,423,043,800.00
215,489,127,500.00
227,561,090,600.00
214,445,203,505.00
77,476,601,001.00
357,880,000,000.00
491,080,000,000.00

-

77,404,162,800.00
91,743,434,620.00
91,816,661,810.00
183,423,043,800.00
215,489,127,500.00
227,561,090,600.00
214,445,203,505.00
77,476,601,001.00
357,880,000,000.00
491,080,000,000.00

2018*

281,240,000,000.00

-

281,240,000,000.00

*until August 31, 2018

As briefly explained in Chapter IV.5, the amount of the fishing fee charged to a
vessel is the result of a multiplication of four components: the vessel size in Gross
Tonnage (GT), the Vessel Productivity (Ton/GT/year), the Basic Fish Price (in IDR)
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and the Coefficient Factor (in percentage). Prior to 2015, these factors, except for the
Coefficient Factor, were reviewed and adjusted periodically, particularly the Basic Fish
Price (BFP) which was always renewed annually by the Ministry of Trade. This
annually revised BFP contributes to the slight increase of fishing fee rates.
Consequently, this adjustment also slightly raises the national revenues from the fishery
sector.

National Revenues from the Fisheries Sector
(2002-2018)
600,000,000,000.00
500,000,000,000.00
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300,000,000,000.00
200,000,000,000.00
100,000,000,000.00
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*the 2018 data per August 31,
Figure 8. The Dynamic of the National Revenues from the Fisheries Sector (2002-2018)

The national revenues plunged in 2007, 2008, and 2015 (figure 8). These
significant declines were caused by policies authorized in the concerned years. Between
2007 and 2008, Indonesia ended the Bilateral Arrangement with three distant-water
fishing nations; the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), the Kingdom of Thailand, and
the Republic of the Philippines. Previously (2002-2007), Indonesia permitted fishing
vessels from those countries to fish in Indonesia’s Economic Exclusive Zone (IEEZ),
mostly in the eastern part of the country: the FMA 718 (the Arafura Sea). These

58

arrangements were made under the implementation of Article 56 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) promoting the accessibility to the
untapped resources of coastal States, by allowing other States to utilize it under foreign
fishing licensing policies.
During that period, approximately 700 licensed foreign fishing vessels operated
in the IEEZ and contributed significantly to the national revenues from the fisheries
sector. In the 2002-2006 period, the percentage of the foreign fishing vessel revenue
over the total fisheries revenues varied between 23% and 79% (figure 9). Not
surprisingly, the revocation of foreign fishing licenses affected the national revenues
from the fisheries sector significantly, with a 42% decline in 2007 and a 33% decline in
2008.
Composition of the National Revenues from the Fisheries Sector
(2002-2018)
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Figure 9. The Composition of the National Revenues from the Fisheries Sector (2002-2018)

The 2007 and 2008 drops were relatively smaller than the one that occurred in
2015. By the end of 2015, the national revenues had declined by 64%, from IDR 214.44
billion (December 31, 2014) to IDR 77.47 billion (December 31, 2015). However, it is
important to underline that the decline was not caused by the increased fishing fee
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authorized by the 2015 Government Regulation No.75. Although the regulation was
signed on October 7, 2015, it was only effectively enforced 60 days later, in 2016.
Therefore, any vessels extending their permit at the end of 2015 were still charged using
the old tariff.
The 2015 drop was primarily caused by other policies regulating commercial
marine fisheries licensing in Indonesia: the expulsion of (ex) foreign fishing vessels,
and the trawler prohibition in all waters of Indonesia Fisheries Management Areas
(IFMA). On November 3, 2014, a Ministerial Decree No.56/Permen-KP/2014
temporarily halted the fishing licensing process for any vessels built overseas. These
kinds of vessels are categorized as ex-foreign vessels, including domestic vessels
previously re-flagged from other nationalities. This policy was followed by Ministerial
Decree No.2/Permen-KP/2015 prohibiting the operation of any type of trawler in all
Indonesian waters, including the IEEZ, starting from January 9, 2015. To this date, these
two crucial regulations have not been repealed.
The enforcement of these regulations denied all ex-foreign vessels and trawlers
extensions of their Fishing Permits (FP). Consequently, these policies greatly reduced
national revenues. Prior to 2015, ex-foreign vessels and trawlers were the primary
contributors to national revenues due to the high fishing fees imposed on them. Trawlers
operating in the IEEZ of the Arafura Sea were charged with the highest fishing fees.
On the contrary, as predicted, implementation of the new fishing fee tariffs as
authorized by Government Regulation No.75 of 2015 led to a sharp increase in national
revenues the following year. By the end of 2016, national revenues collected from the
fisheries sector had increased by 362%, to IDR 357.88 billion.
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This positive trend continued the following year. By the end of 2017, revenues
reached IDR 491 billion or US$ 3.4 million, the highest record so far. It can be
concluded, not surprisingly, that increasing the fishing fees had a positive impact on
national revenues. Furthermore, this policy successfully liberated Indonesia from its
dependency on foreign fishing vessels and destructive fishing gears as the main source
of national revenues from the fishery sector.

V.2. Impact on Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV)
National revenues from the fisheries sector stem from fishing fees paid by
Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV). These vessels are conferred Fishing
Permits (FP) by the central government, the Directorate General of Capture FisheriesMinistry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (DGCF-MMAF). Referring to the fishery
bioeconomic model (Gordon 1954, Schaefer 1957), it is hypothesized that the number
of NRFV will decrease as the fishing fee tariff escalates.
Chapter IV.5 briefly describes the four factors determining the amount of the
fishing fee charged on a vessel. Out of these four factors, the vessel size and the type of
fishing gear represent the input factors in a fishing operation, while the Basic Fish Price
(BFP), which sets the average floor price of the landed catch, represents the output
factor. The Coefficient Factor determines the percentage of the estimated annual catch
that must be paid to the government in the form of the fishing fee.
Essentially, the 2015 Government Regulation No.75 only altered the Coefficient
Factor’s values, from 1.5% to 5% for small-scale vessels (<60GT), and from 2.5% to
10% for middle-scale vessels (60-200 GT). Meanwhile, for large-scale vessels (>200
GT), the coefficient factor was steeply increased from 2.5% to 25%. Not surprisingly,
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these alterations significantly affected the annual fishing fee tariff per gross tonnage of
the NRFV, with an increase ranging from 233% to 2,785 % and averaging 613%
(Appendix 5).
Given the new Coefficient Factor’s structure, it was easy to predict that smallscale vessels would be less impacted by the fishing fee increase than large-scale ones.
For middle-scale vessels, which dominated the NRFV, the fishing fee increase ranged
from 300% to 1,054%.
Among the six types of dominant fishing gears, the small-scale (<60 GT)
oceanic drift gillnet vessels experienced the lowest increase (233%), while the largest
increases impacted squid jigging vessels, with a 2,785% increase for the large-scale
vessels (>200 GT) and a 1,054% increase for the middle-scale vessels, followed by Tuna
Longline and Stick Held Dip Net with respective increases by 488.03% and 370.51%
(Table 10).
Table 10. Fishing Fee Tariff Escalation (%)
No.

Fishing Gear

Small Scale
(<60 GT)
(%)

Medium Scale
(60-200 GT)
(%)

Large Scale
(>200 GT)
(%)

1

Stick Held Dip Net (Bouke Ami)

292.09

370.51

1,076.27

2

Oceanic Drift Gillnet

233.32

299.99

899.97

3

Squid Jigging

861.54

1,053.85

2,784.62

4

238.45

306.14

915.34

5

Small Pelagic Purse Seiner
Big Pelagic Purse Seine - IEEZ
(Single Vessel)

258.56

299.92

899.80

6

Tuna Longline

390.03

488.03

1,370.08
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Figure 10. Fishing Fee Tariff Escalation (%)

It was hypothesized that, by generating additional costs for fishing operations,
skyrocketing fishing fees would have diminished the demand for Fishing Permit (FP)
extensions and decreased the number of NRFV (Gylfasson, 1992), Once again, this
hypothesis was also based on the classical fishery bioeconomic model (Gordon 1954,
Schaefer 1957).
The number of NRFV did plunge in 2015, by 26.97%, from 4,490 units to 3,279
units, but for the same reasons national revenues did (the expulsion of (ex) foreign
fishing vessels, and the trawler prohibition in IFMA,) not because of the fishing fee
increase authorized by Government Regulation No.75 of 2015, which was only enforced
in 2016.
Interestingly, the number of NRFV bounced back slightly during 2016, returning
to 3,980 units (+21%). Similar to the changes in national revenues, the positive trend
persisted the following year: by the end of 2017, NRFV counted 4,913 units (+23.44%).
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Interestingly, this number is also higher by 9.42% than the number of NRFV at the end
of 2014. This means that despite skyrocketing tariffs, 423 vessels were added to the fleet
(figure 11). Reasons contributing to this ‘anti-theory’ phenomenon will be discussed in
the next section.

The Dynamic of NRFV
(2010-2017)
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Figure 11. The Dynamic of Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV)

The composition of the NRFV is also interesting. Notwithstanding being
submitted to the highest fishing fee raise, squid jigging vessel numbers in the NRFV
segment kept rising and almost doubled during 2016-2017. Other types of fishing gear
also increased in numbers, except for the tuna longline, which has continuously declined
since 2010 (figure 12).
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Figure 12. The Dynamic of 6 dominant NRFV Composition

According to data gathered from the various stakeholders, this phenomenon was
caused by several factors: the re-registration of previously downsized fishing vessels,
the expulsion of (ex) foreign fishing vessels, and a higher selling price of the landed
catch.
For years many of the boat owners took advantage of the shortcomings of the
management division between the MMAF and the local governments. In order to avoid
the MMAF licensing process, with higher fishing fees imposed on the NRFV, vessel
owners downsized their boats, registering them as vessels smaller than 30 GT, which
only needed to apply for a Fishing Permit (FP) from the provincial fisheries agency,
with much lower fishing fees. At the beginning of 2016, DGCF-MMAF started
enforcing the re-measurement of every industrial-scale vessel, particularly those

65

registered with the provincial fisheries agencies, forcing previously downsized vessels
to re-register with the MMAF, turning them from “provincial’ vessels” into NRFV.
Adding to this, the expulsion of (ex) foreign fishing vessels opened ‘new fishing
grounds’ to domestic vessels, particularly in the IEEZ Arafura Sea, the most productive
fishing ground in IFMAs. This situation created an incentive for the industry to expand
their armada. Hundreds of the NRFV, including newly built vessels and transformed
fishing gears, were relocated to the IEEZ Arafura Sea.
Lastly, higher market prices for the landed catch also contributed to the NRFV
increase. The selling price is much higher than the Basic Fish Price (BFP) enacted by
the Ministry of Trade, particularly for exported fish. Squid (Loligo sp) BFP, for
example, is set at IDR 16,000/kg while the market price can reach IDR 80,000/kg. The
lowest average price for skipjack (Katsuwonus sp) in Nizam Zachman Oceanic Fishing
Port (NZOFP) is IDR 18,000/kg, twice the BFP at IDR.8,800/kg. This situation is
acknowledged by fishing vessel owners.
At that time, we were saved by two things; decreasing oil (fuel
*ed) price and increasing fish price.
(Anonymous, Director of a fishing company with 73 registered
fishing vessels)

Regarding the NRFV composition dynamics (figure 12), this paper argues that
it was caused by two reasons: the declining catch of longline tuna, and the characteristics
of the other fishing gears, particularly squid jigging.
Longline tuna catch worldwide had been declining since 2004 (Clarke et al.
2014). In Indonesia’s context, the situation was worsening because of fishing gear
conflicts between tuna longlines and purse seiners. During interviews, neither
representatives from the Indonesia Purse Seine Association (Himpunan Nelayan Purse
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Seine Nusantara/HNPN) nor the Indonesia Tuna Longline Association (Asosiasi Tuna
Indonesia/ASTUIN) denied this situation. However, both agreed that the conflict was
not as bad it was believed to be. They claimed that frictions at sea could be minimized
using ‘Indonesia’s way’, to put a compromise before a confrontation. Some owners from
these two types of gear are relatives or have, to some degree, business agreements. Some
even have both types of gears simultaneously.
There was a time when the conflict escalated, the longliners’
crews burnt the Fish Aggregating Device (FAD) set by the (Big
Pelagic) Purse Seine. It costed the purse seine owner a lot. For
your information, one FAD may cost at least IDR 80 million (
US 6,000).
(Anonymous, a fishing company owner operating Big Pelagic
Purse Seine)

Despite claims from fishing association representatives, skippers and owners
have different opinions. Some of them openly blamed their declining catch on the
existence of Big Pelagic Purse Seine (BPPS) fishing on the same fishing ground in
IFMA 572 (Western Indian Ocean of western Sumatra) and IFMA 573 (Part of Indian
Ocean in Southern Java). Their disappointment can be perceived from the following
excerpts gathered during the short interviews.
It is much more difficult to catch the fish (tuna) now, we (the
long liners *ed) are outcompeted by the purse seiners.
(Anonymous, 36 years old, Javanese, Longline skipper)
Our business (Long Line’s tuna fishing *ed) is dying; harsh
competition with the (big pelagic *ed) purse seiner, long and
complicated bureaucracy for a very limited period of Fishing
Permit (FP/SIPI), increased fishing fee rate, and not to
mention, other expenses generated by the various ‘unofficial
fees’ (bribe, graft *ed)
(Anonymous, 56 years old, Javanese, Longline skipper)
We can’t compete with the (Big Pelagic *ed) Purse Seine
(operating *ed) in (FMA *ed) 572 and 573.
(Anonymous, 39 years old, Indonesian-Chinese, Tuna
Longline owner)
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Actually, the Indonesia Tuna Longliners have access to larger and wider fishing
grounds as they are also permitted to fish in the High Seas (the International Waters).
However, the potential catch is limited by the fishing quota allocation given by the
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), a Regional Fisheries Management
Organization (RFMO) in the Indian Ocean. So is the number of permitted tuna longline
that was limited and was monitored both by DGCF-MMAF and the RFMO. In addition,
distant fishing grounds require extra costs for additional fuel. Despite these factors,
longline skippers are still convinced that the declining catch, both in quantity and size,
is caused by the heavy exploitation of juvenile tuna by the Big Pelagic Purse Seine.
Theoretically, the targeted species for the Big Pelagic Purse Seine (BPPS) is
skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis). However, during the fishing season, juvenile tunas
swimming along with skipjack schools are also caught. In fact, this situation has
motivated the increase in BPPS number, as the landing price of juvenile tuna contributes
considerably to its profitability, making it more a lucrative business than the tuna
longline.
The steady decline of longline tuna, as well as structural boat similarities, lower
investment barriers and high exporting squid prices, prompted many of the NRFV
longline vessels to transform into squid jigging vessels and move their fishing grounds
to the IEEZ Arafura Sea. Being a less active fishing gear, squid jigging consumes less
fuel than tuna longline (Sainsbury 1986). Also, the simpler technique involved in squid
fishing requires less skilled labor and lower wages than tuna crews (Ben-Yami 1976).
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the disappearance of the (ex) foreign fishing
vessels, mostly mid-water trawlers, left an abundant stock of squid and small pelagic
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species in the Arafura IEEZ. Nowadays this fishing ground is occupied by small pelagic
purse seiners relocated from the fully exploited IFMA 712 (the Java Sea), and the –
previously tuna longline – squid jigging vessels. Another excerpt from the short
interviews portrays this situation.
The increased fishing fee may be suitable for the purse seine
fishery as they catch much more than us, but it is very hard for
us (the tuna longline fishery *ed). Perhaps, my boss is the only
remaining owner who still running the fresh tuna business, the
others have transformed their vessels into squid vessels (Squid
Jigging and Cast Net *ed). I’m afraid that soon we will have to
do the same thing.
(Anonymous, 56, Javanese, Elementary School, Longline
skipper)

The analysis above shows that increasing fishing fees does not instantly reduce
the number of operating fishing vessels, especially when the profit gained from a fishing
operation outweighs the additional costs generated by a higher fishing fee. In this case,
the findings support Matthiasson’s (2001) argument that the vessel owner will continue
his fishing business as long as the variable costs and the interests of the invested capital
can be covered by the yielded profit. In addition, it can be concluded that several internal
and external factors generated by other related policies also affect both the total number
and the composition of the registered fishing vessels.

V.3. Impact on Fishing Operation Costs
To estimate the impact of the increased fishing fee tariff on the fishing
operational costs, this paper reconstructs the variable costs of a fishing operation for six
dominant fishing gears. Following the operating cost categories (Fyson 1985) and due
to the limitations of the available data, this paper only incorporates six components into
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the analysis. Those encompass the fuel consumption, provision, crew basic wage, crew
incentives, charged fishing fee, and miscellaneous costs. Subsequently each component
is calculated using the formulas described in Section III.6.1.3.
Not all data related to fishing operation expenditures are available to be
calculated. For instance, this analysis excludes the cost for bait in tuna longline. In
addition, the analysis exclusively focused on the middle-scale fishing vessels (60-200
GT) dominating the Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV).
The number of samples from each type of fishing gear varies greatly. Big Pelagic
Purse Seine (BPPS) has the highest number with 394 (in 2014), 82 (in 2017), and 72 (in
2018) vessels. This was caused primarily by two factors; the average length of fishing
trips, and the requirement from the Regional Fisheries Management Organization
(RFMO). These two factors are the underlying reason for the incompleteness of the
available data, data accuracy, and data reliability.
On average, a BPPS spends 3-4 months per fishing trip, a similar period with
Bouke Ami. This fishing trip period is relatively shorter than the other types of fishing
gear based in Nizam Zachman Oceanic Fishing Port (NZOFP) - Jakarta.
Basically, the Oceanic Gillnet (OGN) and the Squid Jigging (SJ) operating in
the FMA 718 (IEEZ Arafura Sea) also spend a similar amount of time per fishing
operation, or even less with 2-3 months per trip. However, those vessels will only return
to their fishing base in NZOFP Jakarta after spending 8-9 months on the fishing grounds.
During their fishing operations in the Arafura Sea, these vessels are back and
forth to the nearest fishing ports either in Dobo or in Tual (Maluku province), or even
in Merauke (Papua province). There the vessels unload their catch and refill with fuel
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and provisions before returning to the fishing grounds. Later, the landed catch is
transported using a fish carrier vessel operated by the same fishing company or by the
same owner. Consequently, the OGN and SJ only carry home the catch from their last
fishing operation, the last 2-3 months, before returning to NZOFP-Jakarta and ending
their fishing trip. Unfortunately, most of the landed catch records including the fishing
logbook reported in their previous fishing ports are incomplete and unreliable.
Meanwhile, the tuna longliners operating in the FMA 572 and 573 (the IEEZ of
the Indian Ocean) have the longest fishing trips, particularly those permitted to fish on
the high seas (international waters). On average, the longliners spend 5-9 months per
trip before returning to the fishing base. During that period, those vessels may have
anchored in the other ports outside Indonesia for refueling and refilling their provisions,
or even for landing their catch. In addition, the tuna longliners also carry home the catch
from other vessels owned by the same fishing company or owner. Similar to the OGN
and SJ, this situation not only affects the number of available vessels to be sampled but
also the data accuracy and data reliability.
There is yet another reason attributed to the requirement from the RFMO. As
the participating member of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), Indonesia is
obliged to submit an annual report of tuna and tuna-like species caught in the IOTC
convention area. The data is required to determine the amount of catch quota for each
participating member. Accordingly, some enumerators in NZOFP are deployed to
specifically record the landed catch from tuna longline and BPPS operating in FMA 572
and 573. This situation contributes to the number of qualified samples from BPPS; much
higher than the other types of fishing gears based in NZOFP.
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Using the verified data and the formulas described in Chapter III.6.1.3., the
operating costs of six types of fishing gears in three different years (2014, 2017, and
2018) were calculated. The 2014 data is used to estimate the percentage of the charged
fishing fee in a fishing operational cost (FOC) before the authorization of the new
fishing fee tariff. Later the results are compared with the 2017 and the 2018 data
representing the period after the enforcement of the new tariff.
Basically, the portion of the fishing fee component in the fishing operational
costs (FOC) is relatively small (Table 11). The value (in percentages) is insignificant
compared to the largest component; the expenditures for fuel (including the lubricant)
consumption. In 2014, the highest fishing fee contribution in the FOC occurred in BPPS.
Nevertheless, the value ranged only between 1.6% and 4.7%. On average, the charged
fishing fee was only 2.7% of BPPS total variable costs. For comparison, the fuel
consumption expenditure for BPPS at the same year ranged from 46.1% to 66%. On
average, the fuel expenditure contributed 54.9% to the total FOC of BPPS in 2014.
Squid jigging, as the least active fishing gear, had the smallest percentage of
fishing fee component in their FOC in 2014. The value ranged between 0.4% and 0.85%.
On average, the variable cost for the fishing fee was only 0.7% of the total FOC of squid
jigging.
After the authorization of Government Regulation No.75 of 2015 in 2016
dramatically increased the annual fishing fee tariff, the magnitude of the fishing fee
component in the FOC escalated. Similar to the situation in 2014, the highest fishing
fee contribution (in percentage) in the FOC also occurred in BPPS. This time the value
escalated and ranged between 4.7% and 11.4%. On average in 2017, the fishing fee
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component was 8.1% of the FOC of BPPS; escalating 199.1% from the value in 2014
(Table 11).
Squid jigging had the smallest percentage of the fishing fee component in the
FOC of 2014 but underwent the most significant escalation in 2017. It ranked as the
fishing gear with the second highest percentage of fishing fee contribution in the FOC.
The value ranged between 4.15% and 9.15% (Table 11 and Figure 13). On average, the
fishing fee component in the FOC for Squid Jigging was 5.9%; skyrocketing 767.5 %
from the value in 2014 (Table 11 and Figure 14). Meanwhile, the smallest contribution
of the fishing fee expenditure in the FOC of 2017 was experienced by Bouke Ami (StickHeld Dip Net), a fishing gear targeting smaller squid operating mostly in FMA 711
(Natuna Sea) and 712 (Java Sea).
Table 11. Fishing Fee Contribution in Fishing Operational Cost (%)

The increased fishing fee contribution to the FOC for squid jigging was mainly
caused by the significant increase of the annual fishing fee tariff for this gear. As
discussed in Section V.2., squid jigging experienced the largest tariff escalation for the
middle-scale and the large-scale of NRFV with 1,053.85% and 2,784.6% respectively
(Table 10).
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Figure 13. Fishing Fee Contribution in Fishing Operational Cost

While Table 11 summarizes the percentage of the fishing fee component in the
FOC of six primary fishing gears, it also demonstrates the magnitude of their escalation
(in percentage terms). As already mentioned, Squid Jigging experienced the largest
increase in comparison with the value in 2014. It was followed by the tuna longline with
437.3% and 320.2% for 2017 and 2018 respectively (Figure 14).
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Figure 14. The Escalation of Fishing Fee Contribution in Fishing Operational Cost
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Based on the magnitude of the observed increase, one can conclude that squid
jigging is the fishing gear that was most affected as a result of the authorization of the
new annual fishing fee tariff. However, it is crucial to consider the size of FOC spent
by each type of fishing gear.
Using the same analyzed data, Table 12 summarizes the descriptive statistics of
the FOC from three fishing gears; Big Pelagic Purse Seine, Tuna Longline, and Squid
Jigging. Generally, the total variable costs of a fishing operation (FOC) in 2018
escalates nearly 1.5 – 2 times from the values in 2014. Mostly this was caused by fuel
prices that increased by 16.7%. Both in 2014 and in 2018, tuna longliners had the largest
FOC among the NRFV based in the NZOFP, two times greater than Squid Jigging’s
FOC. Therefore, 3.85% of increase in Tuna Longline FOC has a larger impact than
5.73% of increase in Squid Jigging FOC. A similar situation occurs when comparing
the impact based on the magnitude of the percentage escalation. In addition, as
previously mentioned, the analysis, due to the data unavailability, has already excluded
the expenditure for the bait in the tuna longline FOC. Inclusion of bait expenditure will
increase the tuna longline FOC
Summarizing from the analysis above, it can be concluded that the increased
annual fishing fee tariff affects the variable cost of fishing operation (FOC). The relative
increase of the fishing fee in the FOC escalates as high as 767.5% which is experienced
by squid jigging. However, this paper argues that tuna longline becomes the most
affected fishing gear. In the long run, it may also affect the number of tuna long line
vessels in NRFV. In addition, regardless of the significant escalation, the fishing fee
contribution in the FOC is still smaller than the fuel consumption expenditure.
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Therefore, it has much less impact on the fishing operational costs than the increasing
fuel price.
Table 12. Descriptive Statistics of the Fishing Operational Costs (FOC)

2018
Mean
Standard Error
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Count
Confidence Level(95.0%)
2014
Mean
Standard Error
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
Confidence Level(95.0%)
*Note:
BPS
LL
SJ
Mean
Minimum
Maximum
Count

BPS
936,186,268.96
31,609,317.85
279,165,936.37
549,784,340.96
1,633,393,455.82
78.00
62,942,193.10

LL
2,148,150,865.88
245,086,995.55
1,319,833,863.11
645,957,424.06
5,383,783,210.27
29.00
502,037,952.04

SJ
946,741,247.28
45,353,201.41
348,364,550.16
376,531,610.96
2,907,248,479.11
59.00
90,784,296.22

BPS
707,768,226.60
7,607,473.56
151,004,038.60
519,556,083.52
1,724,228,418.38
278,860,681,279.58
394.00
14,956,434.63

LL
1,041,720,003.90
47,439,906.07
217,396,960.54
612,565,159.93
1,419,069,269.20
21,876,120,081.86
21.00
98,957,910.01

SJ
558,436,607.68
28,046,925.07
79,328,683.65
419,204,437.65
657,068,741.82
4,467,492,861.47
8.00
66,320,439.21

= Big Pelagic Purse Seine
= Tuna Longline
= Squid Jigging
= Average Fishing Operational Cost (FOC)
= the smallest amount of FOC
= the largest amount of FOC
= number of samples

V.4. The Stakeholders Attitudes on the Increased Fishing Fee Tariff
The investigation of the stakeholders’ attitudes toward the increased fishing fee
tariff focuses on three aspects; the agreement level, the acceptability level, and the
support or the resistance level. The first question measures to what extent that the
stakeholders can agree with the tariff escalation. Meanwhile, the second question
measures to what extent that the stakeholders can accept the tariff escalation. The last
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one investigates the level of support, or resistance toward the new tariff. The
stakeholders are categorized into nine groups as described in Chapter III.5.
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test for three questions related to the increased
fishing fee tariff reject the Null Hypothesis (Table 13 and Appendix 7). This means that
all the samples are not from an identical population. The test also demonstrates that at
least one group of stakeholders has a different median score for their answers. The
results of the median also indicate the dynamic of the central tendency of the collected
answers (Table 14).
Table 13. The Kruskal-Wallis test for the collected samples related to the increased fishing fee tariff
Q1
Agreement
Level
177.714

Chi-Square
Df
Asymp. Sig.

Q2
Acceptability
Level
161.069

Q3
Support
Level
183.090

8

8

8

0.000

0.000

0.000

Table 14. The Median of the collected samples related to the increased fishing fee tariff
Q1
Q2
Q3
Agreement
Level
Acceptability
Level
Support
Level
Stakeholders
∑ Resp.
Median
∑ Resp.
Median
∑ Resp.
Median
Central Govt.

85

5.0

85

5.0

85

5.0

Fishing Port

87

5.0

86

5.0

87

5.0

Provincial Govt.

42

4.0

42

4.0

42

4.0

Regency Govt.

17

4.0

17

4.0

17

4.0

Crews/Skippers

76

1.0

76

2.0

76

2.0

74

2.0

74

2.0

74

2.0

12

3.0

12

4.0

12

2.5

20
28
441

4.0
4.0
4.0

20
27
439

3.0
4.0
4.0

20
28
441

3.0
4.0
4.0

Industry (Owners)
Commercial Fishing
Association
NGO
Academia/Researchers
Total
Notes:
Likert Score
1
2
3
4
5

Q1
Agreement Level
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree

Q2
Acceptability Level
Unacceptable
Slightly Unacceptable
Neutral
Slightly Acceptable
Acceptable
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Q3
Support Level
Strongly Oppose
Somewhat Oppose
Neutral
Somewhat Favor
Strongly Favor

V.4.1. Level of Agreement
The boxplot (Figure 15) portrays the distribution of answers from 9 groups of
stakeholders for question number 1; the agreement level. Not surprisingly, the
stakeholders representing the industry, the crews/skipper (Group 5) and the owners
(Group 6) have a negative attitude toward the increased fishing fee tariff. Their collected
answers range between 1 and 3 on the 5-point scale of the Likert test. The crews/skippers
have a stronger negative attitude than the owners. The median (bold line in each bar) of
their collected answer (1) is lower than the median from the owners’ answers (2). In
addition, small circles in this boxplot denote the outliers, while the numbers represent
the respondents’ numbers.

*Notes:
Y-axis
X-axis
Number
Bold line in bar

= Likert Scale (1 to 5)
= Types of Respondents
= Outliers (marked by respondent number)
= Median

Figure 15. Boxplot of the Agreement Level for the Increased Fishing Fee Tariff
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The negative attitude is understandable as the increased fishing fee tariff, as
discussed in Chapter V.3., escalates the fishing operational costs (FOC). Like the rest
of the world, most of the Indonesian commercial fisheries also apply the profit-sharing
system between the owner and the skipper. For the purse seine fishery, the profit-sharing
system also includes the crews with various levels of sharing. The owners may have
other income from the other vessels to compensate for their declining profit, but for the
skipper (and the crews), the vessel is their only source of income. In addition, the
samples from group 6 (the industry) also incorporate the responses collected from
company representatives and the independent middle-men (Chapter III.5). Although
they can be regarded as the owners’ right-hand man, these professionals might have
dissenting opinions as they receive less direct impact from the increased tariff.
Therefore, it is unsurprising when the skippers have stronger negative attitude than the
owners regarding the agreement level on the increased tariff.
I strongly disagree with the increased fishing fee; we go fishing
further and longer but the catch is declining and smaller.
Nowadays everything is expensive that raise the operational
costs, it takes ages to get the Fishing Permit (FP/SIPI) but the
landing price (the dock price *ed) remains the same. Since the
fishing fee is incorporated into the operational costs, it is
diminishing our income.
(Anonymous, 50 years old, Javanese, Elementary School,
Purse Seine)

In contrast, the stakeholders from the government representatives (MMAF,
Fishing Port, Provincial, and Regency/Municipality) have a positive attitude. The
median values range between 4 and 5 in the 5-point scale of the Likert test (Table 14).
The reasons supporting their answer are attributed to the national revenues from the
fisheries sector and an awareness of guarding the publicly-owned property.
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One of the prominent arguments for strongly agreeing with the increased tariff
is the time period for the tariff stagnancy. Although the tariff has been increased
gradually to a slight extent, it has small impact on national revenues. Furthermore, the
previous government regulation concerning the fishing fee tariff was enacted 12 years
ago in 2006. It is also argued that it is necessary to consider the national annual inflation
rate for adjusting the fishing fee tariff as the compensation for the privilege conferred
on the industry. In addition, the government representatives, particularly from the
central government (MMAF and the Fishing Port), believe that the industry is still able
to pay the escalated fishing fee tariff.
The median of the samples from the fishing association (Group 7) shows a
neutral attitude. Their collected answers range from 1 to 5. This paper argues that there
are two reasons underlying this result. First, some of the respondents from this group
are professionals, not the vessel owner, hired to run the association. Therefore, they
experience less direct impact from the increased fishing fee tariff. Second, the
association representatives have a better understanding regarding the need for
preserving the resources through the entrance fee escalation. The combination of these
reasons with the negative attitude expressed by representatives of other types of
associations results in varied answers covering the whole length of the Likert-scale.
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Group
1.

Stakeholders
Central Govt

2.
3.

Notes
Scale
1
2
3
4
5

Group
4.

Stakeholders
Regency Govt

Fishing Port

5.

Provincial Govt

6.

Color

Color
Blue
Green
Grey
Purple
Yellow

Group
7.

Stakeholders
Association

Crews/Skippers

8.

NGO

Industry (Owners)

9.

Academia Research

Interpretation
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree

Figure 16. Sample Distribution of Agreement Level on the Increased Fishing Fee Tariff

The other types of stakeholders, the NGOs and Academia also demonstrate a
positive attitude regarding agreement with the increased tariff. The median of the
collected answers both from NGOs and academia range between 3 and 4 (Table 14).
This means that both of them are divided between the neutral and the slightly positive
attitude on their level of agreement regarding the increased tariff. Mostly they believe
that the escalated tariff has a positive impact in preserving the resource, however they
also comprehend the difficulties that may be faced by the industry due to the increasing

81

fishing operational costs. This can be seen from the distribution of their answers (Figure
16).
Figure 16 also demonstrates that the number of strong positive attitudes (score
5) collected from the government representatives decline as they are located further
from the central government. For instance, the percentage of score 5 collected from the
fishing port officials (63.22%) is slightly lower than the samples collected from their
counterparts working in headquarters of the MMAF (69.41%). Subsequently, the
collected answers having score 5 from the regency/municipality’s officials are slightly
lower than their counterparts working for the provincial fisheries agencies. This paper
argues that this result is caused by their familiarity with the national fisheries revenues.
Furthermore, these revenues are collected from the fishing fees payment of the NRFV
that were exclusively managed by the MMAF. As predicted, the strongest disagreement
comes from the skippers.
Essentially the national revenues from the fisheries sector have no direct impact
on the income of the officials working in MMAF’s headquarter. As Non-Tax State
Income from the natural resources’ utilization, the national fisheries revenues will be
distributed in form of the Inter-Governmental Transfer Fund. According to Law number
33 of 2004 concerning Fiscal Balance, the distribution composition is 20% for the
central government (MMAF) and 80% for the local governments (the regency and the
municipality, excluding the provincial government. Subsequently, all the funds received
by the MMAF must be allocated for fisheries resource conservation and development.
However, national fisheries revenue has always been used as one of the indicators for
assessing the MMAF annual performance. Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) as
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Indonesia’s legislative branch has always raised this issue during the annual budgeting
meeting with the Minister. Therefore, the MMAF officials have more concern than other
governmental representatives regarding the increased fishing fee tariff.

V.4.2. Level of Acceptability
Hypothetically, the stakeholders’ attitudes regarding their acceptance level of
the increased fishing fee tariff correlates positively with their level of agreement and
support. Those who strongly disagree with the new escalated tariff, hypothetically will
very reluctant to accept and support it. The results from the collected samples support
this hypothesis.
The median of the collected answers for the agreement level and the
acceptability level are almost identical. The only differences occur in 3 groups of
stakeholders; the crews/skippers, the commercial fishing associations, and the NGOs
(Table 14). Skippers’ strong negative attitude (score 1) in the agreement level is
softening in their level of acceptability (score 2). This means that regardless of their
strong disagreement with the escalated tariff, eventually they can accept it somewhat.
Most likely this result is caused by very limited availability of options for them. The
following excerpt from one of the short interviews portrays their opinion.
Honestly, I disagree with the increased fishing fee and cannot
accept it, but we have no choice. We still have to pay it in order
to get the Fishing Permit, right?
(Anonymous, 38 years old, Javanese, Elementary School,
Longline skipper)
What can we do? What can we say? Do we have a choice?
(Anonymous, Javanese-Chinese, a fishing company owner
operating Squid Jigging and Purse Seine)
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A similar situation exists in the group of vessel owners. Their attitude on the
acceptability level softens. In addition to the limited available options, the less
significant impact generated by the new fishing fee tariff on the fishing operational costs
(FOC) also affects their softened negative attitude. As discussed in Chapter V.3., despite
its significant escalation, the contribution of the fishing fee expenditure to the FOC is
much smaller than fuel expenditures.
Fishing fee is nothing compared to the total operational costs.
(Anonymous, a fishing company owner operating tuna
longline).
We don’t have problem with the increased tariff, our business
is still profitable.
(Anonymous, a fishing company owner operating purse seine)

The group of stakeholders representing the commercial fishing associations also
shifts their attitude towards a more positive score; from the neutral attitude (score 3) to
the slightly positive attitude (score 4). On the contrary, the NGOs demonstrate the
opposite direction; shifting to the neutral attitude (score 3) from a slightly positive one
(score 4). Most likely it was caused by the minimum or no direct impact experienced by
the NGOs regarding the escalated fishing fee tariff. In addition, some of the respondents
from NGOs argued that the new tariff was too high and may negatively affect crews’
livelihood.
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*Notes:
Y-axis
X-axis
Number
Bold line in bar

= Likert Scale (1 to 5)
= Types of Respondents
= Outliers (marked by respondent number)
= Median

Figure 17. Boxplot of the Acceptability Level for the Increased Fishing Fee Tariff

The range of the attitudes on the acceptability level from nine types of
stakeholders (Figure 17) is almost identical to the previous boxplot illustrating their
agreement level (Figure 15). However, the range of attitudes from the fishing ports
officials is notable. The range of their acceptability level is slightly wider than their
level of agreement, with a slight movement toward to the neutral attitude. This paper
argues that it was caused by their workplace location. As the central government
officials (DGCF-MMAF) working in the field and interacting intensively with the
skippers and the owners of NRFV berthing in their ports, these officials have more
concern for and empathy with the industry than their counterparts working in the
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headquarters of MMAF. The distribution of the answers (Figure 18) reinforces this
argument. On the other hand, similar to the agreement level, the skippers are the most
reluctant stakeholders in accepting the new tariff authorization.

Group
1.

Stakeholders
Central Govt

2.
3.

Notes
Scale
1
2
3
4
5

Group
4.

Stakeholders
Regency Govt

Fishing Port

5.

Provincial Govt

6.

Color

Color
Blue
Green
Grey
Purple
Yellow

Group
7.

Stakeholders
Association

Crews/Skippers

8.

NGO

Industry (Owners)

9.

Academia Research

Interpretation
Unacceptable
Slightly Unacceptable
Neutral
Slightly Acceptable
Acceptable

Figure 18. Sample Distribution of Acceptability Level on the Increased Fishing Fee Tariff

V.4.3. Level of Support
The third question investigates the stakeholders’ level of support for or
resistance to the new fishing fee tariff. As predicted, the results are identical with their
level of acceptability. The median of the attitudes for the level of support from each
stakeholder is exactly the same with their median of attitude for the acceptability level
86

except for the commercial fishing associations (Table 14). In this case, the associations
have the neutral attitude (score 3), the same with the median for their agreement level.
These identical values indicate a very strong positive correlation between the
acceptability level and the level of support. Those who can accept the new tariff
authorization, ultimately will support it, and the other way around. For instance, the
skippers and the owners who strongly disagree and having low acceptability on the new
tariff will definitely resist it.

*Notes:
Y-axis
X-axis
Number
Bold line in bar

= Likert Scale (1 to 5)
= Types of Respondents
= Outliers (marked by respondent number)
= Median

Figure 19. Boxplot of the Support Level for the Increased Fishing Fee Tariff

A similar situation also occurs in the range of the stakeholders’ attitudes as
portrayed by the boxplot in figure 19 with high support for increased fishing fee tariff
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indicated by score 5. Here the range of the answers from the skippers and the owners
becomes narrower than the range of their answers on the agreement level and the
acceptability level. This indicates the accumulation of their opinion in a specific scale
of the attitude measurement. Although the skippers and the owners have slightly
dissenting attitudes on the agreement level and acceptability level (Figure 15 and 17),
ultimately, they reach a consensus regarding their level of support, or resistance level,
on the escalated fishing fee tariff.
This paper argues that the identical level of resistance measured by the median
values was also caused by the profit-sharing system mostly applied in Indonesia’s
commercial fisheries. The system means they bear together the escalated fishing fee as
one of the components in fishing operational costs.
Our catch is unpredictable, but the operational costs are already
fixed (permanent). Since the fishing fee is part of the
operational costs, automatically it will affect our income, and
certainly it diminishes our income.
(Anonymous, 34 years old, Javanese, High School, Longline
skipper)
The increased fishing fee hits us hard. The captain’s income is
the most affected one.
(Anonymous, a fishing company owner operating 10 Squid
Jiggings)

In contrast, the governmental stakeholders have an exactly identical range of
attitude for the agreement level and the support level. Only a slight difference occurs
with the fishing ports officials and their acceptability level as previously discussed in
Chapter V.4.2. For the level of support, both representatives from the central
government, the MMAF and the fishing ports officials, have exactly the same range of
answers for the highest positive score (Figure 20). However, most likely due to their
workplace location (placing them closer to the industry), the fishing ports officials also
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have slightly larger samples opposing the new tariff authorization. Meanwhile, both
provincial and regency/municipality representatives have wider neutral attitudes for
their collected answers than their counterparts working for the central government.
Presumably this was caused by less impact on them due to the authorization of the new
tariff, particularly for the provincial government receiving no funds from the distributed
national revenues from the fisheries sector

Group
1.

Stakeholders
Central Govt

2.
3.

Notes
Scale
1
2
3
4
5

Group
4.

Stakeholders
Regency Govt

Fishing Port

5.

Provincial Govt

6.
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Color
Blue
Green
Grey
Purple
Yellow

Group
7.
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Association

Crews/Skippers

8.

NGO

Industry (Owners)

9.

Academia Research

Interpretation
Strongly Oppose
Somewhat Oppose
Neutral
Somewhat Favor
Strongly Favor

Figure 20. Sample Distribution of Support Level on the Increased Fishing Fee Tariff
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The distribution of the answers collected from the industry representatives
should also be noted. From the skippers to the commercial fishing associations, the
frequency of the resistance attitudes (blue and green colors) is slightly declining (Figure
20). In addition to the label as the most affected stakeholders, they (the skippers, owners,
and the commercial fishing associations) have different ways to convey their opinions.
Consequently, this nature affects their level of support, or resistance.
Another factor contributing to this result is the data collection mechanism.
Skippers interviewed in the field mostly by the field enumerators have more liberty in
delivering their opinion than the owners and the association representatives interviewed
during the submission of their quarterly fishing report. However, generally, these three
representatives of the industry have resistance attitudes on the escalated fishing fee
tariff. The composition of the negative attitudes (score 1 and 2) varies between 50% (the
associations) and 62.16% (the skippers). Meanwhile, the NGOs slightly shift their
attitude to the neutral position (score 3). Once again, this paper argues that it was caused
by the minimum direct impact experienced by the NGOs.
The Pairwise test was conducted on two most affected stakeholders, the
crews/skippers (Group 5) and the vessel owners (Group 6). The test aims to compare
whether these two groups of stakeholders have a median that is significantly different
(Chapter III.6.2.4). The result indicates that there is no significant difference in the
median between the skippers and the owners for three investigated aspects of the
increased fishing fee tariff (Appendix 9). Regardless of variance on their distribution
range of answer (the boxplots) and composition of responses (histograms), eventually
the skippers and the owners have the same attitude on the increased fishing fee tariff.
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CHAPTER VI
POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE AUTHORITY REVOCATION
Except for the special affairs that are still exclusively governed by the central
government, Law No.23 of 2014 concerning the Local Governments comprehensively
re-organizes the authority and the jurisdiction of the three administration levels in
Indonesia: the central, the provincial, and the municipality/regency governments. The
law itself consists of 411 articles described in 212 pages, excluding the explanation
section and the tables summarizing the distribution of authority and jurisdiction for each
aspect discussed.
The special matters classified as being an absolute (central) government
prerogative encompass foreign affairs, national defense, national security, the judicial
system, the national monetary and fiscal affairs, and religious affairs. Meanwhile
government affairs distributed between the central and the local governments
(provincial and municipality/regency) are classified as concurrent government affairs.
Furthermore, these affairs are categorized into three types: the basic service mandatory
government affairs, the non-basic services mandatory government affairs, and the
optional government affairs.
Education, Health, and Public Works are examples of the mandatory
government affairs providing basic services. Meanwhile, marine affairs and the fisheries
sector fall into the category of optional government affairs. Other sectors grouped into
this category are tourism, agriculture, forestry, energy and mineral resource, trading,
industry, and transmigration.
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Article 27 of the law specifically designates the authority and the jurisdiction of
the provincial governments pertinent to marine affairs. Hereby, the provinces are
conferred the authority to manage natural resources located within their marine
jurisdiction. The term ‘manage’ includes the authority to explore, exploit, conserve, and
manage marine natural resources in their jurisdiction with the exception of exploration
and exploitation of offshore oil and liquid gas, which are exclusively managed by the
central government (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources). Other authorities
conferred to the provincial governments include administrative arrangement and marine
spatial planning. In addition, provinces are also obliged to participate in preserving the
national maritime security and sovereignty.
Subsequently, article 27 (3) designates the maritime jurisdiction of provincial
governments, measured from the baseline (0 nautical miles) to 12 nautical miles. Thus,
their jurisdictions essentially cover the territorial waters of the Republic of Indonesia.
For overlapping maritime jurisdictions, the law applies a method similar to the one
described by article 15 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), according to which the maritime jurisdiction area is divided equidistantly
between concerned provinces.
The law does not specifically revoke municipality/regency authority and
maritime jurisdiction. However, the designation of the provincial maritime jurisdiction,
as stated in article 27 (3), automatically annuls the jurisdiction stipulated by Law No.32
of 2004, except for what concerns small-scale coastal fisheries, which, as stated by
Article 27 (5), are excluded from the provincial authority to manage marine natural
resources. The small-scale sector is composed of boats under 5 Gross Tonnage (GT)
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that are exempted from the obligation to hold the Fishing Permit (FP/SIPI) for their
fishing operation.
The authority and jurisdiction of the marine affairs and fisheries sector,
distributed over three levels of administrations, consists of 7 sub-sectors. These are the
marine, coastal, and small islands affairs, marine fisheries management, aquaculture,
marine and fisheries monitoring and surveillance, processing and marketing of the fish
products, fish quarantine, seafood quality control and safety, and human resources
development.
It is important to note that the term ‘fisheries’ in Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesia
Language) literally covers both fisheries and aquaculture, while the terms ‘capture
fisheries’ or marine fisheries would be used to refer to what ‘fisheries’ usually means in
academic or international circles. For the purpose of this study, this paper limits the
analysis of the policy impact generated by the revocation of the municipality/regency
authority on the marine fisheries sub-sector, and more specifically on boats (5-30 GT)
operating within the 12 nautical miles.
This chapter consists of three sections. First, it describes problems that emerged
during the implementation of the previous regulation of decentralized management
involving municipality/regency administrations. The second section focuses on the
direct impacts generated by the authorization of Law No.23 of 2014 regarding fisheries
management and fishing licensing procedures for fishing boats (5-30 GT) operating
within 12 nautical miles. The last section analyzes the results of the investigation of the
stakeholders’ attitudes toward the revocation of municipality/regency authority.
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VI.1. Emerging Problems in Fisheries Decentralization
In addition to classical problems of Indonesia’s marine fisheries management,
poor quality of data collection (Yuniarta et al. 2017; Muawanah et al. 2018) and weak
law enforcement (Heazle and Butcher 2007; Resosudarmo et al. 2009), which fostered
Illegal, Unreported, and Undocumented (IUU) fishing activities, this paper argues that
at least four other specific problems plagued the decentralized system: rent-seeking
behavior, horizontal conflict, slow response due to long and complicated bureaucratic
procedures, and economic inefficiency.
First, this paper supports the argument on local governments’ rent-seeking
behavior (Satria and Matsuda 2004). The ‘freedom’ conferred to them after decades of
centralized administration (New Order Regime, 1966-1998 period), prompted the local
governments (municipalities and regencies) to behave in a slightly ‘uncontrolled’ way.
Most of them focused on achieving local economic growth.
One of the common practices was to freely give concessions for the exploitation
of natural resources located within their jurisdiction, including fishing permits. In other
words, the system endorsed the race to increase local income while, unfortunately,
mostly ignoring the carrying capacity and the catch limitations set by the higher-level
administration. At the beginning of local autonomy implementation, it was common to
see regents or mayors disobeying the governors of their provinces. In other words, as
stated by Muawanah et al. (2018), the national and provincial governments lacked
control over the utilization of fisheries resources under municipality/regency
jurisdictions.
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Prior to Law No.23 of 2014, municipalities and regencies had the authority to
confer the Fishing Permit (FP or SIPI) to boats sized between 5 and 10 GT (Table 15).
While larger boats/vessels (10-30 GT and >30 GT) are forbidden to fish in coastal
waters (0-4 nm), there is no fishing zone limitation for the smaller boats. For instance,
a 9 GT purse seiner is allowed to fish beyond the municipality/regency jurisdiction (>4
nautical miles) where it obtained the Fishing Permit. Consequently, as discussed in the
Chapter V.2., many of the boat owners took advantage of this situation by downsizing
their vessels. With a 'smaller' boat size, they did not need to apply for their Fishing
Permit (FP) to the higher administrations (the province or the central government)
wielding the right authority for their boats, and which commonly charged higher tariffs
for fishing permits. Yet, the concerned boat is still permitted to fish on wider fishing
grounds, beyond the 4 nautical miles.
The inaccuracy of collected data regarding the size and the productivity
(catchability) of registered fishing boats led to overfishing and to underestimating
exploitation levels. The calculation of the Catch per Unit Effort (CPUE) required to
estimate Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) is an example of how the practice of
downsizing negatively affected data collection. In the last 3 years (2014-2017), the
MMAF had to revise the national MSY.
In addition, many of these boats also held a Fishing Permit (FP) from
neighboring municipalities/regencies as migrant fishers (nelayan andon). This double
permit system ignited a horizontal conflict among fishermen. For instance, fishing boat
‘A’ originally from Regency ‘R’ also holds the Fishing Permit (FP) from the
Municipality ‘M’ as a migrant fisher. This means that in addition to their local fishing
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ground located in the Regency ‘R’ jurisdiction, the fishing boat ‘A’ also has the privilege
to fish temporarily in the jurisdiction of the Municipality ‘M’. This temporary permit
may last for months and may be conferred by other municipalities/regencies located in
different provinces, far from the original residence of the migrant fishers. Not
surprisingly, this ignited feelings of displeasure of local fishermen residing in the
Municipality ‘M’. This situation frequently led to physically violent disputes among
them, particularly at sea. The situation got even worse when fishing gear conflict was
involved. The simple illustration above briefly describes the Muawanah et al. (2018)
argument on horizontal conflict caused by migrant fishers.
Lack of control from the higher administration and the need to reduce horizontal
conflicts were the underlying reasons to re-arrange the distribution of governmental
authority in fisheries management, resulting in the revocation of municipality/regency
authority and jurisdiction by Law No.23 of 2014.
This paper also argues that the previous system generated two additional
problems: slow responses due to long and complicated bureaucratic procedures, and
economic inefficiency.
Despite the decentralized system dividing the authority based on vessel size and
maritime jurisdiction, this paper argues that Indonesia was conducting a top-down
approach in managing marine fisheries. Through the MMAF-RI, the central government
dominates regulation of management measures in each Fisheries Management Area
(FMA). Those include the enactment of the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) and
the Total Allowable Catch (TAC), the prohibition of specific fishing gears (mid-water
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trawler and Danish seine), the fishing zones designation, and the calculation of fishing
fee tariffs for the Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV).
The MMAF-RI determines the TAC allocation for groups of fish stocks that will
be distributed to the provincial administrations in an intergovernmental annual forum
(Forum Komunikasi Pengelolaan dan Pemanfaatan Sumberdaya Ikan/FKPPS, or the
Communication Forum for Fisheries Resources Management and Utilization).
Subsequently, the provincial governments use the given TAC to set the number of
allocated fishing vessels/boats in their jurisdiction (<12 nm). A similar mechanism
occurs at the regency/municipal level to receive the TAC from their provincial
administration.
The top-down approach asserts the central government’s full authority as the
resource owner. It involves only a few representatives of stakeholders in the decisionmaking process. Feedback mostly occurs through various forms of reports, or through
representatives of the commercial fishing associations in a dissemination forum.
Consequently, some of the regulations and policies produced by this approach are
unsuitable to the dynamic conditions of the concerned regions. This often ignites
displeasure, or even rejection from stakeholders, particularly from the industry.
The complicated bureaucracy of decentralized fisheries management also
decelerated decision-making processes and led to overlooking local conditions. The
generalization of the Basic Fish Price (BFC) or the ex-vessel price as factors entering
the fishing fee calculation is one of the examples of overlooked local characteristics.
Decentralized marine fisheries management also induces economic inefficiency
caused by emerging additional costs, both for the government and the industry. All the
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procedures necessary to extend the Fishing Permit (FP) for Nationally Registered
Fishing Vessels (NRFV), for example, are mostly performed by the DGCF of the
MMAF-RI. They encompass the annual vessel inspection, administrative verification,
and the Fishing Fee calculation. The industry must front the additional costs to travel to
or to operate their representative offices in Jakarta, while the MMAF also has to fund
officials to carry out management functions. As an illustration, the distance between
Bitung-North Sulawesi as the fishing base for tuna longline fishing in Indonesia EEZ
Pacific Ocean (IFMA 717), and the MMAF’s headquarter in Jakarta is approximately
equal to the distance between Denver and Washington D.C.
Recently, some procedures have been delegated to the MMAF’s fishing ports
and to the provincial agencies, and an online service has been employed to minimize
costs, yet the final decision is still exclusively determined by central offices of MMAFRI. This mechanism is time-consuming as well as creating economic inefficiency.

VI.2. Direct Policy Impact
The primary direct policy impact of Law No. 23 of 2014 was the transfer of
authority regarding commercial fishing licensing services to provincial governments.
Having their maritime jurisdiction revoked took away the municipalities’ and regencies’
authority to issue Fishing Permits for boats with sizes ranging between 5 and 10 Gross
Tonnage (GT). This implied that boats previously holding Fishing Permits (FP) issued
by the municipality/regency had to apply or to extend their permit with the provincial
governments after Law No. 23 of 2014 was authorized. According to Law No.45 of
2009 concerning Fisheries, any commercial boat fishing in Indonesian waters must hold
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a Fishing Permit, except for boats smaller than 5 Gross Tons. According to the Indonesia
Fisheries Statistics, fishing boats sized between 5 and 10 GT represent 65.21% (2015)
and 64.34% (2016) of the total registered inboard engine fleet obliged to hold Fishing
Permits (FP). Consequently, on average, the total number of fishing boats managed by
the provinces was doubled since it increased by more than 117% (Table 15).
Table 15. Authority and Jurisdiction Distribution based on the Law No.14 of 2014

* 2013
**2016

The fishing fleet expansion (Table 15) after relicensing had different impacts on
provinces. For some of them, particularly in the eastern part of Indonesia, where
municipalities/regencies managed a small number of boats, the impact was low. For
instance, the province of Papua and West Papua only received 58 and 255 additional
fishing boats, respectively, a small number in comparison with the fishing fleet of boats
sized between 10 and 30 GT (Appendix 8) that they previously managed.
In other provinces, the high number of additional boats potentially posed a
problem as it heavily outnumbered the existing fleet. West Java Provinces, for example,
the most populated province in Indonesia, received 4,913 additional boats with sizes
ranging between 5-10 GT. This number is 77 times higher than the fleet of boats with
sizes ranging between 10 and 30 GT that they previously managed. Another less
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extreme example is the East Kalimantan Province with additional 1,751 boats, or more
than triple their previously managed fishing fleet.
This situation led to the pessimistic scenario conveyed by opponents of the
revocation, which had warned that provinces would be overwhelmed by additional
jurisdiction added to additional tasks, particularly concerning the fishing licensing
services. Interestingly, provincial government officials also expressed this concern.
Definitely the provinces cannot cover the additional authority
over 0-4 mile. Unless there are representatives posted in their
regencies, or branches of offices, the provinces will not be able
to perform well the (fishing *ed) licensing services to the
industry.
(Anonymous A., 44 years old, Buginese, Deputy Director for
Fisheries Management Evaluation, DGCF-MMAF)
Our province has vast areas, we can’t control the entire area.
We need the municipality and regency. They know their local
conditions better
(Anonymous, 45 years old, Banjarnese, East Kalimantan
Province)

The second direct impact of Law No. 23 of 2014, economic inefficiency, was
caused by emerging additional costs for fishing licensing services, both for the industry
and the provinces. A “regency fishing boat” based in Tegal, a primary fishing base for
small-scale industrial fishing boats (5-30 GT) of the North Coast of Java, now must
apply for or extend its Fishing Permit (FP) in Semarang, the capital city of Central Java
Provinces. For Tegal fishermen, this may not cause a significant problem as Semarang
is only 160 km (99 miles) away from their base, but the same situation for a Cilacap
fishermen, another fishing base in Central Java Province located in the South Coast of
Java facing the Indian Ocean and distant 274 km (170 miles) from Semarang (more than
5 hours of driving), would bear higher costs. This short description illustrates the
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diversity of impacts experienced by two different groups of fishermen living in the same
province.
So now they (5-10 GT boat owners *ed) have to go to
Semarang to extend their (fishing *ed) Permit? Hmm, it’s
costly
(Anonymous, 39 years old, Javanese, Purse Seine owner based
in Juwana, Central Java)

Additional costs and time-consuming procedures may have a less significant
impact on fishermen residing in Java than on their compatriots living in other islands.
The primary island in the Indonesian archipelago, Java is the smallest of five big islands
and has better infrastructure to support business. It has a much better transportation
system and internet connections than the others, crucial to speed up the licensing
process.
Unfortunately, provinces located outside Java, particularly in less developed
eastern Indonesia, do not benefit from similar conditions. For instance, the archipelagic
province of Maluku has widespread locations of regencies/municipalities under her
administration. It takes a one-hour flight from Dobo, one of the fishing bases located
nearby the Arafura Sea, to Ambon, the capital of Maluku. To overcome this issue, the
Maluku provincial government plans to establish several representative offices in their
archipelago. Undoubtedly this will escalate management costs a direct impact that will
be similar to the emerging additional cost of fishing licensing services for the Nationally
Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV).
Remember, we’re an archipelagic state with numerous islands
occupying a vast area. The online system has not worked
smoothly. The (regency/municipality authority *ed)
revocation tends to generate higher costs for (licensing *ed)
administration.
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(Anonymous, Chairman, of Indonesia Purse Seine
Association/Himpunan Nelayan Purse Seine Nusantara
(HNPN))

The third direct impact is caused by the task adjustment for municipality/regency
officials.

Theoretically,

by

losing

their

authority

and

jurisdiction,

the

municipality/regency governments are regarded as the stakeholders most negatively
affected. The impact weighs on their daily working activities, particularly those of
officials of the fishing licensing services and other pertinent affairs. They no longer have
the authority to issue or extend fishing permits, or to manage small-scale fishing ports.
Regarding fisheries management, the law limits the municipality/regency authority by
focusing on empowering local-small fishers and management of the local fish landing
sites.
To overcome this situation, most municipality/regency fisheries agencies
restructured their institution and re-assigned their staff to other sections or divisions,
such as aquaculture or empowerment of traditional fish processing. The ‘jobless’ staffs
were rarely transferred to provincial governments because transferring government
employees is a complicated administrative process, not to mention that concerned
employees were not always willing to join the new institution located far away from
their home. On the other side, provincial governments seemed reluctant to accept staff
transfers, and tended to hire new staff to fill the openings in their representative offices.
The Maluku Province is a good example.
Everything is handed over to the province (provincial
government *ed) including the fish landing sites. We have no
activities, no work, and no revenues related to fisheries
management. That’s why we altered our program, expanding
empowerment.
(Anonymous, 40 years old, Palembang Municipality officials,
South Sumatra Province)
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All my friends were transferred to different sections. We no
longer deal with (fishing *ed) licensing and (fishing *ed) port
management. The provincial government will open a new
office here with their own people (staff *ed).
(Anonymous, 35 years old, Central Maluku Regency officials,
Maluku Province)

The last direct impact concerns the irrelevance of a few existing marine fisheries
management regulations, particularly concerning the fishing fee implementation.
According to Law Number 33 of 2004 concerning Fiscal Balance, national revenues
collected from the fisheries sector had to be redistributed as an Inter-governmental
Transfer Fund, namely the Revenue Sharing Fund (RSF) from the fishery sector. The
RSF was to be shared between the central and local governments, with 20% for the
central government (MMAF) and 80% for local governments, to be equally distributed
to all regencies and municipalities in Indonesia. Provincial governments were excluded
from this redistribution (GOI 2004, Siddik 2007).
This paper argues that the distribution formula stipulated by Article 14 d of Law
Number 33 of 2004 is no longer relevant in the new regulatory framework. National
fisheries revenues stem from fishing fees paid by Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels
(NRFV), which are operating in the national maritime jurisdiction, beyond 12 nautical
miles, and are registered with the central government (MMAF). These vessels mainly
exploit resources located beyond the local governments’ jurisdiction.
Also, referring to Law No.23 of 2014 concerning Local Governments,
municipalities/regencies no longer have authority and jurisdiction over small-scale
industrial fishing fleet (5-10 GT) management. These boats are now under the
management of provincial governments, which, most likely, have insufficient funds to
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manage extra boats. It is, therefore, necessary to amend the law, particularly regarding
the distribution formula, by including provincial governments in the redistribution of
fisheries based national revenues.
Lastly, the existing formula also does not promote equity. Based on the
aforementioned “equal” RSF distribution formula, landlocked municipalities/regencies
having no jurisdiction over fisheries resources, such as Depok, Cimahi, and Bekasi,
receive the same amount of funds as others located in coastal areas adjacent to
productive fishing grounds, such as Ambon, Bitung, Tual, and Pekalongan. Yet, equity
does not mean equality, it refers to the fair distribution of overall benefits and costs of
natural resources’ utilization among sub-groups of the total population (Field 2008).
Shaffer et al. (2004) define equality as a situation in which everyone has shoes, while
equity refers to a situation where everyone’s shoes fit. This paper argues that the equal
distribution of RSF to all municipalities and regencies all over Indonesia is not
equitable. Moreover, the growing number of municipalities/regencies (457 in 2018 and
511 in 2014) negatively affects the amounts of annual RSF redistribution.
Alternatively, regencies and municipalities could be still included in the sharing
mechanism with a smaller portion than the fund distributed to provinces. However, this
paper argues that it will complicate the sharing mechanism and will diminish the amount
of fund shared. First, it is important to notice that the more recipients of the sharing fund
will lessen the fund that will be distributed. Second, referring to the existing condition,
some of these municipalities/regencies did not allocate the distributed fund for the initial
purposes; fisheries resources conservation and fisheries development. This was
attributed to the small amount of fund distributed. Lastly, as previously explained, an
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equal sharing does not represent equity where the landlocked regions receive the same
amount of fund with the coastal regency/municipality.
Because natural resources are unequally scattered within a country, assigning a
proper distribution formula for national revenue collected from natural resources fees is
harder than stipulating a sharing formula for property-based taxes or personal income
tax. Even more so when it comes to the marine fisheries sector as the resource is located
beyond the authority of local governments (12-200 nm). This was the primary reason
underlying the equal sharing implementation. Another reason came from national
perception. As an archipelagic country, Indonesia perceives her seas as one entity
unifying the nation. Therefore, all economic benefits derived from her seas belong to
the nation as a whole and shall be enjoyed equally by the entire citizenry.
Several studies analyzing distribution of national revenues deriving from natural
resources rent favor a proportional distribution based on the derivation basis. This
means that producer regions shall receive a larger amount of funds than other regions
located further from the location of the resources. The derivation basis assumes that
producer regions suffer from the negative externalities generated by natural resource
extraction. Most of these studies in Indonesia focus on revenue distribution from other
types of natural resources such as mining and forestry (Alisjahbana 2005, Agustina et
al. 2012), and they rarely analyze the formula for intergovernmental distribution of
resource rent from the fisheries sector.
To determine which regions are impacted by offshore fisheries exploitation
(beyond 12 nautical miles), it is necessary to perceive the marine fisheries resources as
one interconnected ecosystem. Although offshore fishing exists beyond the jurisdiction
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of the local governments, it has economic, biological and social impacts on coastal
regions. The exploitation of targeted species offshore, to some extent, affects coastal
species and habitats. Ultimately it has biological impacts on artisanal and small-scale
coastal fisheries. In addition, offshore fishing also contributes to the local economy
growth of coastal regions by providing fishing bases (fishing ports, fish processing
units, and fishermen communities) for the large-scale industrial fishing vessels. In
summary, coastal regions adjacent to the exploited fishing grounds must be considered
as the ones impacted.
This paper argues that the derivation basis implemented in the fisheries sector
should refer to the exploitation level, or fishing intensity in each Fisheries Management
Area (FMA). The simplest way is by referring to the number of permitted vessels in
each FMA, particularly the number of Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV).
Consequently, the national revenue should be shared proportionally among each FMA,
based on the exploitation level represented by the number of NRFV in those FMAs
(Appendix 10). Subsequently, the fund distributed to each FMA will be distributed to
the constituent provinces located adjacent to them. At this advanced stage, the
proportional distribution is made based on the number of registered fishing boats (5-30
GT) managed by each province.
For instance, the fund attributed to FMA 712 (Java Sea) will be distributed
proportionally to 8 constituent provinces; Lampung, Jakarta, Banten, West Java, Central
Java, East Java, Central Kalimantan, and South Kalimantan. The proportional
distribution depends on the number of fishing boats between 5 and 30 GT managed by
the concerned provinces. Similar to the FMA 712, the fund attributed to FMA 718 (Aru
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Sea, Arafura Sea, and Eastern Timor Sea) will also be distributed proportionally based
on the number of managed vessels by Maluku, West Papua, and Papua provinces, the
three constituent provinces of FMA 718. Therefore, although the Arafura Sea is
predominantly exploited by vessels from Jakarta and other fishing bases in Java, the
adjacent provinces would be the ones receiving the biggest part of the national fisheries
revenues stemming from the fishing fees under a proportional allocation. This can be
considered as a compensation fee for the externalities suffered by the adjacent regions
of highly exploited fishing grounds.
With additional funds from the central government, it is expected that provinces
will abandon the rent-seeking race to increase their local income that was happening
when the three-level decentralization system was being implemented (Section VI.1). In
addition, it is also expected that proportional distribution can function as an incentive
for provincial governments to improve their fisheries statistics, particularly regarding
registered fishing boat data. In summary, the proportional distribution has the potential
to contribute to improving the Indonesian marine fisheries management. However, more
thorough and deeper study is required to assess the possible implementation of this
proposed formula, particularly in comparing monetary value with the existing one. This
paper limits itself to delivering the general idea.
On the other side, proponents of the authority revocation argue that eliminating
municipality/regency

authority

would

smooth

the

multi-level

governmental

coordination, while at the same time potentially minimizing the horizontal conflict
among their regencies. The lack of human resources of municipality/regency
governments is one reason put forward. Brodjonegoro and Asanuma (2000), also argued
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that decentralization in Indonesia should be implemented and limited to the provincial
level, not the municipal/regency level, for reasons of institutional and human resources
capacity.
The existing (previous *ed) system is complicated. The
revocation simplifies the system.
(Anonymous, 44 years old, Sundanese, Deputy Director for
Fisheries Management in IEEZ, DGCF-MMAF)
Municipality/Regency infrastructures are not ready yet, and
the provinces manage the (fisheries *ed) resource better.
Regencies mostly focus on increasing their local income,
neglecting the quality of service.
(Anonymous., 41 years old, Javanese, Researcher at MMAF
Research Center)
It’s better to hand over the authority to the higher
administration. Provinces have the potential to minimize the
horizontal conflict among the regencies, particularly in regard
to the overlapped fishing grounds in 0-4 miles.
(Anonymous, 30 years old, Sundanese, Staff at Nizam
Zachman Oceanic Fishing Port, Jakarta)

The absence of municipal/regency interventions provides more liberty to
provincial governments in managing the fisheries. Moreover, not only does their
jurisdiction expand, but also their authority due to the inclusion of 5-10 GT boats.
Therefore, theoretically, provincial governments have sufficient power to minimize
potential horizontal conflicts among their regencies.
The revocation of municipality/regency jurisdiction automatically eliminates the
overlapped maritime jurisdiction in 0-4 nautical miles. Now all waters within 12 nm are
controlled by provincial governments. Thus, theoretically it becomes easier for them to
manage

fishing

allocations,

including

for

migrant

fishers

from

adjacent

municipalities/regencies Furthermore, since all fishing licensing procedures for smallscale industrial fishing boats (5-30 GT) are performed by them, provincial governments
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have full authority to set the number of fishing permits in their maritime jurisdiction.
This includes the number of fishing boats for each type of fishing gear. Therefore, it
also has the potential to minimize fishing gear conflicts. Concentrated public services
also tend to minimize ‘additional’ costs for the industry.
The revocation (of municipality/regency authority *ed)
eliminates the uncertainty in fisheries management. It has the
potential to reinforce more coordinated (fisheries *ed)
management.
(Anonymous, 43 years old, an international NGO, Marine
Stewardship Council-Indonesia)
I favor the integrated (fishing licensing *ed) services at the
provincial level.
(Anonymous, 55 years old, Balinese, Benoa (Bali)-based Tuna
Longline Fishing Company)

VI.3. Stakeholders Attitude on revoking municipality/regency authority
Similar to the analysis of increasing fishing fees, the investigation of
stakeholders’ attitudes about the revocation of municipal/regency authority also focuses
on three aspects: the agreement level, the acceptability level, and the support level
(Appendix 2 and 3). However, this investigation excludes the samples collected from
skippers and crews. Most of them are unwilling to answer questions that, in their
opinion, are beyond their knowledge and capacity. In fact, most of them have no idea
about the subject matter behind such questions.
This condition is attributed to the education level of skippers/crews, half of
which have only completed elementary school, while only 13% of them completed high
school. Moreover, they argue that revoking municipality/regency authority in governing
commercial fisheries in 0-4 nautical miles is a government internal problem that has
nothing to do with them.
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Also, as Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV), these skippers mostly
deal with the central government agency, particularly regarding their Fishing Permit
(FP) and other pertinent administrative matters, such as submitting fishing logbooks and
port clearance. In addition, they mostly assume the government to be a single entity and
not a multi-level administration, so the authority revocation of one level hardly has any
significant impact on their daily activities. Consequently, the attitude investigation on
the authority revocation was only conducted on 8 types of stakeholders.
The Kruskal-Wallis test for three questions investigating the authority
revocation rejects the null hypothesis. This means that at least one group of stakeholders
has a different mean value for their answers, and the collected samples are not from an
identical population (Table 16). Meanwhile, since collected samples are classified as
ordinal data, the central tendency of the stakeholders’ responses is measured by their
median (Table 17).
Table 16. The Kruskal-Wallis test for the collected samples related to the revocation of the
municipality/regency authority
Q4
Q5
Q6
Agreement Acceptability Support
Level
Level
Level
Chi-Square
16.279
20.715
15.156
df
Asymp. Sig.

7

7

7

0.023

0.004

0.034
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Table 17. The Median of the collected samples related to the revocation of the municipality/regency
authority
Q4
Q5
Q6
Agreement Level
Acceptability Level
Support Level
Stakeholders
∑ Resp.
∑ Resp.
∑ Resp.
Median
Median
Median
Central Govt.
86
3.0
86
3.0
86
3.0
Fishing Port

87

4.0

86

4.0

86

3.0

Provincial Govt.

42

3.0

42

3.0

41

3.0

Regency Govt.

17

2.0

17

2.0

17

2.0

Industry

37

3.0

37

4.0

37

3.0

Association

12

3.0

12

3.0

12

3.0

NGO

20

3.5

20

4.0

20

3.0

Academia
Research
Total

28

2.5

28

3.0

28

3.0

329

3.0

328

3.0

327

3.0

Crews

Notes:
Likert Score
1
2
3
4
5

Q4
Agreement Level
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree

Q5
Acceptability Level
Unacceptable
Slightly Unacceptable
Neutral
Slightly Acceptable
Acceptable

Q6
Support Level
Strongly Oppose
Somewhat Oppose
Neutral
Somewhat Favor
Strongly Favor

VI.4.1. Level of Agreement
For the level of agreement, five of eight groups of stakeholders have neutral
attitudes. Their median values are 3 on the 5-scale Likert type measurement. Those are
the central government (MMAF), the provincial government, the Commercial Fishing
Associations, the NGOs, and academia (Table 17). Predictably, stakeholders
representing municipal/regency governments, hypothetically the most negatively
affected stakeholder by Law No.23 of 2014, are the only group with a negative attitude
(score 2).
Interestingly, although hypothetically the most benefitted stakeholder,
provincial representatives also show a neutral attitude. Apparently, additional
jurisdiction and larger authority does not instantly lead to a strong positive attitude,
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probably because stakeholders are aware that additional tasks will not come with
additional supporting budget.

*Notes:
Y-axis
X-axis
Number
Bold line in bar

= Likert Scale (1 to 5)
= Types of Respondents
= Outliers (marked by respondent number)
= Median

Figure 21. Boxplot of the Agreement Level for the Authority Revocation

In addition to the central tendency of the attitudes of each type of stakeholders,
it is also necessary to notice the range of their responses as portrayed by the boxplot
(Figure 21). Except for the municipality/regency, each type of stakeholder has a
dispersed range of answers. The range of the responses collected from central
government representatives has similar width to the one collected from NGOs, with
values ranging between 2 and 5, slightly wider than those of fishing port representatives.
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In contrast, the answers collected from municipality/regency representatives
cover a shorter range, between 1 and 2. These values are categorized as the
representation of negative attitudes, or the disagreement about eliminating their
authority. Another group of stakeholders showing a negative attitude is Academia.
Meanwhile, the responses collected from provincial representatives have the
widest range covering the whole spectrum of the Likert-scale. This means that
provincial stakeholders have a divided and widely distributed attitudes in regard to their
agreement level on revoking municipal/regency authority.
Academia’s negative attitude is notable. They strongly disagree with revoking
the authority, arguing that, due to the jurisdictional area’s characteristics, provincial
governments will be overwhelmed. They believe provinces will not be able to cover it
optimally, particularly in regard to the governance of 5-10 GT fishing boats.
In contrast, the range of vessel owners’ responses indicates a positive attitude.
They believe accumulating authority at the provincial level is an effort to reduce
bureaucratic complexity. Although their vessels are registered nationally with the
central government institution (DGCF-MMAF), these vessels occasionally have to
moor in fishing ports previously managed by the municipality/regency. Dobo is an
example of fishing port managed by the regency. This port becomes a temporary fishing
base for squid jigging vessels from the Nizam Zachman Oceanic Fishing Port (NZOFP)
during their fishing operations in the Arafura Sea. Authority accumulation at the
provincial level will liberate the industry from dealing with the multi-level
administrations regarding their business activities.
Actually, we don’t have a problem with it (the authority
revocation *ed), but it seems that it will make things simpler
and more efficient
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(Anonymous, Balinese, Indonesia Tuna Longline Association
(Asosiasi Tuna Longline Indonesia/ATLI))
It (the authority revocation *ed) accelerates the (fishing *ed)
licensing process. The provinces have better human resources
than regencies
(Anonymous, 29 years old, Javanese, a Fishing Company
Manager)

In spite of slight differences in their central tendency, the responses collected
from the central government representatives (MMAF) have a similar range of
distribution as those of NGOs. Those agreeing to the revocation of municipality/regency
authority believe that it will smooth governmental coordination, accelerating both topdown dissemination and bottom-up feedback. On the other hand, similar to academia’s
argument, those who disagree are also unsure about the provincial governments’
capacity to cover additional jurisdiction and authority conferred on them.
In addition to the central tendency (the median) and the distribution of answers
portrayed by the boxplot, the composition of the responses is notable. The percentage
of positive attitudes from central government representatives is identical with those
from provincial representatives. Meanwhile, although also representing the central
government, fishing port officials have higher positive attitude (score 4 and 5)
percentages than their counterparts working in MMAF headquarters. This was prompted
by the direct impact experienced by those working in the field.
The revocation (of regency/municipality authority *ed) is
good. Now the regents and the mayors cannot disobey their
governor anymore. It eliminates the existence of ‘small kings’
in the regencies.
(Anonymous, 43 years old, Javanese, Head of Fishing Port
Deputy for Port Development, Nizam Zachman Oceanic
Fishing Port, Jakarta)
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Group

Group

1.

Stakeholders
Central Govt

2.
3.
Notes
Scale
1
2
3
4
5

Group

4.

Stakeholders
Regency Govt

7.

Stakeholders
Association

Fishing Port

5.

Crews/Skippers

8.

NGO

Provincial Govt

6.

Industry (Owners)

9.

Academia Research

Color

Color
Blue
Green
Grey
Purple
Yellow

Interpretation
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree

Figure 22. Sample Distribution of Agreement Level on the Authority Revocation

Meanwhile the sum of negative attitudes from municipality/regency
stakeholders, marked by score of 1 (disagree) and 2 (somewhat disagree), reached
76.5%, the highest among all stakeholders. The distribution of answers from provincial
representatives is interesting as well. Those having a positive attitude (agree and
somewhat agree) and those opposing it (disagree and somewhat disagree) are nearly
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equal with 40% and 43% respectively. As previously mentioned, provincial
representatives have a divided attitude on the revocation supposed to benefit them.
Figure 22 shows the balanced frequency of their responses underpinning the previous
statement derived from the boxplot (Figure 21).

VI.4.2. Level of Acceptability
The central tendency of stakeholders’ acceptability level is no different than the
central tendency of their agreement level. The median values are almost exactly the
same except for the industry and NGOs (Table 17). Along with fishing port
stakeholders, both the industry and NGOs indicate positive attitudes (score 4). Other
types of the stakeholders remain neutral (score 3). Meanwhile, the municipality/regency
remains the only type of stakeholder with a negative attitude regarding their level of
acceptability.
The neutral acceptability level most likely was caused by the minimum or no
impact that will be experienced by the concerned stakeholders. For instance, revocation
of municipal/regency authority does not add or eliminate existing jurisdiction or
authority to central governments.
Meanwhile, the positive attitude manifested by the (strong) acceptability is owed
to the belief that eliminating municipality/regency authority simplifies bureaucratic
procedures. As central government employees posted in the field, most fishing port
officials must coordinate with two levels of administration in their daily activities.
Therefore, the authority revocation of one administrative level leads to a reduction of
their tasks.
The authority revocation simplifies the bureaucracy, and it
accelerates the dissemination of regulations and policies.
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(Anonymous, 56 years old, Javanese, Head of harbor master in
Nizam Zachman Oceanic Fishing Port, Jakarta)

A similar situation occurs with the industry stakeholders, who trust that
simplified bureaucracy has a positive impact on commercial fishing businesses,
resulting in slightly positive attitudes in regard to their acceptability level.
It (the revocation of regency/municipality authority *ed)
makes the (fishing *ed) licensing process simpler, more
efficient.
(Anonymous, Balinese, a Benoa Port (Bali)-based fishing
company owner)

The ranges of responses from each type of stakeholders in regard to their
acceptability level (Figure 23) are also almost identical with their agreement level
(Figure 21). It is important to notice that the range of the answers from provincial
stakeholders previously covering the whole spectrum of the Likert-scale on their
agreement level is reduced. Here their values range between 3 and 5, indicating positive
attitudes.
In contrast, the range of responses from the municipality/regency stakeholders
widens. Their answers are not exclusively concentrated in the negative attitude spectrum
(score 1 and 2 on the 5-point scale of the Likert-type measurement) but widen slightly
to the neutral spectrum (score 3). This means that, regardless of their (strong)
disagreement, the attitude of municipality/regency stakeholders softens in regard to their
acceptability level. Arguably this is the result of the binding power of the authorizing
regulation. As the second highest regulation in Indonesia’s law hierarchy, it would
require a long effort to amend Law No.23 of 2014, and the amendment also would have
to be approved by the DPR, Indonesia’s legislative branch. Therefore, these
stakeholders might have limited options other than acceptance. However, the mean
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value of their attitudes remains in the negative zone (score 2) and can be considered
their true opinion regarding their acceptability level.

*Notes:
Y-axis
X-axis
Number
Bold line in bar

= Likert Scale (1 to 5)
= Types of Respondents
= Outliers (marked by respondent number)
= Median

Figure 23. Boxplot of the Acceptability Level for the Authority Revocation

Similar to their median value, the range of responses from vessel owners stays
in the positive range. It has exactly the same range of answers as NGOs. Meanwhile,
the distribution width of academia’s answers, previously in (strong) disagreement on
authority revocation, slightly reduces. None of their responses fall into the weakest
acceptability. Their softening attitude is presumably caused by the absence of impact
they will experience.
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Central government representatives, MMAF and fishing ports, have slightly
different ranges of distribution. The fishing port representatives have a narrower
distribution of responses, leaning more towards a positive attitude, than their
headquarters counterparts.

Group

Group

1.

Stakeholders
Central Govt

2.
3.
Notes
Scale
1
2
3
4
5

Group

4.

Stakeholders
Regency Govt

7.

Stakeholders
Association

Fishing Port

5.

Crews/Skippers

8.

NGO

Provincial Govt

6.

Industry (Owners)

9.

Academia Research

Color

Color
Blue
Green
Grey
Purple
Yellow

Interpretation
Unacceptable
Slightly Unacceptable
Neutral
Slightly Acceptable
Acceptable

Figure 24. Sample Distribution of the Acceptability Level on the Authority Revocation
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The sum of negative attitudes from municipality/regency representatives for
their acceptability level is lower than their agreement level, declining from 76 % to 70%
(Figure 24). The graphic portraying the composition of the answers illustrates the
softening negative attitudes of municipality/regency stakeholders.
Figure 24 also illustrates the divided attitudes of provincial representatives
towards acceptability. As with their agreement level, opposing attitudes have similar
values. This time, the positive attitudes (score 4 and 5) slightly outweigh the negative
ones by 45% compared to 43%. There is an approximate 5% increase of positive
attitudes, due to the slight reduction of the distribution range. The result also indicates
that provincial representatives have a balanced attitude regarding their level of
acceptability, the same as MMAF representatives, whose positive attitudes only
outweigh the negative ones by a very small margin: 42% against 38%. These divided
attitudes are due to opposing predictions about the future impact of this revocation,
which oscillate between increased coordination of multi-level administrations and
provincial governments (in) capability to address it.
Regardless their revoked authority, we still should involve the
municipality/regency. Otherwise, they will ‘clean their hands
up’, ignoring every program we make.
(Anonymous, 41 years old, Assistant Deputy Director for
fishing licensing services, MMAF)

VI.4.3. Level of Support
The central tendency of stakeholders’ level of support indicates almost identical
values. The median values from each type of stakeholder is uniformly neutral (score 3),
except for municipality/regency stakeholders (Table 17). Not surprisingly, as the most
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negatively affected stakeholders, municipality/regency representatives consistently
retain their negative attitudes.
The range of responses from each type of stakeholder becomes smaller
compared to the range of response from previously investigated attitudes (level of
agreement and level of acceptability), slightly accumulating in a specific area of the
Likert-scale spectrum (Figure 25). The attitudes of central government representatives
are still divided between the revocation supporters and those opposing it with their
respective arguments. Meanwhile, the fishing port officials remain in a positive attitude.
The workplace location apparently also affects their favorability in regard to specific
matters. Presumably this was resulted from perceived task reductions.
Provincial representatives’ divided attitude is also reflected in their level of
support. This time, the range of their answers is identical to that of their counterparts
from the MMAF headquarters and academia. The values cover both the negative attitude
(score 2) and the positive one (score 4).
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*Notes:
Y-axis
X-axis
Number
Bold line in bar

= Likert Scale (1 to 5)
= Types of Respondents
= Outliers (marked by respondent number)
= Median
Figure 25. Boxplot of the Support Level for the Authority Revocation
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In addition to the distribution of these answers, the supporting reasons are
noteworthy. Those with a positive attitude can be considered satisfied with the
additional jurisdiction and authorities (for the provincial representatives), or with the
small reduction of tasks (for the central government representatives including the
fishing port officials), while the negative attitude mostly stems from the awareness of
the challenges that provincial governments might face in order to handle their new
jurisdiction, and the added complexity. This includes a limited available budget for
workload increases. For instance, the East Kalimantan province previously managed
approximately 544 fishing vessels ranging between 10 GT and 30 GT, and now has to
manage 2,295 fishing boats, including 5-10 GT boats. Similarly, with fishing port
management, provincial governments now have to allocate a budget to insure smallscale fishing ports and landing sites operability which was previously managed and
funded by municipal/regency governments.
The sum of negative attitudes from municipality/regency stakeholders towards
support is lower than their agreement and acceptability level, at only 65% (Figure 25).
At the beginning, the municipality/regency representatives strongly disagree about the
revocation of their authority and jurisdiction. Their negative attitude softens at the
acceptability level and softens even more when it comes to their support, or resistance
level. This indicates that regardless of their strong initial rejection, the
municipality/regency representatives gradually soften their ‘resistance’.

Of course, I strongly disagree and cannot accept it. If
everything is handed over to the province, what are our jobs
then? But if it has already been decided, what can I do?
(Anonymous, 38 years old, Javanese, Pekalongan Regency,
Central Java)

123

Provincial representatives continue to show divided attitudes in regard to their
level of support, with identical 41% and 41% for negative and positive attitudes
respectively, reflecting once again the undecided attitude of the group, regardless of the
narrowing range of responses.
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Meanwhile, the sum of positive attitudes (score 4 and 5) from central
government representatives, including fishing port officials, slightly outweighs their
neutral attitudes. Despite an initial neutral position, central government stakeholders
eventually manifest a slight support for the revocation of the municipal/regency
authority. Also, those believing in the simplification of bureaucratic procedures
outnumber the pessimist group.
NGO and academia responses provide interesting findings. These two groups of
stakeholders, regarded as highly educated, have opposite responses in regard to the three
investigated aspects. The sum of the positive attitudes from NGOs always decisively
outnumbers the negative attitudes, indicating higher agreeability, acceptability, and
support of the revocation of municipal/regency authority. Academia, on the other hand,
leans toward the opposite direction. Regardless of the neutral tendency indicated by the
median measurement, academia’s negative attitudes are always higher than the positive
ones, yet with margins of differences smaller than those of NGOs, indicating a slight
disagreeability, less acceptability, and a slight resistance towards the revoked authority.
Presumably, they believe that small-scale coastal fisheries (5-10 GT) should be
managed by the local or the nearest administration.
In summary, municipality/regency representatives retain as the only stakeholder
conveying a negative attitude towards the revocation of their authority and maritime
jurisdiction. Interestingly, although regarded as the most benefitted stakeholder,
provincial representatives indicate diverse and balance responses, resulting in a neutral
attitude.
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The Pairwise test was conducted on median values of governmental
respondents; central government (Group 1) vs provincial government (Group 3), and
provincial government (Group 3) vs municipality/regency governments (Group 4). As
mentioned in Chapter III.6.2.4., this test aims to compare whether these groups of
stakeholders have a median that is different significantly.
The result indicates that there is no significant difference of median between the
central government and provincial governments, neither is between provincial and
regency/municipality for three investigated aspects on the authority revocation
(Appendix 9). This means that the attitudes of governmental representatives toward the
authority revocation are not significantly different.
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CHAPTER VII
POLICY ANALYSIS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT COMMISSION IN INDONESIA
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AREA (FMC-IFMA)

VII.1. Background
On January 2015, the president of the Republic of Indonesia issued Presidential
Regulation No.2 of 2015 concerning the Middle-Term National Development Plan. The
plan specifies the national guidelines for Indonesia’s development policy for the 20152019 period. One of the policies pertinent to the fisheries sector is the mandate to
develop the institutional framework and cooperation scheme for managing 11 Indonesia
Fisheries Management Areas (IFMAs). Furthermore, the plan also mandates that the
future regulation and institutional framework of marine fisheries management shall
directly involve all stakeholders in each IFMA for sharing the responsibility in
conserving and managing fisheries resources located across the administrative
jurisdiction.
Responding to the Presidential Regulation mentioned above, the Ministry of
Marine Affairs and Fisheries Republic of Indonesia (MMAF-RI) issued the Ministerial
Strategic Plan for the 2015-2019 period as enacted by Ministerial Decree
No.25/PERMEN-KP/2015. This decree assigns the policies and actions that shall be
taken by the MMAF-RI to execute the national development plan stipulated by the
president.

One of the highlighted actions mandated in the Strategic Plan is the

establishment and operationalization of the regional management institution in all
IFMAs.
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Following those regulations, the Directorate General of Capture Fisheries
(DGCF) as the agency (echelon 1) under the MMAF-RI that is responsible for marine
fisheries governance in Indonesia has been convening several national level meetings
since 2015. The purpose of these meetings is to finalize the establishment of the regional
marine fisheries institutions. The discussions involved representation from nearly all the
Indonesia marine fisheries stakeholders such as the representatives from the provincial
governments, industry representatives (Commercial Fishing Associations), the
Indonesian Navy, academicians, independent research centers, universities, and
environmental NGOs. Eventually, on June 22, 2017, the Fisheries Management
Commission in Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (FMC-IFMA) was established
based upon the Director General’s (DG)’s decree No.47/KEP-DJPT/2017. The decree
assigns the tasks and functions, and the membership apportionment of the FMC-IFMA.
As previously mentioned in Chapter I, this paper argues that the formation of
FMC-IFMA can be considered as an attempt to implement federalism in Indonesian
marine fisheries management. Referring to Juda (1993) and Bauer et al. (2018), the
designated geographical areas are initially located in the national jurisdiction; 12 to 200
nautical miles (nm). Meanwhile, the two level of administration are represented by the
central government (the national level) and the provincial governments (the subnational level).
In addition to the general research question discussed in each chapter-- the
impacts on the existing marine fisheries management in Indonesia-- two questions also
emerge from the establishment of this commission. First, does the FMC-IFMA meet the
objectives mandated in the middle-term national development plan (Presidential
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Regulation) and the Ministerial Strategic Plan? Second, to what extent will the
commission perform fisheries co-management?
This chapter assesses the establishment of the FMC-IFMA focusing on the legal
basis, the tasks and functions, and the apportionment of the commission’s membership.
Subsequently, this chapter also examines the characteristics of fisheries co-management
that most likely will be performed by FMC-IFMA based upon the typology proposed
by Sen and Nielsen (1996). To support the policy analysis, this chapter also portrays the
results from the investigation of the stakeholders’ attitudes concerning the establishment
of the FMC-IFMA. Finally, based on the results of the policy analysis, this chapter
proposes some recommendations for the FMC-IFMA.

VII.2. Brief Description of FMC-IFMA
The official name, as stated in the DG Decree No.47/KEP-DJPT/2017, is the
Fisheries Managers in the Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (IFMA). The decree
specifically establishes a Fisheries Management Commission (FMC) in each IFMA.
The commission (FMC-IFMA) consists of representatives from the central government
(MMAF-RI), representatives from each adjacent or constituent provinces, the
coordinator of the secretariat in each IFMA, the scientific panel coordinator, and the
consultative panel coordinator. The existence of this commission is regarded as the new
model for Indonesia and becomes the main feature from the newly established regional
fisheries management institution.
The decree established eleven commissions based upon the amount of FMA.
Similar to the US Regional Fishery Management Council (RFMC) system, each
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commission bears the name of their concerned management area. FMC-IFMA 718, for
example, will be responsible for IFMA 718 encompassing the Aru Sea, the Arafura Sea,
and the Eastern Timor Sea.
Initially, the commission will be established gradually starting from the FMCIFMA 718. Afterward, all commissions are expected to be fully operationalized in 2020
(Fig.27). However, the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Republic of Indonesia
demanded an acceleration on their establishment to meet the national development plan
enacted by the president; direct involvement of all stakeholders in each IFMA for
sharing responsibility in conserving and managing fisheries resources located across the
administrative jurisdictions

Figure 27. The Roadmap for the establishment of FMC
Source: National Meeting for the Initiation of FMC 2016
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Table 18 summarizes the jurisdictional areas and the constituent provinces in
each IFMA, complemented by their annual production and estimated Maximum
Sustainable Yield (MSY) in 2016 and 2017. The IFMA 712 encompassing the Java Sea
that has been the primary fishing ground in Indonesia for years becomes the largest
producer. Furthermore, along with IFMA 571 (Malacca Straits and the Andaman Sea),
the 712 is also the most exploited IFMA. Meanwhile, IFMA 713 covering Makassar
Strait, Gulf of Bone, Flores Sea, and the Bali Sea is the FMC having the largest number
of the constituent provinces (10 provinces). Conversely, the IFMA 571, 717 and 718
have the smallest members with only three constituent provinces each.
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Table 18. The Summary of the FMC-IFMA

Source: MMAF (2013), MMAF (2016), MMAF (2017)
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VII.3. Legal Basis
Although essentially the establishment of the FMC-IFMA was mandated by the
higher laws. Eventually, it is the DG’s decree No.47/KEP-DJPT/2017 that legally assign
the tasks, the functions, and the apportionment of commission’s membership. The
decree assigns the composition of fisheries managers in each IFMA supplemented by a
long list of names and/or positions for the scientific panel, the consultative panel, three
working groups, and the supporting team. The decree only assigns the tasks and the
functions of the commission in general, without specifying it in detail (Chapter VII.4).
According to Law No. 12 of 2011, the hierarchy of the Indonesia’s laws consists
of 7 tiers/levels. The 1945 Constitutional Law, as the fundamental law, is the highest
level (1st tier) of the laws. It is followed by the MPR (People Consultative Assembly)’s
Decree, the National Laws (Undang-undang), the (Central) Government Regulations,
and the Presidential Regulation respectively. Along with the Provincial Government
Regulations, the Ministerial Decree is in the lower level than the laws or statutes
mentioned previously; the 6th tier. Meanwhile the Regency/Municipality Regulation is
the lowest level, the 7th tier (Fig.28).
Although it regulates the general affairs such as education or public health, the
authority of the Local Government Regulations (the provincial and the
regency/municipality regulations) is limited by the administrative jurisdiction of the
concerned regions issuing the laws/regulations. Conversely, the authority of the
Ministerial decrees encompasses the national jurisdiction but is limited to specific
technical matter regulated by the concerned ministries. To address more specific and
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technical issues, most of the ministry also assigns some regulations based upon the
Director General (DG) Decree, the highest bureaucratic position under the minister.

Figure 28. Indonesia Law Hierarchy

Referring to this brief explanation of the Indonesia law hierarchy, this paper
argues that the establishment of FMC-IFMA has a weak legally binding power.
Consequently, this condition will affect the future performance of the concerned
institution.
Most of the personnel commissioned in the FMC-IFMA are provincial
government employees. On average, 57% of each FMC-IFMA is officials from the
provincial fisheries agencies (Chapter VII.5). The number is almost double the central
government (MMAF-RI) representatives (table 21). Similar to the composition of the
commission membership, the provincial agency officials also dominate the composition
of the three working groups in each FMC-IFMA.
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In the decentralized governmental system, the provincial government employees
are hired and paid using the annual fiscal budget of the concerned provinces. Moreover,
the officials are also commissioned based upon the provincial regulation or the
Governor’s decree. Therefore, it is likely that these officials tend to put their loyalty to
the regulations, or the assignment issued by their own offices. In contrast, the DG decree
as the more specific and technical regulation has much less legally binding power over
the officials working outside the concerned institution; the Directorate General of
Capture Fisheries (DGCF). Therefore, it is hard to expect that the representatives from
the constituent provinces will work optimally in the commission and its supporting
bodies such as the working groups.
Although it has been disputed by the official responsible for the establishment
of the commissions, this paper argues that the FMC-IFMA is the Indonesian version of
the US Regional Fishery Management Council (RFMC) system. Therefore, it is
necessary to take the lesson learned from the existence of the RFMC in regard to the
legal basis underlying its establishment.
The formation of the RFMC was mandated by the Magnusson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (generally known as the Magnusson-Stevens Act
(MSA)), the highest public law after the constitutional law in the US law hierarchy.
Certainly, it has very powerful legal base in binding the council’s elements. The
constituent states have no reason to refuse to participate in the council process. In fact,
most likely these states are delighted for the privilege conferred to them to participate
in managing the natural resources that intrinsically are located in the federal
government’s jurisdiction (3-200 nautical miles). Subsequently, a similar situation
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occurs in the other elements of the council; the industry and the other interests’
representatives. They are conferred, by strong legally binding power, the opportunity to
participate in conserving and managing the publicly-owned resources.
The DG decree also has a bright side. As a regulation stipulating the more
specific and technical matters, it has more flexibility than the higher laws. The Director
General has more liberty in amending or altering his/her own decree. As long as the
decree does not violate the higher statutes or regulations, and is officially reported to
the minister, an amendment of the DG’s decree may proceed.
In order to adjust to a situation in which the provincial governments
representatives dominate the commission (will also be discussed in Chapter VII.5), it is
necessary to strengthen the legally binding power of the regulation mandating the
formation of the FMC-IFMA. Not only is it for the effectiveness of commission’s
function but also for its sustainability. A weak legal binding power has a potency to
make the provincial representatives to disregard the tasks assigned to them. As a result,
this potential situation affects negatively the futures performance of the newly
established institution.
In regard to strengthening the legal base, this paper partially supports Muawanah
et al’s (2017) recommendation for a gradual reinforcement; from the issuance of the
ministerial decree to the inclusion of the FMC-IFMA into the proposed national
fisheries law amendment. However, this paper argues that reinforcement of the legal
base should be executed as soon as possible without waiting until the commission runs
smoothly. Without a stronger legally binding power, these newly established
commissions will most likely not be able to be operationalized. Indonesia fisheries
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stakeholders should have taken faster actions in gaining the momentum. 2019, as the
political year in Indonesia (the presidential and the legislative elections), provides a
great opportunity for them to propose a national fisheries law amendment.
In the short term, it is necessary to upgrade the underlying legal base to a slightly
higher level of the Indonesia law hierarchy. A ministerial decree as a statute having
national jurisdiction concerning technical matters is sufficient to act as the legal base
for the formation of FMC-IFMA. Furthermore, a ministerial decree must also assign
more specific rules stipulating all aspects related to the commission, similar to what had
been stipulated by the MSA for the US RFMC system. These specific rules should
encompass detailed tasks and functions of the commissions (including the supporting
bodies; scientific panel, consultative panel, and working groups), source of funding for
operational costs, benchmarks for setting up fisheries management plans, and the
decision-making procedures An exemption may occur for the list of the assigned
members of the scientific panels, the consultative panel, and the three working groups.
Preferably, it is better to keep the list under the DG’s decree that will leave more space
for future adjustment
In summary, national fisheries law needs only to stipulate the principles and
framework. Meanwhile, the operational details will be regulated by the ministerial
decree and director general’s decree. The last one should only focus on the list of
commission’s members.
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VII.4. Tasks and Functions
The DG’s decree only states the tasks and the functions of the commission
generally and briefly as follows:
To coordinate the implementation and evaluation of
fisheries
management,
and
to
prepare
the
recommendations for fisheries management in Indonesia
Fisheries Management Area (IFMA) based on their
jurisdiction.

From the excerpt above, it can be assumed that the decree emphasizes the task
and function of the commission to be the implementation and evaluation of fisheries
management. Presumably, this is related to the newly authorized Fisheries Management
Plan (FMP) for each IFMA in recent years. Therefore, the development of FMPs is not
prioritized. The next assigned task is to prepare recommendations for fisheries
management. However, there is no further explanation regarding the definition and the
types of recommendations that must be prepared and be submitted to the minister.
In addition to the FMC-IFMA or the commission, there are three other bodies
that have their tasks and function assigned by the DG’s decree. Those are the Chair of
the Fisheries Managers of IFMA, the Secretariat, and the Supporting Team. Like the
commission, the DG’s decree does not specify the tasks and the functions of other
supporting bodies in each FMC-IFMA such as the scientific panel, the consultative
panel, and the working groups.
The Secretariat of the Fisheries Managers of IFMA is comprised of four
directors (Echelon II) and one deputy director from the DGCF. Their role is to
coordinate and to review the recommendations prepared by each FMC-IFMA. The
Director General of Capture Fisheries as the chair of the Fisheries Managers in IFMA
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is tasked to formulate these reviewed recommendations. Eventually, it is the minister of
Marine Affairs and Fisheries who has the authority to authorize the recommendations
for the Fisheries Management Plan (FMP) in each IFMA.
Finally, the tasks and functions of the supporting team are to assist the
implementation and evaluation of the fisheries management conducted by the FMCIFMA. There are eleven members of the supporting team, one for each FMC-IFMA.
Limited description of the task and function of the commission generates
vagueness and a wide-open space for interpretation. Regardless of its obscurity, this
paper classifies the tasks of the commission into two main parts. First, the commission
shall implement and evaluate the fisheries management in their jurisdiction. Second, the
commission shall prepare the policy recommendation draft for the FMP in their area.
An ambiguity emerges in regard to the first task of the commission due to the
opposing nature of implementation versus evaluation of fisheries management. It is hard
to imagine one institution can carry out, while at the same time evaluate the management
measures.
This ambiguity also generates several questions pertinent to the mandated task.
First, to what extent is the commission given authority to perform management?
Subsequently, what types of management measures can be carried out by the FMCIFMAs in their areas of jurisdiction? Is the commission given authority to enforce the
existing limited entry regime for the Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV),
such as providing services for the Fishing Permit (FP) extension? Or does the
commission merely act as the evaluator or the analyst reporting on the implementation
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of fisheries management based upon data provided by the working groups? Based on
field observations conducted during this study, the latter option tends to be true.
The second task, to prepare a draft policy recommendation, is also marked by
vagueness. The decree does not specify in detail the definition and type of
recommendation required. Does the draft exist in the form of the amended Fisheries
Management Plan (FMP)? Or it is just merely a recommendation concerning more
specific information such as the estimated Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) for a
certain species or group of species in the commission’s area of jurisdiction? If the
answer is the latter, then there will be an overlapping function between the FMC-IFMA
and the already existing national commission for the Stock Assessment (the
Komnaskajiskan), a recommending body for the minister responsible for the assessment
of the stocks as stipulated in Article 7 (4) of Law 45/2009 concerning the Fisheries
One thing is sure, the second task mandated for the commission is only the first
stage of the decision-making process. As previously described, the draft policy
recommendations prepared by the commission shall be reviewed by the Secretariat in
the central government comprised of four directors from the DGCF-MMAF.
Subsequently, the reviewed draft shall be formulated by the Director General of Capture
Fisheries as the Chair of the Fisheries Managers before being submitted to the minister
for approval. In summary, the decision-making process still features a long bureaucratic
mechanism and almost exclusively involves government representatives.
Drawing on the previous brief description, it can be assumed that the existence
of the FMC-IFMA initially is an attempt to perform a bottom-up approach where the
decision-making process is started from the lower level of administrations or regions.

140

Sen and Nielsen (1996) classified this approach as the advisory or the informative in
their typology of co-management arrangements. However, it is also necessary to
consider the level of user participation in the decision-making process of the
commission. This process is almost fully dominated by the government representatives.
In light of this reality, it is hard to accept the classification (of co-management)
mentioned previously.
According to Jentoft (1989), the level of user involvement in the decisionmaking process is one of four factors affecting the legitimacy of the regulatory scheme.
In addition, full participation of affected individuals was one of eight principles for
successful cooperative common-pool resources (CPR) management (Ostrom 1990).
Lacking these two principles was the primary shortcoming of FMC-IFMA to classify it
as a scheme of fisheries co-management.
Although arguably it is too early to evaluate the performance of the commission,
this paper argues that the function of the FMC-IFMA has been restricted to mere policy
recommendation drafter. The commissions have very limited authority, or even have no
authority at all, in the decision-making process. In this case, with an exemption to the
maritime jurisdiction, the FMC-IFMA has a slightly similar function with the Atlantic
States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC). Here, the ASMFC drafts
recommendations regarding the conservation of marine living resources (including
anadromous fish) of the Atlantic seaboard located in state’ jurisdiction (0-3 miles) to
the governors and legislators of signatory states (ASMFC 2016).
Furthermore, other stakeholders’ engagement, particularly the non-government
representatives, has been marginalized (as only one person is included in the
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commission) (Chapter VII.5). Therefore, although it can be regarded as a bottom-up
approach in the co-management arrangement, this paper classifies the FMC-IFMA in
between the Type A (Instructive) and the Type B (Consultative) fisheries comanagement in the typology presented by Sen and Nielsen (1996).
Due to the highly limited representation of resource users, it is easily predicted
that a minimum exchange of information will occur at the commission. Regardless the
availability of data and information provided by the working groups in each FMCIFMA, the first-hand information from users is still regarded as the best available data
in developing the policy recommendations. The fishing gear conflict between the Big
Pelagic Purse Seine and the Tuna Longline, and the extensive use of Fish Aggregating
Devices (FADs) in IFMA 572 is an example of the first-hand information garnered from
the industry.
Alternatively, this problem can be resolved by convening a regional public
hearing. However, referring to field observations, commercial fishing associations have
already been regarded as the voice of the industry. Therefore, most likely the regional
public hearings will not be been convened anymore. Consequently, a minimum
exchange of information will still exist.
However, although it is very limited, the commissions still provide a small space
for consulting over or disseminating to users the decision that will be taken by the
government. In addition, the FMC-IFMA also has a potency to function as the
communicating forum for the provinces in resolving the potential horizontal conflicts
that may be caused by migrant fishers (Chapter VI.2). This is also the underlying reason
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for categorizing the FMC-IFMA as the combination of Type A and Type B of the
fisheries co-management typology.

VII.5. Membership Apportionment
In performing their tasks and functions, each FMC-IFMA is supported by one
secretariat team and two panels; the scientific and the consultative panel (Fig.29). The
Secretariat team is led by an executive coordinator coordinating three working groups
(WG); WG for data and information, WG for fisheries management and conservation,
and WG for control and compliance. Each WG comprises of the representatives from
the central government (MMAF-RI, mostly from DGCF) and the concerned provincial
governments (officials from the provincial fisheries agencies).

Figure 29. The Institutional Structure of the FMC-IFMA
Source: DGCF, 2017

Initially, the executive coordinator position in each FMC-IFMA will be held by
a professional having extensive experience in marine fisheries management. These
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professionals will be hired by the MMAF-RI for a specific period. However, eventually,
the decree assigns the head of the fishing port managed by MMAF-RI located in each
FMA as the executive coordinator.
Up to 2016, DGCF of the MMAF-RI managed 23 industrial-scale fishing ports.
These ports are classified into the Oceanic Class (Type A) and the Archipelagic Class
(Type B) fishing ports, the two highest categories in Indonesia’s fishing port
classification. Therefore, intrinsically the executive coordinator in each FMC-IFMA is
a central government representative.
As the coordinator of three WGs, the executive coordinator is also a member of
the commission. This is one of the reasons for commissioning the head of fishing ports,
mostly echelon II or echelon III in the hierarchy of Indonesia’s bureaucracy, as the
executive coordinator. S/he is expected to be able to smooth the coordination among the
working group members representing two different level of administrations and other
institutions.
Other reasons are attributed to budget availability and administrative problems.
So far, the DGCF only allocates relatively small budgets for the FMC-IFMA
operationalization. Basically, this budget has been distributed to the concerned fishing
ports and provincial fisheries agencies. However, in several cases, the misuse of budget
still occurs where either the fishing ports or the provincial agencies use this budget for
other purposes.
Small budget allocations are also attributed to the scale of priority in Indonesian
fisheries development. In recent years, most of the DGCF’s annual budget is allocated
to infrastructure projects, such as fishing port constructions, the development of the
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Management Information System (MIS), and of procurement fishing boats. This fund
is insufficient for the newly established commissions to run their functions, even to
convene meeting with designated commission members.
In regard to recruitment of professional candidates, the Indonesian bureaucratic
system is restricted to hire and to pay a non-government employee for a long-time
period. Eventually, these problems relate to insufficient budget and administrative
restrictions prevent professionals from filling executive coordinator positions. On the
other hand, there is a strong demand from the minister to accelerate FMC-IFMA
establishment.
The membership of each Working Group (WG) varies between 9 and 18
persons, depending on the type of WG and the number of constituent provinces. In total,
members of WGs in each FMC-IFMA range between 32 and 52 persons. Most WG
members representing the central government (MMAF-RI) are deputy directors from
the DGCF, which have job descriptions relevant to the task and function of the
concerned WGs. The deputy director for fishing vessels and the deputy director for
fishing gear, for example, are commissioned in the WG for data and information.
Meanwhile, the deputy director for commercial fishing licensing and fisherman affairs
is commissioned in the WG for Control and Compliance in each FMC-IFMA. Lastly,
the number of WG members representing provincial government is correlated to the
number of constituent provinces in each FMC-IFMA.
Table 19 summarizes the apportionment of FMC-IFMA membership. The
Scientific Panel comprises scientists and researchers from four types of institutions: the
MMAF-RI’s research center, universities, the EAFM learning center, and independent
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fishery experts. There is no specific formula specifying the number of representatives
from each research institution
Referring to the DG decree and interviews conducted during data collection,
these researchers were assigned in each FMC-IFMA based on their expertise. For
instance, the small pelagic species researchers from MMAF Research Center are posted
in FMA 712 (the Java Sea), while those having expertise on big pelagic species are
assigned in FMA 572 (the Indian Ocean of western Sumatra) and FMA 573 (the Indian
Ocean of southern Java). In addition, the scientific panel is also fulfilled by academia
from universities located adjacent to the concerned FMC-IFMA. For instance, two of
scientific panel member of FMC-IFMA 718 (the Arafura Sea, and the eastern Timor
Sea) are faculty members of Papua University.
Table 19. The Apportionment of the FMC-IFMA membership

The DG Decree No.47/KEP-DJPT/2017 directly appoints the Scientific Panel
members for each FMC-IFMA. The number varies between 3 and 15 persons. Some of
Indonesia’s leading fishery researchers are commissioned to be on more than one
scientific panel. A senior researcher from the MMAF-RI’s research center, for example,
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is commissioned on two scientific panels of the adjacent IFMAs simultaneously, the
572 and the 573. The decree also assigns a coordinator for each scientific panel that
automatically becomes a member of the commission. Interestingly, few researchers
interviewed have information on their appointment. In fact, it seems that they are
confused about their task on the commission.
The Consultative Panel comprising five types of representatives: the commercial
fishing association, the MMAF-RI representative (Non-DGCF), the head of local
communities/tribes, the fish processing association, and NGOs (Table 19). The decree
does not clearly set the number of representatives for each stakeholder type and the
required criteria to fulfill these positions. Yet the decree appoints a representative from
the commercial fishing association as the Consultative Panel coordinator. For the
purpose of the study, this paper assumes that each stakeholder type in the Consultative
Panel is represented by one person.
At the end of the field observation for this study, the Consultative Panel of each
FMC-IFMA still had not been filled. In fact, two important commercial fishing
associations, the Indonesia Purse Seine Association (HNPN) and the Indonesia Tuna
Association (ASTUIN), had little knowledge concerning the establishment of the FMCIFMA or the existence of the Consultative Panel and the possibility for them to
coordinate it.
Regardless of the existence of the Working Groups and the Panels, basically the
core of the FMC-IFMA is the commission (Fig. 29). The members of this commission
can be classified into 3 types; the permanent member, the representatives of supporting
bodies, and the representatives of the constituent provinces. The permanent member is
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the Secretary of the Directorate General of Capture Fisheries (the Deputy Director
General) that becomes a member of all FMC-IFMA. S/he is an echelon II official that
is considered as the 2nd person in command in the DGCF.

Figure 30. The Apportionment of the FMC-IFMA membership

The representatives of supporting bodies consist of the Executive Coordinator,
the Scientific Panel coordinator, and the Consultative Panel coordinator (the
representative from the commercial fishing association). Meanwhile, the constituent
provinces are represented by the head of marine affairs and the fisheries provincial
agency (Fig. 29). Since the head of the provincial agency is categorized as the first
echelon in the Indonesia bureaucracy hierarchy (higher than the Deputy Director
General; the echelon II), one of them is appointed as the coordinator in each FMCIFMA. Due to the characteristics of the archipelagic State where one province becomes
the constituent in two or more FMC-IFMA, a province may only coordinate one FMCIFMA.
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Referring to the apportionment described above, the number of commission
members in each IFMA varies between 7 and 15 persons (Table 20). Once again, the
number is correlated to the number of constituent provinces. A special composition
occurs in IFMA 712 covering the Java Sea where additional members representing the
central government are commissioned. Those are four Deputy Director Generals
representing other DGs (Agencies) under the MMAF-RI. Presumably, it is related to the
complexity of fisheries problems in the Java Sea, which has the largest marine fisheries
production and population of fishermen.
Table 20. The number of FMC-IFMA personnel
No.

1
2
3
4
5

Types

The
Commission
Scientific
Panel
Consultative
Panel
Working
Group
Supporting
Team
Total

571

572

573

711

712

713

714

715

716

717

718

Total

7

10

12

11

15

13

9

11

10

7

7

112

3

7

15

3

3

10

8

4

8

5

3

69

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

44

32

41

48

45

47

52

38

40

41

32

32

448

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

11

47

63

80

64

70

80

60

60

64

49

47

684

The DG decree also assigns eleven DGCF staff as the supporting team. Each
person is commissioned specifically in one FMC-IFMA. Their role, as previously
described, is to assist with implementation and evaluation of fisheries management
conducted by the FMC-IFMA.
Due to his/her high workload, it is highly unlikely that the Deputy DG could
fully perform his tasks and function as the permanent member in each FMC-IFMA.
Therefore, this paper predicts that the supporting team members will be designees for
the Deputy DG charged with performing his daily tasks and function in the commission.
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Interestingly, 9 out of 11 members of the supporting team were previously sent to the
US to pursue a higher education degree. However, by summer 2018, some of them had
been posted or promoted in different positions in DGCF, not related with the FMCIFMA.

The Composition of Personnel in each FMC-IFMA
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Figure 31. Personnel Composition in each FMC-IFMA

On the subject of membership apportionment, this paper also investigates the
stakeholder composition in the commission. Following Okey (2003), this paper first
classifies the stakeholders representing different interests into four categories; the
central government, the provincial government, the industry (commercial fishing), and
other interests. Subsequently, the number from each category is calculated and
converted into a percentage. As predicted, stakeholders representing the provincial
government’s interests dominated the commission, ranging from 43% (FMA 571) to
69% (FMA 713). On average, the commission consists of 57% of members representing
the provincial governments (Table 21).
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Table 21. The Composition of FMC-IFMA members based on the Stakeholders Interests

Although it has been differentiated between the central and the provincial
government, essentially the commission is still highly dominated by government
representatives. There is only one person representing the non-government interests on
the commission; the commercial fishing association representative as the Consultative
Panel coordinator. Therefore, it is highly unlikely for the commission to meet one of the
requirements for performing fisheries co-management; equity.
According to Hanna (1996), equity is one of the outcomes for evaluating
fisheries-co-management performance. The extent that resources users and other
stakeholders are represented is one of the elements for measuring equity outcomes.
Unfortunately, although it can be considered as the simplest measurement, the FMCIFMA tentatively fails to meet this objective. Broader stakeholder participation has not
been accommodated yet, particularly those representing the industry and other interests
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In addition, it is also necessary to be alerted to the potential impacts caused by
the domination of a specific stakeholders’ interests in a co-management forum. First,
the failure to bring diverse points of view into the discussion and the decision-making
process (Eagle et al. 2003). Second, the resulting policies may only benefit the dominant
stakeholders (Dell’Apa et al. 2012).
During the field observations, several interesting findings and perspectives were
garnered from the short-interviews with industry representatives. Interestingly, several
government representatives interviewed during the study were less aware of these
collected findings. For instance, even some field officials in Nizam Zachman Oceanic
Fishing Port (NZOFP) and in the headquarters of MMAF were surprised when informed
about the dimensions and the price of Fish Aggregating Devices (FAD) used by Big
Pelagic Purse Seine based in the Jakarta fishing port.
Another example is attributed to the distinct point of view of the industry
concerning transshipment at sea. While most of the government officials consider the
transshipment prohibition as an effort to deter IUU fishing and to improve data
collection, the industry views this mechanism not only to overcome the increased
fishing operational costs but also for preserving the quality of fresh caught tuna.
Diverse perspectives are absolutely required to resolve the escalating problems
in Indonesian marine fisheries management. The potential social unrest ignited by the
increased fishing fee tariff and fishing gear conflict is one of the potential latent
problems. Other problems that may also evoke social unrest are the prohibition of
certain types of fishing gear, fishing access limitation, and horizontal territorial conflicts
ignited by migrant fishers. In addition, the downsized fishing vessels and poor data
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collection still continuously disrupt the evaluation of the marine fisheries utilization.
Eventually, it is also necessary to include the conservationists’ point of view regarding
future management measures that shall be taken for ensuring sustainability.
Unfortunately, due to very small representation from the other interests on the
commission, this paper argues that the existing condition of the FMC-IFMA will not be
able to contribute more in resolving the problems mentioned earlier. Without significant
alteration of the membership apportionment, it is likely that only minor or even
unimportant changes can result from the commission in the near future
However, it also necessary to notice that the addition of FMC-IFMA members
representing the industry must not decrease or eliminate the existing members,
particularly those representing constituent provinces. Strengthening the previous
finding (Chapter VII.3), an amendment and reinforcement of the existing legal base (the
DG decree) are absolutely required to make this new concept, the marine fisheries
federalism, works.

VII.6. The Stakeholders Attitude on the establishment of FMC-IFMA
The investigation of stakeholders’ attitudes regarding the establishment of the
Fisheries Management Commission in Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (FMCIFMA) was conducted on four aspects; the familiarity level, the support level, the
representativeness level, and the comparison level (Appendix 2 and 3). The first one
measures the extent of stakeholders’ knowledge of or familiarity with this newly
established regional institution. The second question investigates the support level, or
the resistance level from stakeholders concerning the formation of FMC-IFMA. The
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third question investigates the stakeholders’ attitudes towards the existing FMC-IFMA
membership apportionment. The last one investigates stakeholders’ attitudes comparing
the potential FMC-IFMA performance with the existing system.
Similar to the analysis of the revocation of the municipality/regency authority
(Chapter VI.3), the analysis in this chapter also excludes the skipper/crew
representatives. Unwillingness to answer due to their unfamiliarity with the context of
the questions asked and the respondents’ educational background are the underlying
reasons for the exclusion. This unwillingness is also attributed to the nature of issues
that, in their opinion, are beyond their knowledge and capacity. As described in Chapter
VI.3, this situation is related to the skippers’/crews’ educational level. Moreover, they
view this issue as the government’s internal problem that has no impact on their daily
activities. Consequently, similar to the Chapter VI.3., the investigation of the
stakeholders’ attitude on the establishment of FMC-IFMA was only conducted on 8
types of the stakeholders.
Like the previous two investigations, the Kruskal-Wallis test for four questions
investigating the FMC-IFMA establishment rejects the null hypothesis (Table 22). This
means that the collected samples are not from an identical population, and at least one
group of stakeholders has a different mean for their answers (Table 22). Meanwhile, as
ordinal data, the Central Tendency of the stakeholders’ responses is measured by their
median (Table 23).
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Table 22. The Kruskal-Wallis test for the collected samples on the FMC-IFMA establishment
Q7
Q8
Q9
Q10
Familiarity Support Representativeness Comparison
Level
Level
Level
Level
Chi41.366
46.556
29.057
40.947
Square
df
7
7
7
7
Asymp.
0.000
Sig.
a. Kruskal Wallis Test

0.000

0.000

0.000

b. Grouping Variable: Stakeholders
Table 23. The Median of the collected samples on the FMC-IFMA establishment
Q7
Q8
Q9
Q10
Familiarity Support Representativeness Comparison
Stakeholders
Level
Level
Level
Level
Central Govt.
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
Fishing Port

3.0

5.0

4.0

4.0

Provincial
Govt.
Regency
Govt.
Crews

3.0

5.0

4.0

4.0

2.0

4.0

4.0

4.0

Industry

2.0

3.0

3.0

3.0

Association

3.5

4.0

4.0

4.0

NGO

3.0

5.0

4.0

4.0

Academia
Research
Total

4.0

4.0

4.0

4.0

3.0

4.0

4.0

4.0

Notes:
Likert
Score
1
2
3
4
5

Q7
Familiarity Level

Q8
Support Level

Not at all Familiar
Slightly Familiar
Somewhat Familiar
Moderately Familiar
Extremely Familiar

Strongly Oppose
Somewhat Oppose
Neutral
Somewhat Favor
Strongly Favor

Q9
Representativeness
Level
Extremely Unlikely
Unlikely
Neutral
Likely
Extremely Likely

Q10
Comparison
Level
Much Worse
Somewhat Worse
About the Same
Somewhat Better
Much Better

VII.6.1. Level of Familiarity
For level of familiarity, five groups of stakeholders exhibited moderate positive
attitudes (Table 23). Their median values are larger than 3 (somewhat familiar) on the
5-point Likert type measurement. The exception occurs with the municipality/regency
and the industry (fishing vessel owners and fishing company representatives). Their
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median values indicate slight familiarity (or less) with the establishment of the FMCIFMA.
The results also indicate that information regarding the formation of the FMCIFMA has not been disseminated optimally, particularly to the industry (vessel owners).
This can be seen from the gap in the median value between the commercial fishing
associations and the fishing vessel owners they represent. Therefore, it can be assumed
that the associations invited to dissemination sessions did not spread the information
regarding the FMC-IFMA to their members.
Other types of stakeholders having a negative value (less than 3) on the
familiarity level are the municipality/regency representatives. Most likely this was
caused by their non-engagement in the FMC-IFMA. As previously explained (Chapter
VII.5), this regional fisheries institution only involves representatives from the
provincial level.
In addition to the Central Tendency measurement of stakeholders’ attitudes, the
boxplot portrays the distribution range of their collected responses (Figure 32). Similar
to the Central Tendency, 5 groups of stakeholders have the same distribution range. The
exception also occurs in the answers collected from the municipality/regency and the
industry representatives. Their collected responses range between 1 and 2 on the Likertscale, considered as negative attitudes in terms of their familiarity with establishment
of the FMC-IFMA.
Meanwhile, the dispersed responses from 5 types of stakeholders ranged
between 2 and 4 (Fig.32). This means that although their median values represent a
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positive attitude (score higher than 3), there are parts of these groups still having little
knowledge of the establishment of the FMC-IFMA.

*Notes:
Y-axis
X-axis
Number
Bold line in bar

= Likert Scale (1 to 5)
= Types of Respondents
= Outliers (marked by respondent number)
= Median

Figure 32. Boxplot of the Familiarity Level for the FMC-IFMA establishment

To support analysis of the central tendency (the median) and the range of the
collected answers, it is also necessary to observe the composition of the collected
responses from each type of stakeholder (Fig.33). This graph portrays the declining
trend of positive attitudes (score 4 and 5) collected from the government representatives.
Positive attitudes decline as distance from Jakarta increases. This situation supports the
previous statement concerning the flawed dissemination of information on the FMCIFMA.
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Group

Group

1.

Stakeholders
Central Govt

2.
3.
Notes
Scale
1
2
3
4
5

Group

4.

Stakeholders
Regency Govt

7.

Stakeholders
Association

Fishing Port

5.

Crews/Skippers

8.

NGO

Provincial Govt

6.

Industry (Owners)

9.

Academia Research

Color

Color
Blue
Green
Grey
Purple
Yellow

Interpretation
Not at all Familiar
Slightly Familiar
Somewhat Familiar
Moderately Familiar
Extremely Familiar

Figure 33. Sample Distribution of the Familiarity Level for the establishment of the FMC-IFMA

Figure 33 also shows the magnitude of negative responses from the two types of
stakeholders having the least knowledge of establishment of the FMC-IFMA. Here 82%
of the answers from municipality/regency representatives have negative attitudes
(scores 1 and 2). These values indicate no familiarity and slight familiarity with the
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FMC-IFMA. The industry representatives occupy second place with 79% [having
negative attitude].
Interestingly, half of the collected answers (50%) from the commercial fishing
associations represent positive attitudes (score 4 and 5). The value is more than twotimes of positive responses collected from the vessel owners that they are representing.
This indicates their moderate to extreme familiarity with the existence of FMC-IFMA.
Similar to the findings derived from the Central Tendency (Table 23) and the boxplot
(Fig.32), apparently dissemination of information stops at the association level. This
also indicates institutional failure of commercial fishing associations to communicate
with their members. Therefore, in the future, it will be necessary to directly invite vessel
owners to dissemination fora to inform them of new regulations or policies pertinent to
their business.

VII.6.2. Level of Support
Interestingly, regardless of their level of familiarity, the Central Tendency for
the level of support indicates positive attitudes (Table 23). Except for the industry
representatives, the median of answers from all stakeholders indicates a moderate to a
strong support (score 4 and 5) for the FMC-FMA formation. Strong support (score 5)
comes from the fishing ports, provincial governments, and NGO representatives.
Meanwhile, the central government along with the municipality/regency, commercial
fishing association, and academia representatives display moderate support (score 4).
The industry (vessel owners and fishing company representatives) is the only
stakeholder having a neutral attitude (score 3).
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Unlike level of familiarity, stakeholders’ level of support is more narrowly
concentrated on the Likert-scale spectrum (Fig.34). The central government, the fishing
ports, provincial governments, and the commercial fishing associations have identical
distribution ranges for their answers. However, both the fishing ports and the provincial
government representatives have higher ‘mean’ (score 5); represented by the bolder line.
These results are identical with their Central Tendency (Median).

*Notes:
Y-axis
X-axis
Number
Bold line in bar

= Likert Scale (1 to 5)
= Types of Respondents
= Outliers (marked by respondent number)
= Median

Figure 34. Boxplot of the Support Level for the establishment of the FMC-IFMA

The strong support from these 2 types of stakeholders is attributed to their direct
involvement in the FMC-IFMA. As described in the discussion of membership
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apportionment (Chapter VII.5), the provincial government representatives and the head
of the fishing port are the core members of the relevant commission. Most importantly,
the head of the fishing port acts as the executive coordinator in each FMC-IFMA.
The most concentrated distribution of answers occurs with the NGOs
representatives. This indicates the accumulation of strong support from NGOs regarding
the formation of the commission. Once again, this strengthens the previous result
derived from their median value. In contrast, the most dispersed answers occur with the
municipality/regency representatives. Their answers range from a neutral attitude (score
3) to a strong positive attitude, or strong support (score 5). Most likely this result was
correlated with their lower familiarity and their non-involvement in the commission.
The institution (FMC-IFMA *ed) endorses the more integrated
(Indonesia *ed) marine fisheries governance.
(Anonymous, 43 years old, International NGO)
Although rather complicated, the FMC-IFMA provides us the
opportunity to re-design the FKPPS (the communicating forum
*ed), and to ‘control’ the provinces.
(Anonymous, 44 years old, Sundanese, Deputy Director for
Fisheries Management in IEEZ, DGCF-MMAF)
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Group
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Provincial Govt
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Scale
Color
Color
Interpretation
1
Blue
Strongly Oppose
2
Green
Somewhat Oppose
3
Grey
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4
Purple
Somewhat Favor
5
Yellow
Strongly Favor
Figure 35. Sample Distribution of the Support Level for the FMC-IFMA establishment

The composition of the responses (Fig.35) strengthens two previous findings
derived from the median value and the distribution range analysis. Here NGOs have the
highest level of positive attitudes with 95%, consisting of 75% strong support (score 5)
and 20% moderate support (score 4). Surprisingly, the commercial fishing associations
have the second highest level of positive responses. However, moderate support (score
4) dominates (58%) over strong support (33%).

162

Meanwhile, as predicted, another high level of strong support is reflected in the
responses from the fishing ports and the provincial government representatives. Their
strong support percentages (Score 5) are 56% and 55% respectively. These values
outnumber the strong support responses from their counterparts working in the HQ of
MMAF. Once again, it is argued that this result is caused by their direct involvement in
the commission. In contrast, neutral responses dominate (62%) the answers from
industry representatives, indicating a significant difference from the associations
representing them.

VII.6.3. Level of Representativeness
This

section

investigates

the

stakeholders’

attitudes

regarding

the

representativeness of the FMC-IFMA membership apportionment. The question is
asking whether the membership apportionment has represented Indonesian marine
fisheries stakeholders. The Central Tendency (the median) values are almost identical
(Table 23). Once again, except for the industry (vessel owners) representatives, all
stakeholders have identical median value (score 4). This means that most of them
thought that the existing membership apportionment does indeed represent the marine
fisheries stakeholders in Indonesia.
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*Notes:
Y-axis
X-axis
Number
Bold line in bar

= Likert Scale (1 to 5)
= Types of Respondents
= Outliers (marked by respondent number)
= Median

Figure 36. Boxplot of the Likelihood Level for the FMC-IFMA membership apportionment

Although the boxplot shows a slightly wider distribution range, the ‘mean’ of
the answers reflects identical values (Fig.36). Except for the industry representatives,
the mean values from the stakeholders’ responses are 4 (the bold line located at the
center of each bar). Similar to the Central Tendency analysis, this means that most of
the stakeholders assume that the existing membership apportionment does represent
them.
The municipality/regency, industry, and academia have more concentrated
responses compared to the other types of stakeholders. However, their mean values (the
bold line) are different. Both the municipality/regency and academia have moderately
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positive attitudes on FMC-IFMA membership apportionment, leaving the industry as
the only stakeholder having a neutral attitude,

Group

Group

1.

Stakeholders
Central Govt

2.
3.
Notes
Scale
1
2
3
4
5

Group

4.

Stakeholders
Regency Govt

7.

Stakeholders
Association

Fishing Port

5.

Crews/Skippers

8.

NGO

Provincial Govt

6.

Industry (Owners)

9.

Academia Research

Color

Color
Blue
Green
Grey
Purple
Yellow

Interpretation
Extremely Unlikely
Unlikely
Neutral
Likely
Extremely Likely

Figure 37. Sample Distribution of the Likelihood Level for the FMC-IFMA membership
apportionment
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Similar to the results from the investigation of the level of support, the
composition of the responses (Fig.37) strengthens two previous findings derived from
the median value and the distribution range. This time the NGOs share their position as
the stakeholder having the highest positive attitudes (accumulation of score 4 and 5)
with the provincial governments. Their levels of positive attitudes are identical; 75%.
However, the highest composition for the strongest positive attitudes (score 5) are
collected from the fishing port representatives. Nearly half of them (47 %) assume that
the existing FMC-IFMA membership apportionment is extremely likely to represent the
Indonesian marine fisheries stakeholders. Not surprisingly, this value is followed by the
provincial government representatives. Most likely, both of them are satisfied enough
with the existing commission membership apportionment.
The smallest positive attitude is expressed by the industry representatives. A
neutral attitude dominates (57%) their responses. Two hypotheses emerge regarding this
result. First, the industry does not really care about the formation of the new regional
institution. As with the skippers and the crews, the vessel owners consider this issue as
an internal governmental affair. Thus, they selected the neutral choice on the Likertscale as a reflection of their ignorance, or their disinterest. Second, the industry actually
is not satisfied with the existing apportionment as they are only represented by one
person in each commission. However, as typical Indonesians, they keep their
disagreement silent. Referring to their gestures ‘recorded’ during the short interviews,
and with the addition from the author’s personal experience, apparently the first
possibility tends to be true.
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VII.6.4. Level of Comparison
This section investigates the stakeholders’ views comparing the future
performance of the FMC-IFMA with the previous system. The term ‘the previous
system’ refers to the status quo situation in which marine fisheries governance runs as
usual without the existence of the regional fisheries institution. Here, the most positive
attitude is represented by the belief that the existence of FMC-IFMA will create much
better marine fisheries governance. In contrast, an assessment of a much worse
condition constitutes the most negative attitude.
The median values of the responses from each stakeholder type are identical
with the previous investigation assessing the representativeness level of the FMC-IFMA
membership apportionment (Table 23). Except for the industry representatives having
a neutral attitude (score 3), the other types of stakeholders have identical median values
(score 4). This means that they believe FMC-IFMA will generate slightly better
conditions than the previous system. This also indicates an optimistic outlook for the
future performance of FMC-IFMA. In contrast, the consistency of the industry
representatives’ attitudes strengthens the previous argument concerning their disinterest
on the ‘government’s internal affair’ (Chapter VII.6.3).
Compared to the previous investigations, the distribution ranges of the responses
are narrower. The respondents’ answers are more concentrated in a specific portion of
the Likert-scale spectrum. In fact, the answers from the provincial governments and
academia representatives are accumulating in one point; the score of 4 (Fig.38).
Meanwhile, the responses from the central government, the fishing ports, and the NGOs
range between scores 4 and 5. All of them have an identical ‘mean’ value (score 4).
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Identical mean values also occur for the municipality/regency and the
commercial fishing associations. However, the distribution of their answers ranges
between 3 and 4, (the same as with the industry). A distinction occurs in the mean value
as the industry maintains a neutral attitude (score 3).
The repeating median value and distribution range from the industry
representatives provide stronger evidence to strengthen the previous argument;
essentially the industry (the vessel owners) have little or no attention focused on the
FMC-IFMA. In this case, the industry believes that the commission will have no impact
for Indonesian marine fisheries governance. For them, the situation will remain the
same. Most likely this result is attributable to the low level of effort by the DGCFMMAF to disseminate information concerning the formation of the FMC-IFMA.
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*Notes:
Y-axis
X-axis
Number
Bold line in bar

= Likert Scale (1 to 5)
= Types of Respondents
= Outliers (marked by respondent number)
= Median

Figure 38. Boxplot of the Comparison Level for the FMC-IFMA existence

In summary, all stakeholders except the industry indicate an optimistic attitude
concerning the potential performance of the FMC-IFMA. Five of them exhibit a sum of
positive attitude scores exceeding 80% of their responses (Fig.39). These are the central
government, the fishing ports, the provincial governments, the NGOs and academia.
Not surprisingly, these are the types of stakeholders represented in the commission
membership.
FMC-IFMA will improve data collection, provide better
monitoring system. Moreover, it will also function as the
‘watching’ forum where the provinces will keep an eye on each
other in regard to the fishing allocation.
(Anonymous, 41 years old, Sundanese, Assistant Deputy
Director for fishing licensing services, MMAF)
The commission (FMC-IFMA *ed) will make the provinces to
race in improving their data.
(Anonymous, 43 years old, Javanese, Head of Fishing Port
Deputy for Port Development, Nizam Zachman Oceanic
Fishing Port, Jakarta)

In contrast, among the governmental stakeholders, the municipality/regency has
the lowest positive attitude. Most likely this was caused by their exclusion from the
FMC-IFMA. However, the sum of their positive attitudes still greatly exceeds the
negative scores. The range is almost similar to composition of the answers from the
commercial fishing associations.
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Figure 39. Sample Distribution of the Comparison Level for the FMC-IFMA existence

Figure 39 also portrays the dominance of neutral responses from the industry
representatives; 59% of the total answers. This means that more than half of the industry
representatives believe that the situation will remain the same regardless of the existence
of the FMC-IFMA. Furthermore, this result, once again, strengthens the argument that
the industry is paying little or no attention to the establishment of the FMC-IFMA. As
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previously mentioned, this paper argues that this situation was caused by poor
dissemination of information to the industry that should have been performed by the
DGCF-MMAF.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

VIII.1. Conclusions
VIII.1.1. Increased Fishing Fee Tariff
The analysis of the policy impacts and the investigations of the stakeholders’
attitudes produced several interesting findings. First, as easily predicted, the escalated
fishing fee tariff generates a positive impact on the national revenues from the fisheries
sector. Not only does it increase the national revenue, it also successfully liberates
Indonesia from her dependency on (ex)-foreign fishing vessels and the more destructive
fishing gears that previously had been the primary contributors to the State income.
Interestingly, the number of registered fishing vessels also increases. This result
is in contrast to the classic hypothesis positing a negative correlation between an
increased fishing fee tariff and the number of registered fishing vessels; the fishery
bioeconomic model (Gordon 1954, Schaefer 1957). However, it is crucial to underscore
that this result is mostly caused by other circumstances and other policies enforced over
the same period of time: the increasing price of the landed catch and the enforcement of
re-registration of previously downsized vessels.
Another interesting finding related to the new fishing fee tariff authorization
occurs in the composition of the Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV).
Although experiencing the highest percentage increase in the fishing fee (741.33 767.49%), the number of registered Squid Jigging vessels increases; doubling in two
respective years (2016 and 2017). Once again, this result was also affected by other
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factors: the declining catch of the tuna longline fleet and the operational characteristics
of the relevant fishing gear.
In regard to the contribution of the fishing fee component of fishing operational
costs (FOC), this paper concludes that it represents a relatively small portion compared
to the primary variable cost-- fuel expenditures. The expenditure for the fishing fee
ranges between 3.1% and 9.2%. The percentage of total FOC represented by the fishing
fee component is highest for Big Pelagic Purse Seine (BPPS) targeting skipjack
(Katsuwonus sp) and operating in IFMA 571 and 572, ranging from 8.1% to 9.2%.
Although experiencing a smaller increase in the fishing fee compared to the
increase for squid jigging, tuna longline should be considered as the most negatively
affected fishing gear. As the type of fishing gear having the largest FOC, a four-fold
increase (437.4%) generates more impact than the one experienced by squid jigging.
This situation is worsened due to the doubling of the average FOC occurring between
2014 and 2018.
Predicted results also emerge from the investigation of the stakeholders’
attitudes. Among nine types stakeholders questioned, the respondents representing the
vessel owners and the skippers consistently convey their negative attitudes (Score 1 and
2 in the Likert-Scale) for three investigated aspects; the level of agreement, the level of
acceptability, and the level of support. The analysis also indicates the positive
correlation among the investigated attitudes. Those having strong positive attitude on
the level of agreement strongly accept and support the policy.
Three reasons underlying the positive attitudes towards the increased fishing fee
tariff are the positive impact on the national fisheries revenues, the time period for the
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old tariff stagnancy, and the awareness of preserving publicly-owned resources. In
addition, the proponents of the increased tariff also believe that the escalated fishing fee
still can be covered by the industry and is relatively small compared to the other variable
costs of a fishing operation.
The analysis also discovered weakening positive attitudes among government
representatives, correlated to an increasing distance from the center of administration;
Jakarta. Most likely it was caused by the reduced fiscal impact for the concerned
regions. In addition, the work location also slightly affects the attitude of the
government stakeholders. Regardless of their status as central government employees,
the fishing port officials interacting daily with the industry have more concern and
empathy concerning the increased fishing fee than their counterparts working in the
headquarters of the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF).

VIII.1.2. Municipality/Regency Authority Revocation
This paper summarizes six emerging problems which were considered as the
reasons for revoking the municipality/regency authority and maritime jurisdiction.
These encompass poor quality of data collection, weak law enforcement, rent-seeking
behavior, the horizontal conflict caused by migrant fishers, the long and complicated
bureaucracy, and economic inefficiency. Unfortunately, the last one, economic
inefficiency, still exists as the direct impact resulting from the authorization of the Law
No.23 of 2014. As fishing licensing services for the 5-10 GT boats are transferred to the
provincial governments, it generates additional costs both for the industry and the
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government, particularly in the less developed regions of the eastern part of Indonesia
where online services have not worked optimally
The transfer of authority also evokes another potential problem. The provinces
will be overwhelmed trying to manage their expanded maritime jurisdiction not to
mention the added fishing fleet. Generally, the potential number of managed fishing
boats (5-30 GT) is doubling. However, a much larger impact will be experienced by the
more populated provinces. For instance, the number of additional fishing boats in the
West Java province increases by 77 times over the previous fleet.
The third impact consists of job reassignments for the municipality/regency
officials previously dealing with fisheries management. To cope with this situation,
most of the municipality/regency fisheries agencies have been restructuring their
institution and re-posting their staff. While some provincial agencies have not yet
adjusted, many municipalities and regencies have discontinued their services to
fishermen. Consequently, this situation caused temporary confusion among the
neglected fishers in some regions.
The last direct impact is the irrelevancy of the distribution formula for national
fisheries revenues stipulated by Article 14 d of the Law No.33 of 2004. Referring to the
fishing ground locations of the charged fishing vessels and the revocation of the
municipality/regency maritime jurisdiction, the sharing revenues should have been
allocated only to two levels of administration; the central and the provincial
governments. Another aspect to this impact is the insufficient funding of the provincial
governments in managing the additional boats transferred from their municipalities and
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regencies. Further explanation regarding this issue, including a proposed proportional
distribution, will be discussed in the recommendation section (Chapter VIII.2).
Similar to the increased fishing fee tariff, the predicted results also occurred in
the investigation of the stakeholders’ attitudes towards the revocation of the
municipality/regency authority. As the most negatively affected stakeholder, the
municipality/regency representatives were the only group of respondents who
consistently conveyed their negative attitudes on the three aspects investigated. In
contrast, although regarded as the most benefited stakeholder, the provincial
representatives have a dispersed and divided attitude resulting in a neutral score (3) on
the Likert-Scale.
This paper argues that the negative attitudes conveyed by nearly half of the
provincial representatives were caused by their awareness concerning the job
reassignments, mostly without the extra budget support. In other words, half of the
provincial respondents expressed a pessimistic outlook: the provinces being
overwhelmed by their expanded authority and maritime jurisdiction.
In addition to the positive correlation between the three aspects examined, where
the median values were almost identical, the investigation also discovered the slightly
declining negative attitudes of the municipality/regency representatives. Regardless of
their strong disagreement and their strong unacceptability, eventually the
municipality/regency representatives’ attitudes were slightly softening in their level of
support, or resistance. Most likely this was caused by the binding power of the
authorizing regulation; the third highest rank in the Indonesia law hierarchy
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VIII.1.3. Establishment of the Fisheries Management Commission in Indonesian
Fisheries Management Area

Theoretically the FMC-IFMA has met three favorable conditions (Pinkerton
1989) for performing fisheries co-management. Despite its weak binding power, a longterm legally formalized arrangement exists in the form of the DG decree assigning the
task, the function, and the membership apportionment of the commission. The
appointment of academia and NGO representatives in the commission panels indicates
partial external support. Subsequently, the domination of the government
representatives both from the central and provincial administrations affirms the
existence of experienced bureaucrats as the third favorable condition.
However, it is also necessary to summarize several shortcomings of the FMCIFMA as currently implemented. First, direct fishermen engagement is highly limited.
Only one representative is incorporated into the core commission; the commercial
fishing association acting as the consultative panel coordinator. Unfortunately, as of the
end of data collection for this study, the consultative panel in each FMC-IFMA had not
yet been formed.
According to Jentoft (1989), the level of user involvement in the decisionmaking process is one of the factors affecting the legitimacy of a regulatory scheme. In
addition, it is also one of the principles for successful common-property resources
(CPR) management (Ostrom 1990). Moreover, the investigation of stakeholder attitudes
indicated an institutional failure where commercial fishing associations as official
representatives of vessel owners failed to disseminate the information to their members.
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Second, as previously mentioned, the legal base authorizing formation of the
commission is not strong enough to bind the commission members, particularly the
provincial officials dominating the core of the commission in each FMC-IFMA.
Third, the vague description of the task and function of the commission led to
wide-open interpretation. As a result, this paper presumes that the FMC-IFMA merely
acts as the evaluator or the analyst of the fisheries management performance in their
jurisdiction.
In addition, the task assigned to the commission is only the first stage of the
decision-making process. Therefore, tentatively the commission’s existence fails to
reduce the long and complicated bureaucratic process as one of the classical problems
in Indonesian marine fisheries governance. Consequently, it is hard to expect that in the
foreseeable future the commission will work effectively in resolving escalated fisheries
issues.
Referring to the commission’s job descriptions and the engagement level of the
involved stakeholders, particularly the industry representative, this paper classifies the
FMC-IFMA on a spectrum located in between the Type A (Instructive) and Type B
(Consultative) of Sen and Nielsen’s (1996) fisheries co-management typology. Thus,
the government representatives tend to dominate the co-management activities.
Therefore, although initially intended to feature a bottom-up approach, the commission
fails to meet the objective mandated by the Presidential Regulation concerning the
Middle-Term National Development Plan for the 2015-2019 period. The failure is
attributed to a lack of broad stakeholder participation, particularly by the industry.
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The study also found problems that impeded the operationalization of the
commission. In addition to the weak authorizing law, budget constraints also hamper
the commission’s performance. These insufficient operating budgets are attributed to
the priority placed on fisheries development focused on infrastructure projects such as
fishing port construction, the Management Information System (MIS) development, and
fishing boat procurement. Furthermore, the poor dissemination of information also
inhibits the operationalization of the commission’ panels.
Despite diverse familiarity levels, the establishment of the FMC-IFMA
essentially results in positive stakeholder attitudes. Except for the industry
representatives, all types of stakeholders indicated their positive attitudes at the support
level, the representative level, and the comparison level. On average, the stakeholders
exhibit moderate support (Score 4) for the FMC-IFMA formation. Subsequently, they
also indicate that the existing membership apportionment scheme represents them.
Finally, the responses indicate optimistic assessments of the potential future
performance of the FMC-IFMA. In this case, they believe that the FMC-IFMA has the
potential to improve the quality of data collection due to the involvement of the
provincial governments in the commission.
The industry representatives were the only stakeholder group conveying a
neutral attitude (score 3). Two hypotheses were developed from the repeating median
values and the distribution range of the responses from the industry representatives.
First, the industry is not really concerned with the FMC-IFMA formation. Second, they
are disappointed with the very limited representation in the apportionment of the
commission membership. Referring to their expressions garnered during the field data
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collection, this paper argues that the first hypothesis as the primary reason. Most likely
this resulted from the flawed dissemination of information performed by the DGCF as
the responsible agency for the FMC-IFMA operationalization.

VIII.2. Recommendations
Following the conclusions described above, this paper offers several
recommendations. These recommendations were developed by combining the results of
the policy analyses conducted. First, drawing from the positive trend of the national
fisheries revenues resulting from the increased fishing fee tariff and the expanded
authority and maritime jurisdiction of the provincial governments, this paper
recommends amending of the distribution formula for the Revenue Sharing Fund (RSF).
Particularly the formula assigning the sharing mechanism to the local governments;
article 14 d of Law No.33 of 2004.
The amended formula should apply the derivation basis leading to a proportional
distribution of the RSF. The exploitation level estimated from the number of permitted
Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV) in each Fisheries Management Area
(FMA) can be set as the benchmark for this proportional distribution. Subsequently, the
sharing fund allocated to each FMA should also be distributed proportionally to the
constituent provinces based on their registered managed fishing boats (10-30). This
proposed formula is expected to encourage the provinces to improve the commercial
fishing licensing data in their maritime jurisdiction.
This study also argues that the municipality/regency shall be excluded from the
proposed funding formula. The argument is made based on recognition of the source of
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the potential sharing fund, and the absence of municipality/regency authority and
maritime jurisdiction as a result of the recent reforms. More thorough and focused study
is required to assess the possibility of implementing the proposed formula, specifically
comparing the potential fiscal benefits with the existing formula.
Second, in regard to the weak binding power of the existing regulation
authorizing the FMC-IFMA formation, this paper recommends reinforcement of the
legal base. This action should be executed immediately. It is unnecessary to wait until
the existing commissions are fully operational. In the short term, the establishment and
the membership apportionment of the FMC-IFMA should be mandated by the
ministerial decree. Subsequently, it should also be incorporated into a potential
amendment of the national law concerning fisheries. The political year of 2019 provides
an appropriate moment for amending the law. Referring to the formation of the US
Regional Fishery Management Council (RFMC) system, a sturdy legal base is
absolutely required to make the regional institutions perform properly.
The last recommendation concerns the FMC-IFMA membership apportionment.
This paper recommends more diversified commission members, particularly by adding
more representatives from the industry. The highly restricted engagement from the
industry representative not only leads to a failure in bringing diverse points of view into
the discussion and the decision-making process (Eagle et al. 2003) but is also most
likely to benefit the dominant stakeholder (Dell’Apa et al. 2012). In this case, the
dominant point of view in FMC-IFMA discussions will be easily predictable. Contrary
to Eagle et al. (2003) and Dell’Apa et al. (2012), the discussion may only endorse
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government interests. The results garnered during the field observations, including
attendance at several national meetings, support these two arguments.
This paper proposes at least two commercial fishing associations should be
seated on each commission based on the type of dominant fishing gear operating in the
concerned area. Not only would this empower the resource users, but this
recommendation also has the potential to balance the point of view at the FMC-IFMA.
For instance, both the Indonesia Tuna Association (ASTUIN and ATLI) and the
Indonesia Purse Seine Association (HNPN) should be represented on the commission
in FMC-IFMA 571 and 572, where their members share the fishing grounds. The more
balanced and diverse points of view that can be brought into the discussion for resolving
potential conflicts, and to debate the future management measures, the better the entire
system will function. Indonesia should start to involve non-governmental stakeholders
in governing one of her natural resources, and the FMC-IFMA provides this
opportunity.
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Appendices

Appendix 1. Location of the Study
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Appendix 2. The Questionnaires (Bahasa Indonesia version)

Survey Persepsi Pemangku Kepentingan (Stakeholders)
Penjelasan Singkat
Tujuan dari survey ini adalah untuk mengidentifikasi persepsi para pemangku
kepentingan (stakeholders) terhadap pelaksanaan Federalisasi Pengelolaan Perikanan
Tangkap sebagai salah satu bentuk pengelolaan bersama (co-management) sumberdaya
ikan di Indonesia.
Survey ini terdiri dari pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang berkaitan dengan Sikap
(Attitude) yang akan diambil atau dipilih oleh para pemangku kepentingan
(stakeholders) terhadap dampak kebijakan yang dihasilkan dari pemberlakuan 3
regulasi baru yang ditetapkan pada periode 2014-2015.
Dampak kebijakan tersebut adalah:
1) Kenaikan Pungutan Perikanan (PPP dan PHP) yang sangat signifikan,
2) Penghapusan/pencabutan kewenangan pemerintah kabupaten/kota dalam
pengelolaan perikanan di wilayah perairan 0-4 mil laut, dan
3) Pembentukan Komisi Pengelolaan Perikanan (KPP) di masing-masing
Wilayah Pengelolaan Perikanan Negara Republik Indonesia (WPP-NRI).
Instruksi
Mohon untuk menjawab setiap pertanyaan di lembar kuisioner dengan memilih
(menconteng) salah satu kotak pilihan jawaban yang tersedia di bawah masing-masing
pertanyaan yang diajukan. Diperkirakan survey ini akan berlangsung selama 15-30
menit. Kami sangat mengapresiasi kesediaan dan kerjasama bapak/ibu sekalian atas
partisipasinya di kuisioner ini.
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Pertimbangan Etika
Kuisioner ini hanya diberikan kepada responden dewasa yang berusia lebih dari
18 tahun. Kuisioner ini Tidak membedakan responden berdasarkan jenis kelamin
(gender), kesukuan/ras/etnik, agama, status kehamilan, bahasa, tingkat pendidikan,
dan/atau status finansial. Sangat kecil kemungkinan bahwa setiap responden akan
mengalami gangguan fisik, psikologis, sosial, hukum, dan atau ekonomi sebagai
dampak dan akibat dari partisipasi di kuisioner ini.
Selama survey berlangsung, responden disarankan untuk memahami hak yang
diberikan kepadanya. Sangat disarankan agar setiap responden untuk mengajukan
pertanyaan lebih lanjut dan lebih mendalam terkait pelaksanaan penelitian ini.
Penelitian saya sangat menghargai keamanan dan kenyamanan (privacy) para
responden. Jawaban para responden di kuisioner ini bersifat rahasia (confidential).
Transkrip dari kuisioner ini akan dijaga sepenuhnya oleh saya selaku peneliti, dan hanya
saya selaku peneliti yang mempunyai akses terhadap transkrip data kuisioner ini.
Data yang dikumpulkan akan disimpan di dalam basis data (data base) di sebuah
folder khusus dengan kata sandi (password) rahasia yang hanya diketahui oleh saya
selaku peneliti. Folder tersebut akan disimpan di dalam hard drive and external hard
disk yang berada di Ruang 115 Coastal Institute, the University of Rhode Island (URI)
di negara bagian Rhode Island, Amerika Serikat.
Informasi Responden
Institusi
:
Nama
:
(Silahkan dipilih berdasarkan tabel klasifikasi di bawah ini)
No.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Jenis Pemangku Kepentingan
(Types of Stakeholder)
PNS di Kantor Pusat Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan
Republik Indonesia (KKP-RI), Jakarta
PNS KKP-RI yang ditugaskan di luar kantor pusat (Contoh:
Kepala dan atau pegawai pelabuhan perikanan UPT Pusat)
PNS dari Pemerintah Propinsi
PNS dari Pemerintah Kabupaten/Kota
Nakhoda dan atau ABK Kapal Ikan
Pemilik Kapal Perikanan dan atau perwakilan perusahaan
penangkapan ikan
Asosiasi Perikanan/Himpunan Nelayan/Kelompok Usaha
Bersama (KUB) Perikanan Tangkap
LSM
Akademisi
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Conteng (√)
kolom di
bawah ini

I.
1.

Pertanyaan-pertanyaan terkait dampak kebijakan nomor 1 (Kenaikan
Pungutan Perikanan (PPP/PHP) yang sangat signifikan) = 3 pertanyaan.
Peraturan Pemerintah (PP) Nomor 75 tahun 2015 tentang Jenis dan Tarif atas
Jenis Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak (PNBP) yang berlaku pada Kementerian
Kelautan dan Perikanan menyebabkan kenaikan Pungutan Perikanan (PPP dan
PHP) yang sangat signifikan.
Apakah anda setuju atas kenaikan tarif Pungutan Perikanan ini?
 (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Agreement)
 Tidak
 Sedikit
Setuju
Tidak
Setuju

 Antara
Setuju
dan
Tidak
Setuju

 Agak Setuju

 Setuju

Mengapa?

2.

Sejauh mana anda dapat menerima (akseptabilitas) kenaikan tarif pungutan
perikanan (PPP dan PHP) tersebut?
 (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Acceptability)
 Tidak
 Agak tidak
dapat
dapat
menerima
menerima
Mengapa?

3.

 Netral

 Agak
Menerima

 Dapat
menerima

Bagaimana sikap anda terhadap kenaikan pungutan perikanan (PPP dan
PHP)?


(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Support/Opposition)
 Sangat
 Agak
 Netral
 Agak
 Sangat
Menentang
Menentang
mendukung
mendukung
Kenaikan
Kenaikan
Kenaikan
Kenaikan
Pungutan
Pungutan
Pungutan
Pungutan
Perikanan
Perikanan
Perikanan
Perikanan
Mengapa?
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II.

1.

Pertanyaan-pertanyaan terkait dampak kebijakan nomor 2
(Penghapusan/pencabutan kewenangan pemerintah kabupaten/kota dalam
pengelolaan perikananan di wilayah perairan 0-4 mil laut) = 3
pertanyaan.
Undang-undang (UU) Nomor 23 tahun 2014 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah
telah memperluas kewenangan Pemerintah Propinsi dalam mengelola
perikanan tangkap (dari 4-12 nm menjadi 0-12 nm). Pada saat yang
bersamaan, Undang-undang ini juga mencabut/menghapus kewenangan
pemerintah kabupaten/kota di perairan 0-4 nm.
Apakah anda setuju terhadap pencabutan/penghapusan kewenangan
pemerintah kabupaten/kota dalam pengelolaan perikanan di wilayah perairan
0-4 nm seperti yang telah ditetapkan oleh UU tersebut?

(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
 Tidak
Setuju

Agreement)
 Sedikit
Tidak
Setuju

 Antara
Setuju
dan Tidak
Setuju

 Agak Setuju

 Setuju

Mengapa?

2.

Sejauh mana anda dapat menerima (akseptabilitas) pencabutan/penghapusan
kewenangan pemerintah kabupaten/kota dalam pengelolaan perikanan di
wilayah perairan 0-4 nm?

(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Acceptability)
 Tidak
 Agak
dapat
tidak
menerima
dapat
menerima
Mengapa?

3.

 Netral

 Agak
Menerima

 Dapat
diterima

Bagaimana sikap anda terhadap pencabutan/penghapusan kewenangan
pemerintah kabupaten/kota dalam pengelolaan perikanan di wilayah perairan
0-4 nm?


(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Support/Opposition)

 Sangat
Menentang

 Agak
Menentang

 Netral

Mengapa?
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 Agak
mendukung

 Sangat
mendukung

III.

1.

Pertanyaan-pertanyaan terkait dampak kebijakan nomor 3 (Pembentukan
Komisi Pengelolaan Perikananan (KPP) di masing-masing Wilayah
Pengelolaan Perikanan Negara Republik Indonesia (WPP-NRI)) = 4
pertanyaan.
Indonesia berdasarkan Kep Dirjen PT No.47/KEP-DJPT/2017 (Juni 2017)
telah mendirikan Komisi Pengelolaan Perikanan (KPP) di setiap Wilayah
Pengelolaan Perikanan Negara Republik Indonesia (WPP-NRI). KPP akan
melaksanakan dan mengevaluasi Pengelolaan Perikanan di masing-masing
WPP-NRI. Salah satu tugas yang dimandatkan ke KPP adalah penyiapan
bahan Rencana Pengelolaan Perikanan (RPP). KPP terdiri dari perwakilan
pemangku kepentingan (stakeholders) seperti tercantum pada tabel 1.
Pembentukan KPP dianggap sebagai salah satu upaya untuk meningkatkan
partisipasi para pemangku kepentingan (stakeholders) dalam mengelola
sumberdaya perikanan laut di wilayah perairan 12-200 nm.
Sejauh mana anda mengetahui tentang Komisi Pengelolaan Perikanan
(KPP)?

Tidak
tahu
sama
sekali

(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Familiarity)
Sedikit
Agak
Cukup
Sangat
Mengetahui
Mengetahui
Mengetahui
Mengetahui

Table 1. Komposisi Keanggotaan Komisi Pengelolaan Perikanan (KPP) di WPPNRI

2.

Bagaimana sikap anda terhadap pembentukan Komisi Pengelolaan Perikanan
(KPP) di WPP-NRI?


(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Support/Opposition
Sangat
Agak
Netral
Agak
Sangat
Menentang
Menentang
mendukung
mendukung
Mengapa?
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3.

Apakah komposisi Komisi Pengelolaan Perikanan (KPP) di WPP-NRI (lihat
tabel 1) sudah mewakili kepentingan beragam pemangku kepentingan
(stakeholders) perikanan tangkap Indonesia?


(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Likelihood)
 Sangat
 Tidak
 Netral
 Agak
 Sangat
Tidak
Mewakili
mewakili
Mewakili
Mewakili
Mengapa?

4.

Bagaimana keyakinan/kepercayaan saudara/i terkait pembentukan Komisi
Pengelolaan Perikanan (KPP) di WPP-NRI jika dibandingkan dengan sistem
yang ada saat ini?


(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Comparison of two
products)
 Lebih
 Agak Buruk
 Sama
 Sedikit
 Jauh lebih
Buruk
Saja
Lebih
Baik
Baik
Mengapa?
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 Data Demografi Responden:
1.
Usia:

2.

Jenis Kelamin:
 Pria

 Wanita

3.

Suku:

4.

Pendidikan Akhir:
 SD

 SMP

 S2

 S3

 SMA

 Biografi Peneliti
http://web.uri.edu/maf/highlight/fery-sutyawan/
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 D3/D4

 S1

Appendix 3. The Questionnaires (English version)

Stakeholders’ Perception Survey
Brief Description
The purpose of this survey is to investigate the stakeholders’ perception toward
the implementation of Federalism in Indonesia Marine Fisheries Governance as one
forms of fisheries co-management. The survey consists of questions related to
stakeholders’ attitudes toward the policy impacts generated by the enactment of 3 new
policies in the 2014-2015 period.
The policy impacts are:
1) The significant increase of fishing fee,
2) The elimination of Regency/Municipality's authority over fisheries management
in 0-4 nm, and
3) The establishment of Fisheries Management Commission (FMC) in each
Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (IFMA).
Instruction
Please answer the questions from the survey sheet by ticking off one of the boxes
below each question. The survey will take approximately 15-30 minutes to be
completed. Thank you very much in advance for your attention and kind cooperation.
Ethical Consideration
My research will not survey individuals under the age of 18. Participants will
not be excluded based on gender, race/ethnicity, religion, pregnancy status, language,
education, or financial status. It is highly unlikely that respondents will experience
physical, psychological, social, legal, or economic harm as a result of participating in
this research project.
During the survey, the respondents will be advised to ask questions for further
information about the process and nature of the survey.
My research shall respect the potential participant's right to privacy. Their
recorded responses to the questionnaires are confidential. The interview question
transcripts will remain at all times with the interviewer. Only the researchers will have
access to the data. The collected data will be entered into a database that will be kept
in a folder on a password protected hard drive or external hard disk that will be stored
in Room 115 of the Coastal Institute, the University of Rhode Island-USA.
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Respondent information
Name
:
Institution
:
(Please chose one of the stakeholders’ types)
No.
Types of Stakeholder
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

National Officers in HQ of MMAF-RI
National Officers outside the HQ
(Heads of Fishing Ports or Fishing Ports’ officer)
Provincial Fisheries Agencies Officer
Regency/Municipal Fisheries Agencies Officer
Fishing Vessel’ Skipper or Crew
Fishing Vessels’ Owner or Fishing Companies’
Representative
Fishermen Association
Environmental NGO
Academicians
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Choose (Thick
the Box below)

I. Questions related to the Policy Impact No.1 (The significant increase of fishing fee)
= 3 questions.
1. Government Regulation No.75 of 2015 concerning the Non-Tax State
Income (NTSI) from the Fishery Sector has increased significantly the
fishing fees charged to the Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (>30 GT)
that operating in IFMA (12-200 nm).
Do you agree about the increase of fishing fees generated by the
Government Regulation No.75 of 2015?


(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Agreement)

Disagree

2.

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

To what extent is your acceptability in regard to the increase of fishing fees
generated by the Government Regulation No.75 of 2015?


(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Acceptability)

Unaccept
able

3.

Somewhat
Disagree

Slightly
Unacceptab
le

Neutral

Slightly
Acceptable

Acceptable

What is your response in regard to the increased fishing fees?


(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Support/Opposition)

Strongly
Oppose

Somewhat
Oppose

Neutral
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Somewhat
Favor

Strongly
Favor

II. Questions related to the Policy Impact No.2 (The elimination of
regency/municipality’s authority over fisheries management in 0-4 nm) = 3 questions.
1. Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning the Local Governance expands the
authority of provincial governments in managing the commercial fisheries,
from 4-12 nautical miles (nm) to 0-12 nm, while, at the same time, it
eliminates the authority of the regency and municipal government in 0-4 nm
(GOI 2014). Do you agree about the elimination of Regency/Municipality’s
authority over commercial fisheries management in 0-4 nm as mandated by
the Law?


(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Agreement)

Disagree

2.

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

To what extent is your acceptability in regard to the elimination of
Regency/Municipality’s authority over fisheries management in 0-4 nm?


(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Acceptability)

Unaccept
able

3.

Somewhat
Disagree

Slightly
Unaccepta
ble

Neutral

Slightly
Acceptable

Acceptable

What is your response in regard to the elimination of Regency/Municipality’s
authority over fisheries management in 0-4 nm?


(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Support/Opposition)

Strongly
Oppose

Somewhat
Oppose

Neutral
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Somewhat
Favor

Strongly
Favor

III. Questions related to the Policy Impact No.3 (The establishment of the Fisheries
Management Commission (FMC) in each Indonesia Fisheries Management Area
(IFMA)) = 5 questions.
1.
Indonesia has just established (June 2017) the Fisheries Management
Commission (FMC) in each Indonesia Fisheries Management Area
(IFMA). These FMCs will be responsible for implementing and
evaluating marine fisheries management in each IFMA. One of the tasks
mandated to the commission is to prepare the material for developing the
Fisheries Management Plans (FMP). The commission consists of
stakeholders’ representatives (Table 1). The establishment of the
commission is considered as one of the efforts to encourage stakeholders’
participation in managing the Indonesia marine fisheries resources
located in 12-200 nm.
To what extent do you know about IFMC?


(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Familiarity)

Not at all
familiar

Slightly
familiar

Somewhat
familiar

Moderate
ly
Familiar

Extremely
Familiar

Table 1. The Apportionment of the Fisheries Management Commission (FMC) in
each IFMA

2.

What is your response in regard to the establishment of Fisheries
Management Commission (FMC) in each Indonesia Fisheries
Management Area (IFMA)?


Strongly
Oppose

(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Support/Opposition
Somewhat
Oppose

Neutral
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Somewhat
Favor

Strongly
Favor

3.

Does the existing composition of FMC-IFMA membership (Table 1)
represent the interests of various stakeholders of Indonesia marine
fisheries?


(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of
Likelihood)

 Extremely
unlikely

4.

 unlikely

 Neutral

 Likely

 Extremely
Likely

What is your belief in regard to the establishment of IFMC in each IFMA
compared with the existing system of marine fisheries governance?


(Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Comparison of
two products)

 Much Worse

 Somewhat
Worse

 About
the same
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 Somewhat
Better

 Much
Better


1.

Respondent’s Information:
Age:

2.

Sex:
 Male

3.

Ethnicity:

4.

Education:
 Elementa
ry School
 Master’s
Degree

 Female

 Junior
 High
High
School
School
 Doctorate’s Degree



Diploma

 Bachelor/
Undergrad

Researcher biography (http://web.uri.edu/maf/highlight/fery-sutyawan/)
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Appendix 4. List of Key Informants for In-Depth Interview
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Appendix 5. Fishing Fee Rate/Tariff Escalation
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Appendix 6. Descriptive Statistic Analyzing the Percentage (%) of Fishing Fee on
the Total Fishing Operational Costs
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Appendix 7. The Kruskal-Wallis Test Summary
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Appendix 8. Statistics of Registered Fishing Fleet by Province (2016)
Province
Total
Sumatera
Aceh
Sumatera Utara
Sumatera Barat
Riau
Kepulauan Riau

Fishing Boat Reange Size (in GT)
<5

5-10

10-20

115 814

35 988

9 790

20-30
6 481

30-50
805

50-100
2 008

100 -200
847

200-300
11

300-500
-

55 930

171 744

48 268

11 483

1 886

1 688

133

352

92

6

-

15 640

63 908

5 862

2 049

423

397

-

-

3

-

-

2 872

8 734

14 972

3 618

541

858

33

212

65

6

-

5 333

20 305
1 734

Sum > 5GT

Total

771

521

293

147

1

1

-

-

-

963

4 660

625

399

75

2

17

4

-

-

1 122

5 782

10 000

1 232

72

157

88

108

20

-

-

1 677

11 677

Jambi

2 275

224

9

-

-

-

-

-

-

233

2 508

Sumatera Selatan

1 320

1 101

7

1

8

8

-

-

-

1 125

2 445

Kepulauan Bangka Belitung

5 663

545

12

-

-

1

-

-

-

558

6 221

Bengkulu

580

100

35

25

1

5

-

-

-

166

746

Lampung

2 165

1 468

95

28

-

-

-

-

-

1 591

3 756

J a w a

7 110

8 694

3 743

2 059

419

1 276

527

3

-

16 721

23 831

992

2 149

1 061

827

3

20

2

-

-

4 062

5 054

-

42

29

11
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625

360

3

-

1 267

1 267

1 562

4 913

51

12

94

146

1

-

-

5 217

6 779

456

368

1 528

424

84

435

157

-

-

2 996

3 452

-

6

38

6

3

-

-

-

-

53

53

Jawa Timur

4 100

1 216

1 036

779

38

50

7

-

-

3 126

7 226

Bali - Nusatenggara

7 690

3 880

997

813

61

200

220

1

-

6 172

13 862

83

236

65

620

61

200

220

1

-

1 403

1 486

Nusa Tenggara Barat

3 140

1 031

319

21

-

-

-

-

-

1 371

4 511

Nusa Tenggara Timur

4 467

2 613

613

172

-

-

-

-

-

3 398

7 865

27 121

4 244

1 138

90

12

55

2

-

-

5 541

32 662

Kalimantan Barat

3 419

1 252

233

60

8

55

2

-

-

1 610

5 029

Kalimantan Tengah

1 769

234

101

6

-

-

-

-

-

341

2 110

Kalimantan Selatan

6 080

504

245

15

3

-

-

-

-

767

6 847

14 569

1 751

538

6

1

-

-

-

-

2 296

16 865

Banten
DKI Jakarta
Jawa Barat
Jawa Tengah
DI Yogyakarta

Bali

Kalimantan

Kalimantan Timur
Kalimantan Utara
Sulawesi
Sulawesi Utara

1 284

503

21

3

-

-

-

-

-

527

1 811

20 774

5 624

842

1 062

131

85

4

1

-

7 749

28 523
154

6

-

-

-

73

70

4

1

-

148

74

100

28

38

23

-

-

-

-

189

263

Sulawesi Tengah

1 070

294

69

28

-

-

-

-

-

391

1 461

Sulawesi Selatan

Gorontalo

10 143

3 892

439

282

-

1

-

-

-

4 614

14 757

Sulawesi Barat

3 917

536

47

26

-

-

-

-

-

609

4 526

Sulawesi Tenggara

5 564

802

259

688

35

14

-

-

-

1 798

7 362

Maluku - Papua

4 851

2 063

1 184

769

49

40

2

-

-

4 107

8 958

Maluku

4 077

1 239

517

312

6

2

2

-

-

2 078

6 155

561

511

370

328

23

1

-

-

-

1 233

1 794

-

58

51

34

17

11

-

-

-

171

171

213

255

246

95

3

26

-

-

-

625

838

Maluku Utara
Papua
Papua Barat
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.1)
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.2)
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.3)
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.4)
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.5)
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.6)
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.7)
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No. 8)
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.9)
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.10)
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